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PROLOGUE
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION REVISITED

By

WAYNE

N.

ASPINALL*

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, several members of
Congress, charged with legislative responsibility over the federal
lands, became convinced that a new study of these federal national resources was not only timely but was absolutely necessary.
The reasons for the study have best been set out in the law authorizing the establishment of the Public Land Law Review Commission.' In relevant part this law reads as follows:
Because the public land laws of the United States have developed over a long period of years through a series of Acts of Congress
which are not fully correlated with each other and because those

laws, or some of them, may be inadequate to meet the current and
future needs of the American people and because administration of
the public lands and the laws relating thereto has been divided
among several agencies of the Federal Government, it is necessary
to have a comprehensive review of those laws and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder and to determine whether and
to what extent revisions thereof are necessary.'

The Commission was organized in 1965. It consisted of six
members of the United States Senate,3 six members of the House
of Representatives,' and six public members appointed by the
* Former Chairman of the Public Land Law Review Commission, and Conference
Chairman; presently employed as a Natural Resources Consultant, Palisade, Colorado.
Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§
1391-1400 (1970)).
2 43 U.S.C. § 1392 (1970).
2 The senatorial appointees at the time the report was issued were Gordon Allott (R.,
Colo.), Clinton P. Anderson (D., N.M.), Alan Bible (D., Nev.), Paul J. Fannin (R., Ariz.),
Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and Len B. Jordon (R., Idaho).
' The appointees from the House of Representatives at the time the report was issued
were Walter S. Baring (D., Nev.), Laurence J. Burton (R., Utah), John H. Kyl (R., Iowa),
John P. Saylor (R., Pa.), Roy A. Taylor (D., N.C.), and Morris K. Udall (D., Ariz.).
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President.' A Chairman elected by the eighteen members of the
Commission was aided by eight official federal liaison members,
an Advisory Council of twenty-five nongovernment members,
fifty governors' representatives, and a staff of professional and
clerical personnel headed by a director, the late Milton A. Pearl.
The work of the Commission was completed in approximately six years. Its report, One Third of the Nation'sLand,6 was
delivered to the President and the Congress during the latter part
of June, 1970. The Commission's report contained 17 formal recommendations in the introductory summary, 137 specific recommendations in the body of the report, and numerous recommendations as backup suggestions to the specific recommendations.
As of April 1, 1977, some of the recommendations of the
Public Land Law Review Commission had been implemented by
Congress and approved by the President. Others, which did not
need legislative attention, had been implemented through the
administrative rulemaking authority of the various federal agencies.
During the early part of October, 1976, after consultation
between Professor John A. Carver and Dean Robert B. Yegge,
both of the University of Denver College of Law; H. Byron Mock,
former Vice President of the Commission; Charles Conklin, Assistant Director of the Commission; and Wayne N. Aspinall,
Chairman of the Commission, it was agreed to contact former
members of the Commission to determine whether a sufficient
number favored a Commission reunion in Denver during the early
part of 1977. The response was overwhelmingly in favor of such a
meeting. The College of Law, in conjunction with the Denver Law
Journal, agreed to sponsor the undertaking. Accordingly, the
Public Land Law Review Commission Revisited Conference was
set for April 1 and 2, 1977. All Commission members were invited.
Professor Carver arranged for the program speakers and the
subjects of their presentations. The purposes of the conference
were agreed upon as follows:
I The presidential appointees at the time the report was issued were H. Byron Mock,
Robert Emmett Clark, Maurice K. Goddard, Philip H. Hoff, Laurence S. Rockefeller, and
Nancy E. Smith.
* PuBLic

LAND LAW REvIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND

(1970).
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1. To review governmental actions and decisions made since the
filing of the Commission's report, and
2. To continue efforts to generate individual and collective interest
in the important public land law matters which had occupied the
Commission for six years.

More than 100 persons attended the conference. The program was strictly adhered to. The value of the meetings can be
attested to only by the individuals who were present. I for one,
however, consider the conference to have been one of the most
successful, pleasurable, and educational experiences of my life.

BLM ORGANIC ACT
FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

AcT

OF

1976:
FRUITION OR FRUSTRATION
By JOHN A. CARVER, JR.*
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976' was
enacted by the Congress on October 21, 1976. The law is drawn
largely from the work of the Public Land Law Review Commission, but also incorporates ideas that took form after the Commission's report was filed. Many outdated and archaic public land
laws were repealed. Although the General Mining Law of 1872
was not repealed, a new requirement that unpatented mining
claims be recorded in federal land offices, subject to forfeiture for
failure to do so, worked a considerable reform. New management
authorities were granted to the Secretary of the Interior, and a
degree of coordination in management between Interior and Agriculture was accomplished.
When the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC)
was created in 1964, 3 Congress in the same legislation passed a
public lands sales act' and the Classification and Multiple Use
Act,' both of which expired by their terms in 1970, six months
after the filing of the final report of the PLLRC. A new sales act
has now been enacted, but "classification" is now integrated into
land use planning procedures as specified in the new act.
Congress has strongly reasserted its authority concerning
whether public lands may be withdrawn from mineral develop* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Program, University of Denver
College of Law.
I BLM Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2773 (codified at 43 U.S.C.A. §§
1701-1782 and in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 48, 49 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1977)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act].
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
3 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970). For the legislative history of the creation of the
Commission, see H.R. REP. No. 1008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1964); S. REP. No. 1444,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3741.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1427 (1970).
Id. §§ 1411-1418.
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ment. A time limit has been imposed to minimize the segregative
effect of withdrawals authorized by the executive branch.
I.

APPLICABILITY, STATUTORY TERMINOLOGY, AND POLICY
PRONOUNCEMENTS

A.

Terminology

The 1976 Act defines "public lands," as "land and interest
in land owned by the United States within the several States and
administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau
of Land Management .
*..."6
This differs from the definition of
"public lands" in the act creating the Public Land Law Review
Commission, 7 principally by excluding the Outer Continental
Shelf and by not including lands administered by the U.S. Forest
Service or by other agencies, such as the National Park Service
or the Fish and Wildlife Service. This concept is also distinguished from the broader and separately defined term, "federal
land." 8 Governmental property interests include "interest[s] in
land" so that reserved minerals which are within the reach of the
Act will thus broaden the BLM's ultimate jurisdiction.
Many parts of the 1976 Act are concerned with land and
resource management activities of the Forest Service; the Secretary of Agriculture is subject to many of the same requirements
as the Secretary of the Interior.
Besides the redefinition of "public lands," the statute defines
''multiple use" and "sustained yield" in order to make these
management concepts applicable to the BLM.1
The foundation is laid for a change in the administration of
the Taylor Grazing Act 0 by defining "allotment management
plan" and "grazing permit and lease." The former is defined as
"a document prepared in consultation with the lessees or permittees involved, which applies to livestock operations on the public
lands, or on lands within National Forest . . . ."" The latter is
generically defined as including "any document authorizing use
of public lands or lands in National Forests ... for the purpose
of grazing domestic livestock."' 2
43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (West Supp. 1977).
43 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970).
Unfortunately, there is no statutory definition of "federal lands."
* 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1702(c), (h) (West Supp. 1977).
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-1 (1970).
43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1702(k) (West Supp. 1977).
7
I! Id. § 1 02(p).
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"Public involvement" is generally defined to include the entire spectrum of public and nonfederal participation in the decisional processes of the land use planning and implementation
processes mandated by the new law. 3
Although it does not define "management decisions" as a
new term, the 1976 Act clearly invokes new terminology by its
description of "management decisions" as a term covering any
order of the Secretary to implement land use plans developed or
revised under the new Act." Certain "management decisions"
and "action pursuant to a management decision" are subject to
reversal by legislative veto. 5
B.

CongressionalPolicy Pronouncements

Resolution of the continuing struggle between the executive
and legislative branches over the authority to withdraw land,
particularly from the effect of the General Mining Laws, is attempted by this inartful language: "The Congress declares that
it is the policy of the United States that-. . . Congress delineate
the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands without
legislative action . .."I'
". The new Act also increases the number
of types of withdrawals which are subject to congressional authorization or congressional veto.
Federal-state relationships are extensively treated. The Act
provides for a different state share formula in the proceeds of the
grazing programs," and greater leeway for the states in spending
the monies from grazing and mineral leasing." There is a policy
preference for helping impacted areas." The Act creates a state
role in carrying out some of the law enforcement functions on
public lands.2 1 It mandates the uniform application of state and
§ 1702(d).
Id. § 1712(e).

'= Id.
1,

Id. § 1712(e)( 2).
Id. § 1701(a)(4). In the absence of specific legislative pronouncement on the subject
of withdrawals, the President had been presumed to have such authority and the Supreme
Court upheld such an exercise of executive power. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
1143 U.S.C. § 315i (1970).
"
"

Id.

Id. §§ 1701(a)(11), 1712(c)(3), 1747(1).
Id. §§ 1733(c), (d).
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federal air, water, and noise pollution standards.2 Land use
plans, however, must also conform to local land use planning and
zoning "to the maximum
extent [the Secretary] finds consistent
' 22

with Federal law.

The new statute makes it clear that lands should be retained
in public ownership unless the needs of specific programs require
their sale or lease.2 Moreover, the disposition of public lands is
authorized only if it serves important public objectives.24 Such
public interests would include the expansion of communities, or
economic development which cannot be achieved
prudently or
25
feasibly without the acquisition of public land.
II.

LAND USE PLANNING, CLASSIFICATION, INVENTORY, AND
WITHDRAWALS

A.

Land Use Planning

Land use planning, as treated in the 1976 Act, may be characterized as a "process." Planning is separated into phases, requiring the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to use a systematic
and interdisciplinary approach in formulating land use decisions.2 1 The Act purports to integrate physical, social, and economic values in the decision process at the agency level. In addition to this provision, public involvement is encouraged, and
land use plans remain subject to revision even after the Secretary
has made a management decision. In applying this approach,
some factors are required to be considered, including: present
and potential uses, relative scarcity of the values involved, availability of alternative means and sites, and long-term benefits to
the public as weighed against short-term benefits.? On the
other hand, priority status is accorded to the designation and
protection of "areas of critical environmental concern.

' 28

Princi-

ples of multiple use and sustained yield are required to be applied .29
21Id. § 1712(c)(8).

Id. § 1712(c)(9).
Id. §§ 1701(a)(1), (10).
11Id. § 1713(a)(3).
2Id.
21 Id. § 1712(c)(2).
21 Id. §§ 1712(c)(5), (6), (7).
25 Id. § 1712(c)(3).
21 Id. § 1712(c)(1).
2
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In sum, the Act requires compliance with numerous procedural standards before any action may begin to implement the
land use plans. These requirements, such as coordination of plans
with those of other federal agencies, cooperation with state and
local governments, and public hearings, necessitate patience and
attention to detail in application of the Act.
B.

Classification

The 1976 Act's procedures for land use planning replace the
old concept of "classification" as it was first formally prescribed
in the Taylor Grazing Act, 30 and expanded in the Classification
and Multiple Use Act of 1964. 3' With the repeal of so many of the
disposition statutes, and with the enactment of a strong retention
policy, "classification" of land with respect to particular statutory disposition standards is no longer necessary. Instead, the
land use planning process must precede the "management decision" that a particular tract of land is not suitable for retention
in federal ownership, and therefore may be disposed of. All existing "classification" actions for the public lands are required to be
reviewed in accordance with the land use planning provisions of
the new Act.
The Recreation and Public Purposes Act3 2 is one disposition
act which is amended, not repealed.3 Communities can still gain
title to public lands under this act through a special
"classification" type process in which it must be shown that the
land to be disposed of is to be used for an established or definitely
proposed project.3 4 Moreover, if the contemplated disposal pertains to more than 640 acres, state land use planning and zoning
35
regulations must be considered.
C.

Inventory

The new law requires that the Secretary of the Interior prepare and maintain an inventory of all public lands and their
resource and other values, including outdoor recreation and sce43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-1 (1970).

§§ 1411-1418 (1970).
Id. § 869-873 (1970).
= 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 869-1, 871a (West Supp. 1977).
- Id. § 869-1.
3 Id. § 869(a).
3t Id.
32
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nic values.36 Associated with the inventory requirement is a provision that as funds and manpower are available, the Secretary
shall provide means of public identification of the boundaries of
the public lands, such as signs and maps, and shall make the
inventory available to state and local governments for the purpose of planning and regulating the uses of nonfederal lands in
proximity to the public lands. 7
D.

Withdrawals

The Act effectively repeals the President's implied authority
to withdraw public lands. This is accomplished by the policy
statement that Congress should exercise its constitutional authority to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate federal
lands for specified purposes and delineate the extent to which the
38
Executive may withdraw lands without legislative action.
The Act provides for land use decisions to proceed in an
orderly manner. Pending applications for withdrawals are required to be processed and adjudicated to conclusion within fifteen years. 39 Any existing application that has not been processed
in that period automatically expires.4 0
In a clear distinction between legislative and executive authority in land use planning, the Secretary has no conclusive,
only administrative, jurisdiction over any withdrawal authorized
by Congress. Neither can the Secretary make a withdrawal which
can only be made by Congress. He may not modify or revoke any
withdrawal creating a national monument, or modify or revoke
any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge System prior to the Act, or which thereafter adds lands to
the System. 4'
Among the eleven contiguous western states which closed
lands to appropriation under the Mining Law of 187242 or the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,11 presently authorized withdrawals
Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), 1711(a), 1712(c)(4).
Id. § 1712(c)(9).
Id. § 1701(a)(4).
" Id. § 1714(g).
'7

'°Id.

' Id. § 1714(j).
12

30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).

BLM ORGANIC ACT

1977

are required to be reviewed within fifteen years, except that such
review does not apply to withdrawals for Indian purposes, or for
the National Forest System, the National Park System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System, the National Wildlife Refuge System, or the National System of Trails." The reevaluation is not to be made for
lands already classified by Congress or the managing agency as
wilderness, primitive, natural areas, or recreation areas.45 Thus,
many withdrawals previously made under implied executive authority are now given recognized legal status.
III. MINING CLAIM RECORDATION AND MINERAL MANAGEMENT
In the new Act, Congress once again required implementation of the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970,"e and also
affirmed the policy favoring retention of mineral rights which
underlie land that has been disposed of for other than mineral
recovery purposes. 7 Congress also expressed a strong policy that
ingress and egress rights of mining locators be protected.
The most significant provision regarding mineral interests is
the mining claim recordation feature of the new law. Under this
procedure, the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining
claim must make certain filings with the BLM.49 Failure to file
as required is deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment
of the mining claim.50
IV. RANGE MANAGEMENT
Title IV of the new Act deals specifically with range management, but Title III, which contains the "organic" provisions for
the BLM, also extensively affects range and forage management.
Range management decisions must be in accordance with overall
land use plans."
The formulation of procedures pertaining to BLM and Forest
4443 U.S.C.A. § 1714(l)(1).
/d.
I'

, Id. § 1701(a)(12). The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91631, is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1977 Supp.).
'7 43 U.S.C.A. § 1719(a) (West Supp. 1977).
"

Id.

I[d. § 1744(a), (b).
50Id. § 1744(c).
"Id. § 1701(a)(8).
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Service grazing fees are required to be uniform. New statutory
procedures direct the two Secretaries to jointly determine "the
value of grazing on the lands under their jurisdiction" and then
establish a fee which is equitable to the United States and to the
users.52 The fee determination must give consideration to such
factors as the cost of production normally associated with western
53
livestock grazing.
The new law also unifies grazing administration practices
between the BLM and the Forest Service. Not only the fees, but
the length of the term of a permit must be the same, and permits
must contain the same conditions, including those respecting the
availability of the land for disposition, the requirement that permittees be paid for their improvements, and priority given to
existing permit holders to renew.5"
V.

RIGHTS-OF-WAY

Title V, the general rights-of-way title, applies both to the
BLM-administered public lands and to National Forest lands but
not to wilderness lands.5 5 It does modify the provisions made
for gas and oil pipelines in amendments to the Mineral Leasing
Act" enacted after the Alyeska pipeline decision. 5
A right-of-way definitionally includes easements, leases, permits, or licenses to occupy, use, or traverse public lands-over,
upon, under or through-granted for the purposes listed in Title
V of the Act. Grants of rights-of-way may be conditioned upon
full disclosure of the applicant's plans, contracts, and agreements; consideration of effects on competition; and furnishing of
information to disclose partnership and stock holdings and affiliation."
The management authority of the Secretary of the Interior
with respect to grant of rights-of-way across BLM lands in
connection with timber harvest is broadened by the new Act. It
S2

Id. § 1751(a).
Id.

Id. 88 1752(a)-(c).
Id. § 1761(a).
30 U.S.C. § 185(a)-(y) (1977 Supp.).
Pub. L. No. 93-153, which provided for the gas and oil pipeline amendments as set
forth in note 56 supra, was enacted on Nov. 16, 1973.
1 43 U.S.C.A. § 1761(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1977).

1977
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appears to be at least the equivalent of the authority now vested
in the Secretary of Agriculture.
Right-of-way corridors are favored, thus avoiding adverse
environmental impacts from the proliferation of rights-of-way.
Boundaries must be specified, the term of the grant can be limited as reasonably related to the contemplated use, and other
conditions can be imposed, including submission of construction
plans and agreement to permit inspection. " Mineral and vegetative materials within or without a right-of-way may be used or
disposed of only according to prior authorization. Fees are required to reflect fair market value, and must be paid annually in
advance. 6 ' Liability clauses may be inserted by the granting authority and bonds may be required.2 Provision is made for terminating rights-of-way after abandonment or for noncompliance
63
with conditions.
Public land already subject to rights-of-way, if conveyed pursuant to other land law provisions, must remain subject to the
existing right-of-way. 4 This would include retention of federal
control of the conditions of the right-of-way grant as circumstances might dictate.
Existing rights-of-way are nominally protected, but the Secretary, with the consent of the holder, may replace an existing
permit with one under the new title.
VI.

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION

The "organic" provisions of the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act which apply specifically to the Bureau of Land
Management make its director a Presidential appointee subject
to Senate confirmation." The Director is required to have both a
broad background and substantial experience in public land and
natural resource management. An associate and as many assistant directors as are necessary are authorized. The substantive
"organic" provisions for BLM are committed to the responsibility
1' Id. §§ 1764(a), (b), (d).
10Id. § 1764(f).
" Id. § 1764(g).
' Id. §§ 1764(h), (i).
u Id. § 1766.
e Id. § 1769.
6 Id. § 1731(a).
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of the Secretary of the Interior, who can delegate them to the
Director of the BLM .1 Withdrawals by public land orders under
secretarial authority must be made by a Presidential appointee
where appointment is subject to Senate confirmation.
The additional management authority granted to the Secretary with respect to BLM lands is extensive, and leads to an
integrated pattern of management. The Secretary of the Interior
may acquire lands by eminent domain in order to assure access
to the public lands." Lands acquired by the Secretary of the
Interior for access to public lands, and lands acquired by the
exchange authority for any public purpose assume the status of
public lands for management." Specific authority is granted to
insert terms, covenants, and conditions in conveyance instruments, but authority to waive compliance with land use plans is
withheld. 9
Under an important new authority, the secretary may make
loans to states and political subdivisions against anticipated mineral revenues up to fifty-five percent of the amount for any prospective ten-year period.70 The purpose of this provision is ostensibly to relieve social or economic impacts occasioned by mineral
development at a generous three percent interest rate.
A working capital fund is authorized to be available for management of the public lands without fiscal year limitation, for
general administrative purposes.7 Contracting authority, authority to conduct studies, to enter into cooperative agreements, rulemaking authority, authority to participate in search and rescue
operations, provisions for open meetings ("sunshine in government"), and similar administrative details are provided in the
legislation.7
Special provisions for aiding states are contained in the secu Id.
IId. § 1715(a).
6: Id. § 1715(c).
"
7

Id. § 1718.
Id. § 1747(1).

71 Id. § 1736.
11Id. §§ 1733(b) [contracting authority], 17 33(a) [authority to conduct studies],
1733(b) [cooperative agreements], 1740 [rulemaking authority], 1742 [authority to participate in search and rescue operations], 1739(e) [open meetings].
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tion authorizing the Secretary to convey unsurveyed islands determined to be public lands as well as areas erroneously or fraudulently omitted from the original surveys to states or their political subdivisions under the Recreation and Public Purposes Act,7"
without acreage limitation.
One vestige of the venerable public land principle of
"preemption," the favoring of those whose claimed rights to the
public lands arose out of the priority of their squatter status, is
retained in a provision7 5 detailing how the new Act should apply
to the Unintentional Trespass Act.7" The right of first refusal
granted to preference holders under that act to buy the lands at
fair market value is continued for a limited time period, and all
processing of claims under it must be completed within five years.
VII.

THE

PLLRC

RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE

1976 BLM

ORGANIC ACT

A.

A Program for the Future

The Commission's report77 contains an introductory chapter
entitled "A Program for the Future," which summarized the
Commission's basic concepts and its recommendations for longrange goals, objectives, and guidelines, respecting the public
lands and their management. The drafters of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 must have attempted to
articulate goals, objectives and guidelines which paralleled those
stated by the Commission. As Table 178 shows, virtually all of the
recommendations contained in the introductory summary are
treated in the congressional declarations of policy. Not all of
them, however, have been substantively enacted.
The congruence suggested by Table 1 is not emphasized in
the legislative history. The House, Senate and Conference Committee reports7 9 are virtually silent with respect to the recommendations of the Commission.
7' Id. §§ 1721(a), (b).
43 U.S.C. §§ 869 to 869-4 (1970).
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1722(a), (b) (West Supp. 1977).
43 U.S.C. § 1431-1435 (1970).
7 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the PLLRC REPorr].
Table 1 is reprinted in the Appendix.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 94-583, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 6175-6238.
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A few of the policies are stated in divergent terms, indicating
more than mere editorial revision. The Commission's approach to
land use planning contained in Recommendation F emphasizes
the responsibility of Congress to establish goals and objectives for
land use planing, "under the general principle that within a specific unit, consideration should be given to all possible uses and
the maximum number of compatible uses [should be] permitted." It also called for recognition that certain uses could be
treated as "dominant."
The 1976 Act, on the other hand, gives a great deal more
emphasis to the land use planning process. The Secretary of the
Interior has the duty to "consider" and "weigh" such matters as
present and potential uses, long-term versus short-term benefits,
and the relative scarcity of the values involved. The idea of a
"dominant use" is a lesser value than in past legislation. The 1976
Act does, however, give priority to the decision processes related
to areas of critical environmental concern.
In Recommendation Q the Commission made an attempt to
define the various "publics," including the Federal Government
itself as both sovereign and proprietor, whose interests should be
considered to assure the "maximum benefit for the general public." The 1976 Act does not adopt this concept, nor does it give
explicit recognition to the position of the Public Lands Commission that the public lands must serve regional and local needs,
including consideration to the dependence of regional and local,
social and economic growth.
B.

Planning Future Public Land Use

Chapter Three of One Third of the Nation's Land, 0 entitled
"Planning Future Public Land Use," begins the numbered recommendations of the Commission. Table 2"' outlines these recommendations and action of the Congress in the 1976 Act with
respect to each.
The Commission's treatment of "planning" is quite different
from that in the 1976 Act. The Commission's fundamental premise was that planning at national, regional, and local levels is
"

PLLRC

REPORT,

supra note 77, at 41.

' Table 2 is reprinted in the Appendix.
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intended only to provide a guide for future decisions; in the new
legislation, land use planning describes the decisionmaking process itself.
In earlier congressional consideration of the Commission's
recommendations, when the House of Representatives' Committee on Interior and Insular affairs was considering H.R. 7211 in
the ninety-second Congress, "land use planning" by the Federal
Government was included, as the Commission had recommended. Land use planning by states and local governments was
an entirely separate legislative proposal. As Committee Chairman Aspinall then said, the pending Public Land Policy Act"2
would have established guidelines for management of the onethird of the nation's land held by the Federal Government, while
the separately proposed Land Use Planning Act 3 would encourage land use planning for the remaining two-thirds. He also said,
however, that "it is a seamless web with which we deal."
Senators Allott and Jordan, members of the Public Land
Law Review Commission, expressed the thought that land use
planning for both federal and nonfederal lands should proceed
together.
The intransigence of the problem of treating land use planning by and for both the states and the Federal Government in
the same legislation probably contributed to the eventual defeat
of the effort to pass a National Land Use Policy and Planning
Assistance Act. Nonetheless, Senator Jackson's proposal, S. 268,
passed the Senate in the ninety-third Congress, but was not affirmatively acted upon in the House.
In H.R. 7211 (the Public Land Policy Act) land use planning
for federal lands was not a system for making decisions, but a
coordinating process. That bill would have left the agency much
more leeway in development of procedures and process, only requiring that whatever process was finally adopted had to be published as a departmental rule. It was a feature of H.R. 7211, as it
was with PLLRC, that policy was to be set forth in the statutes.
H.R. 7211, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
H.R. 4332, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
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Public Land Policy and the Environment84

C.

The congruence between the Commission's recommendations as to policy and that of the Congress in the 1976 Act was
close, as has been noted. Congrence in what the Commission said
and what came to be the law with respect to management of the
public lands in the environmental area is not as close in language,
but equally close in emphasis. Part of the credit for this is owed
to the courts. As the Commission noted, the National Environmental Policy Act 85 was already law when its report was issued,
but the series of cases specifically affecting public land administration were still in the future.
The 1976 Act incorporates one concept not included in the
Commission's recommendations, but found in the antecedent
proposals for national land use policy legislation already mentioned. "Areas of critical environmental concern" have no analogue in the Commission's recommendations, even though a general emphasis on protection of the environment is present
throughout the report.
The proposals in the ninety-second Congress for land use
legislation, concerning federal and private lands, were concerned
with environmental values. It is notable, however, that "areas of
critical environmental concern" were not discussed in H.R. 7211,
but only in the general land use planning legislation, S. 268. In
this, and in its predecessor, S. 632 in the ninety-first Congress,
these areas were definitionally on nonfederal lands.
The Commission's recommendation that Congress provide
for the creation and preservation of a natural area system was
accompanied with the further observation that educational institutions should be encouraged to assume administrative responsibility for such areas under permit or lease arrangements. This has
not been implemented. However, the 1976 Act authorizes the
BLM to designate lands as wilderness, subject to the conditions
specified in the Wilderness Act,'8 and two special areas, California Desert Conservation Area and King Range National Conservation Area, have been legitimated by legislative discussion.
Table 3 is reprinted in the Appendix.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1973).
16 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1970).
"

95
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Commission Recommendation 23, that Congress authorize
and require public land agencies to condition the granting of
rights or privileges on compliance with environmental control
measures governing operations of nonpublic lands closely related
to the right or privilege granted, and Recommendation 24, that
the public land environment be protected by imposing protective
covenants in disposals of public lands, and acquiring easements
on nonfederal lands adjacent to public lands, have been effectuated. In doing this, Congress went somewhat farther, and required the Secretary to insert in patents or other documents of
conveyance such terms, covenants, conditions, or reservations
that would be necessary to insure proper land use and protection
of the public interest. A conveyance subject to such terms, covenants, conditions, or reservations, may not exempt the grantee
from compliance with applicable federal or state law or state land
use plans.
The implications of post-conveyance federal controls over
land use are grave. When a patent no longer ends federal interest
in the property conveyed, the basis is established for a wholly new
and extensive federal supervision of conformance with the
"terms, covenants, conditions, and reservations" deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Interior to insure "proper" land use
and protection of the "public interest." This program will be at
least as demanding as the supervision of the retained public
lands.
D.

Timber Resources

Congress chose separate legislative vehicles for consideration
of some of the reforms it identified as being necessary in timber
management. As Table 487 shows, only Recommendation 36, recommending controls to assure that timber harvesting is conducted to minimize adverse environmental impacts, could be
considered to have been implemented by the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act. Nevertheless, the National Forest Management Act of 1976,18 enacted the same day as the 1976 Act, does
furnish considerable cross-reference material.
Table 4 is reprinted in the Appendix.
Pub. L. No. 94-588, codified in 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472a, 500, 515, 516, 518, 521b (West
Supp. 1977).
"
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Range Resources

The Commission's recommendations concerning changes in
the system of mangement of public lands range resources were
framed in terms of retention of the basic system of the Taylor
Act, 9 but with modifications to give statutory authority for allocation of forage for wildlife, to specify a market value standard
for grazing fees, and to make it somewhat easier for new entrants
(those not dependent by use or location) to be given grazing privileges. The Commission recommended a security of tenure policy,
but at the same time emphasized a statutory ten-year term for
permits, so that the recommendation for "security of tenure"
generally could be read as being limited to the right to receive
compensation for the unused term if the lands permitted should
be taken for other uses. This is hardly the "tenure" the users were
seeking.
The decision by the Department of the Interior not to appeal
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,90 spelled the
demise of the Taylor Act scheme of grazing administration; it is
not necessary to turn to the 1976 Act to find this result, but it
would have accomplished it anyway. Under the settlement terms
agreed to by the Interior Department and the plaintiffs, the essential features of grazing administration are to be delineated
district-by- district in environmental impact statements which
must pass judicial muster under the National Environmental
Policy Act.9 This is "law to apply" which gives the courts a
different standard than that in the Taylor Act."'
The entirely new provisions respecting grazing administration in the 1976 Act are consistent. Grazing administration must
follow the land use planning procedures, and although the new
statute does not state that new entrants may be awarded grazing
privileges, such is the fair implication of the provision that existing permit holders are entitled only to a preference to renew. Once
such preferences are satisfied, there would seem to be no dependency requirement for eligibility for grazing permits.
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 315o-1 (1970).
" 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1973).
2 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (West Supp. 1977).

BLM ORGANIC ACT

Table 593 shows that a high degree of congruence marks the
grazing subject matter, as between the Commission's actions and
those of the Congress.
4
F. Mineral Resources"

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 does
not purport to be amendatory of either the General Mining Law"
or the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,"6 although it tracks some of
the adjective recommendations of the Public Land Law Review
Commission. Of particular importance is the matter of greater
congressional control over the procedures governing the availability of public lands for mineral development.
The mining claim recordation approach was recommended
by the Commission but not in a numbered recommendation.
Certain Commission recommendations, such as the one that
Congress adopt a judicial rather than a legislative process to acquire outstanding claims, and that an experimental oil shale project be begun, have been accomplished without legislation.
The Commission identified the problem of whether geothermal steam is a reserved mineral, or water, within the reservation
clause of patents under the Stockraising Homestead Act. 7
G.

Water Resources"

The land-related water problems identified by the Commission have become exacerbated since the Commission's recommendations were filed, and they will not be quickly resolved. Two
Supreme Court cases have reinforced the implied reservation doctrine,"9 and at least one state, Colorado, is trying to integrate the
doctrine into its water adjudication procedures.
In Recommendation 58, the Commission expressed some
doubt as to whether the "watershed" purposes of the Forest Serv, Table 5 is reprinted in the Appendix.
" Table 6 is reprinted in the Appendix.
30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970).
43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970). For additional authority pertaining to geothermal energy,
see the Geothermal Steam Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1970).
" Table 7 is reprinted in the Appendix.
" Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
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ice Organic Act of 1897,110 the Weeks Act,10' or the Multiple Use
Act,'10 were broad enough to justify acquiring lands or retaining
them in federal ownership. The new Act's definition of multiple
use makes no change in the language in this respect, but the
retention and acquisition clauses of the new Act are clearly adequate to conform to the recommendation.
01 3
H. Fish and Wildlife Resources
Several court decisions, such as New Mexico State Game
Commission v. Udall ,104 emphasize the observation by the Commission that land use decisions affecting game habitat or populations on the public lands are within the Federal Government's
preemptive prerogatives under the Supremacy Clause. 10 5 The
cases do not resolve the position taken by the Commission that
the federal policy should emphasize conformance with state regulations in this traditionally state-dominated area.
The controversy was partially addressed by the 1976 Act.
The Act emphasized that wildlife values would be served by
range improvement investments, by specific provisions allowing
more flexibility in managing protected free roaming wild horses
and burros, and by state dominance of wildlife management.
Intensive Agriculture'0

I.

A key PLLRC recommendation was that the homestead and
desert land entry laws be repealed, and that public lands be made
available for agricultural development through sale procedures.
Although the existing entry laws have been repealed, it is doubtful that public land will be made available for agricultural development under the workings of the land use planning procedures
which must now be followed for disposition of lands. In the arid
Western states, where much of the water has been fully appropriated, a role for the state government with respect to development
of public lands is not provided in the new Act, and it is unlikely
16 U.S.C. §§ 475-482 (1970).
16 U.S.C. §§ 515-523 (1970).

"'
"

16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1970).
Table 8 is reprinted in the Appendix.
410 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1969).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Table 9 is reprinted in the Appendix.
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that one will develop. Certainly no federal legislation which recognizes the dominance of the state water rights system can now
be foreseen.
The Outer Continental Shelp 7

J.

Congress is currently considering revisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 08 Generally speaking, the recommendations on this subject are not covered in the 1976 Act, and OCS
lands are excluded from the definition of public lands in the new
Act.
K.

Outdoor Recreation'

The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission,
which was a model for PLLRC, made recommendations for the
creation of a Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and for the preparation of national and statewide recreation plans. The Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation continues with its assigned responsibilities;
a national recreation plan has been published; and statewide
recreation plans have been funded. Recreation, however, has been
displaced by an interest in a federal program for the environment,
and the urgency of federal action to furnish recreation opportunities on the public lands (and generally) has been considerably
tempered.
Many of the recommendations of the Commission respecting
outdoor recreation transcend recreation as such. The recommendation that the land managing agencies identify and protect
"unique areas of national significance on the public lands" has
been substantially adopted by the Congress. Both the statute and
Recommendation 79 give lip service to "statewide recreation
plans," although their efficacy now seems doubtful. The organic
authority of the Bureau of Land Management is inconsistent with
the recommendation that additional authority be granted to the
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Rationing of recreation use was
recognized as inevitable by the Commission in national park
areas, but the 1976 Act does not seem to contemplate either rationing or any similar concession-type administration of recreation facilities on BLM administered lands.
"0

'"

Table 10 is reprinted in the Appendix.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970).
Table 11 is reprinted in the Appendix.
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Occupancy Uses"0

L.

Congress has attempted to consolidate and clarify in a single
statute the myriad policies related to the occupancy purposes for
which public lands may be made available. It has not followed
the recommendation that this be use classification, but the land
use planning procedures achieve the same result.
In its report, the Commission expressed preference for disposal rather than leasing or permits. This approach appears to
have been rejected by Congress, but the policies respecting size,
tenure, and term are substantially adopted. The Congressional
action did not provide an entirely new statutory framework to
make public lands available for expansion of communities'and
development of new towns, but the substance of the Commission's recommendation has been achieved.
M.

Tax Immunity"'

The Federal Land Policy and Management Act was passed
without substantial credit being given to the antecedent work of
the Public Land Law Review Commission. When Public Law 94565 was passed, providing for payments to local governments
based upon the acreage of public lands within the jurisdiction,
the Committee Reports before the Congress relied heavily upon
the Commission's work to justify the legislation. It is noteworthy
that the bill was signed, although vigorously opposed by the
Administration during legislative consideration.
N.

Land Grants to States"'

The 1976 Act is not explicit on the point, but seems clearly
to contemplate that no additional land grants be made to states.
Its general provisions for review of classification and withdrawals
is broad enough to cover the recommendation that the Secretary
complete the process of state indemnity selections, although the
Act itself is silent on this. No action was taken to erase the limitations placed by the Federal Government on the use of grant lands,
or the funds derived from them, nor to expedite the codestral
survey program with respect to Alaska's selection of lands.
"

"'

Table 12 is reprinted in-the Appendix.
Table 13 is reprinted in the Appendix.
Table 14 is reprinted in the Appendix.
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0. Administrative Procedures"3
The American Bar Association and the Administrative Conference both joined the Public Land Law Review Commission in
recommending greater use of rulemaking and improved adjudicative procedures by the Department of the Interior. Many commentators have emphasized this recommendation. Beyond including judicial review in its policy pronouncements, Congress
has not expressly provided for judicial review of public land adjudications where it is not already available, nor has it directly
addressed the matter of rulemaking and adjudicative procedures
in the public land area.
Trespass and Disputed Title"4

P.

The Commission recommended adoption of a uniform federal trespass law, but the 1976 Act does not accomplish that
objective. Neither does it make the doctrine of adverse possession
available against the United States, although at least one court,
the Ninth Circuit, has approached this objective by determining
the conduct of the Federal Government could raise an estoppel
justifying a decree quieting title in an individual."'
Disposals, Acquisitions, and Exchanges"'

Q.

Chapter 18 of the Commission's report concerns general policies and principles, unrelated to the "commodity" orientation of
many of the chapters. Generally speaking, the recommendations
in this chapter were adopted by the Congress in the 1976 Act.
7
FederalLegislative Jurisdiction"

R.

Kleppe v. New Mexico"' had the effect of making jurisdiction under the Property Clause"' as broad as the legislative jurisdiction clause.'1" The 1976 Act did not address the problem, assuming one still remains after Kleppe.
Table 15 is reprinted in the Appendix.
Table 16 is reprinted in the Appendix.
"
United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
", Table 17 is reprinted in the Appendix.
" Table 18 is reprinted in the Appendix.
' 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
.' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
' Id. art. I, § 9.
"3
'
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Organization,Administration, and Budgeting Policy2'

The Forest Service his not been brought into the Interior
Department, nor has a Department of Natural Resources been
created. Paradoxically, the creation of a new Department of
Energy to which would be transferred many of the Interior Department's energy activities probably will lay the groundwork
for a restructured Natural Resources Department which might
include both the Forest Service and the civil functions of the
Corps of Engineers of the Department of the Army, but this is
only speculation.
However, the failure of consolidation has not prevented the
accomplishment of a considerable measure of the recommended
uniformity of management policy. This uniformity is due, in large
part, to the specificity of the standards that Congress has enacted. It is doubtful that greater emphasis on regional administration will occur, but the citizen advisory board recommendation of the Commission has been effectually adopted.
CONCLUSION

The underlying philosophy of the Public Land Law Review
Commission was congressional control of land management policy through legislation. The 1976 Act states the same goals, but
does not carry through. The land use planning procedures are
circumscribed by policy controls which are so general as to allow
administrative discretion fundamentally broader than that existing in the displaced preceding system.
The 1976 Act in many respects is comparable to the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969,122 which also specified procedure and process which came to have a substantive component
under judicial interpretation.
The courts, in their expanded review of agency action against
the inferred substantive standards of the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 have been able to find congressional warrant for
the frustration of projects and programs with long histories of
congressional support.
" Table 19 is reprinted in the Appendix.
,2242 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1977 Supp.).
123 Id.

1977

BLM ORGANIC ACT

409

Executive branch tension with the legislative branch over
control of traditionally congressionally-dominated public works
functions was not eased or altered in Congress' favor by the enactment of NEPA, nor will it be by the enactment of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976. In the former case, the
executive branch has been able to adjust its processes and procedures in such a fashion that ultimate judicial validation of an
executive decision carries with it an accompanying determination
that Congress has signed off.
The same thing may well happen with the new Act. In spite
of many provisions for congressional surveillance, the underlying
land use processes, when carried through in the executive branch
in a fashion to satisfy judicial scrutiny, will buttress executive
action which will be far more dominant in the future than it has
been even in the past.
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REVISITED-A POTPOURRI OF MEMORIES

By

CHARLES CONKLIN*

Although John Carver and I began talking about this conference nearly six months ago, only three days ago did I learn that I
was to be the "speaker to be announced" for this luncheon. To
be candid about it, Professor Carver and I had a conversation
about a speaker and it developed that I was not the first choice
of either one of us. First we started off on a rather lofty level: We
thought it would be appropriate to invite Mo Udall, now Chairman of the House Interior Committee and a former member of
the Public Land Law Review Commission; and, after it was
learned that Chairman Udall would be unable to attend, Secretary Andrus of the Interior Department was considered. When
neither of these prospects materialized, we discussed whether the
speaker should be one who could deliver a formal paper or one
who merely could entertain you. Although I am honored to be a
substitute for the others who were invited, I won't presume to
speculate on whether I was selected as an entertainer or as one
bearing a more substantive message.
Being a substitute is risky enough. One is reminded of a story
about another substitute. Back when Woodrow Wilson was Governor of New Jersey, he was asleep at three o'clock one morning
when his telephone rang. Upon answering, the Governor was
greeted by his former campaign manager from Hoboken, Manny
Baretta. Manny said, "Governor, I called to tell you that Judge
Joseph Milano has just died." Governor Wilson, with a substantial trace of irritation, said, "What do you want me to do about
it at three o'clock in the morning?" And Manny said, "I just
wanted you to know that he died and I would like to take his
place." The Governor was quick to respond, "Well, it's all right
with me if it's all right with the undertaker."
Other speakers at this conference will provide a review of the
reasons leading to the establishment of the Public Land Law
Review Commission in 1964. But let me go back a few more years,
when the Taylor Grazing Act' was about to be implemented, and
*

Staff Director, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of Represent-

atives.
1 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1970).
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use the words of Ferry Carpenter, the first director of the Grazing
Service, as he recalled those early days:
Well, I feel like the man from Mars. How did I ever get in here?
What have I been listening to this morning? What is this problem
that brings you here and furls your brow when you think about it? I
don't belong here, but 40 years ago to a day, I belonged very much
here in Grand Junction because that was the first meeting ever held
under the recently passed Taylor Grazing Act to see whether they
could put the show on the road or not.
I got my appointment on September 7 and on the 12th I was
here, with no instructions what to do, and this is what I found:
Grand Junction was packed with stockmen. The cattle boys had the
LaCourt Hotel and the woolgrowers had the LaHarpe Hotel, and
neither would speak to the other.
There were so many of them and the next morning when we
looked around for a hall, we couldn't begin to get them in any hall.
We adjourned and went out on the city park here and took over the
exhibition building. The cowboys sat on one side with Frank Delaney and the sheepherders on the other with Dan Hughes and Wilson
McCarthy and we got ready for business like a peace talk between
two nations that had been fighting-and they had been fighting and
I knew they had been fighting. What were they there to talk about?
Why did Congress wake up and say they should have to drag grass
into the conservation program? They put water in under the Reclamation Act; put trees under the Forest Act; put minerals and oils
under the Mineral Reserve Act. But not the grass. Everybody could
get the grass if you knew how to get it. All of a sudden they passed
the Taylor Grazing Act. The boys out here didn't know the Act
existed but they were there to see that they got their share of the
grass. There were two factions and they were ready to continue the
war they had been having for fifty years to fight over it. That's the
woolgrowers and the cowboys.
I didn't get any help from Washington on what to do. There
wasn't anybody in the whole Department that knew which end of
the cow got up first. I went to the Land Office. I said "You want me
to straighten out this land-give me a map of it." "Oh! We haven't
got any map. There is filing on it day and night all over 27 local land
offices, but we haven't got any map." "Well, how in the hell can I
find the land if I haven't got a map!" "That's for you." That was
for me. So, when I came here, I said I'm supposed to set up grazing
districts. I don't know whether you want them or not and I wouldn't
know where they go and Washington doesn't know where they would
go and nobody knows where they would go. But you fellows have
been fighting over this thing, you know every blessed acre there is
and the poorer the acre, the harder you fight for it. I found that out,
too. But I had one little piece of advice that I followed-and I am
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going to follow it until the end of my days-and it was a little saying
by Justice Cardozo on the Supreme Court. "When the task is to
clean house, it is sensible and usual to first consult with the inhabitants." There I was and there were the inhabitants-cowboys ready
to jump and sheepherders ready to jump-everybody at each other's
throat. But they were the inhabitants.
Well, they read a message from President Roosevelt. He said it
was a great day for the West. Read a message from Secretary Ickes;
he said he was the Lord's anointed! And now we got down to business and they began asking me questions about the Act, like how
near was near. I didn't know how near was near. I didn't know the
answer to them but I did know what to do with them. So, I said, all
and pick five men
right; you woolgrowers go out there and caucus
2
to speak for you. You cowboys do the same.

That was Ferry Carpenter's way of starting in to solve some
of the public lands problems that, despite continued efforts at
resolution, continue to exist. I don't believe there is a man in the
BLM yet who knows where all the public lands are.
Rolling time forward thirty-five years from those early grazing service days will permit a reflection on the PLLRC operation
of nearly ten years ago now. Most of you may recall the generalities of the Commission's operations. Only a few of us who are here
today, however, were active participants every step of the way.
Although, as Chairman Aspinall said in calling this conference to
order, the Commission operation generally was an open one, deliberative meetings at which the report evolved, chapter by chapter, were executive sessions. Not only was attendance limited to
Commission members and staff, but the Commission also made
a decision not to use the services of an official reporter. Consequently, there is no transcript. The staff took notes, and we did
have one microphone hooked up to a tape recorder to assist us in
interpreting difficult points.
There was humor occasionally at these executive sessions.
Mo Udall had a fortuitous way of livening up the meetings when
things appeared too grim. And there were some sad episodes, too.
My notes indicate the following exchange when the Commission
was developing its position with respect to Alaska:
I Remarks of Ferry Carpenter as recorded at a meeting of the National Advisory
Board Council of the Bureau of Land Management, Grand Junction, Colorado (Sept. 5,
1974).
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Vice-Chairman, Byron Mock: Can a state, particularly Alaska,
be trusted with the public interest?
Representative Roy A. Taylor: While Alaska has had to receive
more assistance than other states, oil discoveries on state lands will
help this problem.
Senator Clinton Anderson: The Federal role will be npticeable
and will be continued, but Alaska should not be treated different
from other states.
[And then my notes say: "this according to the Chairman; the
Senator could not be heard."] 3

Of course, Senator Anderson is now gone, but his mind had
remained ever active even though his illness often prevented him
from expressing himself clearly. And often we honestly couldn't
hear Clinton Anderson; so the Chairman, who sat next to him,
had to interpret, as my notes indicate. Two other members of the
Commission have died-Representatives Walter Baring and John
Saylor. We lost one member of our staff, Joe MacDonald, in a
tragic accident about six months before the Commission submitted its report; and, of course, Milton A. Pearl, staff director, died
within a few months after the Commission went out of existence.
Other things, however, were in a lighter vein. Let me refer
to my notes made the day we discussed multiple use. The Commission found that this term meant "all things to all people."
Nowhere was this more evident than when Vice-Chairman Byron
Mock opened up the discussion in February, 1970. The ViceChairman talked for what seemed over half an hour, but I remember the Chairman, in his usual meticulous way, saying that it was
twenty-eight minutes. My secretary did her best to transcribe
what could be recorded on tape from the one microphone placed
in the middle of a large room. I am not going to relate all twentyeight minutes of it, but this is the way some of Mr. Mock's
thoughts on multiple use came through:
Mr. Mock: Mr. Chairman, in order to get a hold on this problem, I have tried to understand what it's all about, and at this stage
I still haven't arrived there.
Representative Morris K. Udall: This is not like you.
Mr. Mock: No, it isn't. I've normally declared otherwise in the
Author's notes on meeting of the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC),
Washington, D.C. (May 10, 1969).
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same situation. In this particular case, though, I've heard so much
of this discussion and debate from all places that I've tried to do a
little analysis of my own. I have tried to figure out what the difference is between multiple use and dual use, and I finally came down
to the idea that multiple use is where you have more than one use
but not necessarily all conceivable uses. And then I got to worrying
about how you eliminate which use you exclude, and I think then I
began to come a little bit to grips with what the problem is.

And I am going to skip twenty paragraphs. Mr. Mock continues:
[And] now, as for that grazing thing, Mo, I can't help but think
that maybe the problem of having cattle out there is probably if they
get under foot, rather than anything else, because I don't see anybody objecting to aesthetics and scenery because it's just when you
get too close. But the limitation aspect probably becomes the most
critical as to whether it is a prohibition of a particular use, and there
is where we start to find that the withdrawal on other things would

start to come in to limit what the land may be used for, and exclude
certain types of development.
So, with that rather extended preface, Mr. Chairman, I think
we should proceed now to take these things up rather rapidly on an
identification as to what we want to do and make sure that we are
doing them. I've read all these papers, and I would suggest that we
start directly here, Mr. Chairman, with the first question, and simply ask the staff to state what is involved, and if we need any limitation on it at that stage, then we can discuss it more. I have tried to
give this background about my concern, and it is probably shared
by many of the others in this discussion.
Chairman Wayne Aspinall: Thank you very much. Perry, you
can add anything you wish to what Mr. Mock has said and start
right out.
Perry Hagenstein (staff project officer): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very helpful discussion.4

To provide another glimpse of the Commission in executive
session, I'll continue with the subject of multiple use. As if it were
reflecting its Vice-Chairman's early groping for a meaning, the
Commission, in its final report, said:
"Multiple use" is not a precise concept. It is given different meanings by different people, as well as different meanings in different
situations. We have listened to statements from diverse interests
who all commended the idea of multiple use, but it was apparent
Remarks made in opening the discussion of multiple use at PLLRC meeting, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 1970).
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that they were supporting different basic positions. This confusion
permeates public land policy.'

To aid it in reaching its conceptual conclusion, the Commission had asked the staff to present various positions for discussion. It was hoped that by detaching the competing interests, our
overall principles might be better understood. Here is one of those
proposals which was originally posed as a question by the staff:
"On national parks and wilderness areas, should preservation of
the natural environment be given dominant status over outdoor
recreation?" '
Senator Len B. Jordan: What happens where we want to preserve wilderness and yet beetles are infesting the trees located in the
wilderness area? Must we let nature take its course?
Chairman Wayne Aspinall: You put your finger on the ultimate
question. In certain areas we protect for protection's sake-for example, historical sites. I believe in saving where you preserve, but
not in saving where you destroy.
Mr. Hagenstein: I don't think a "yes" answer to this question
would conflict with management techniques to preserve a desirable
environmental aspect.
Mr. Mock: Should preservation always be given dominant
status? If this is the question, we should say "no." All we should be8
saying here is that "in proper situations" preservation of natural
environment should supersede other utilization.
Professor Emmet Clark: We could strengthen what we said earlier if we say here ". . . in some instances . .. ."

I am going to omit some further remarks so that I may reflect
upon the Commission's amendment of this proposition. It was at
this time that Byron Mock said:
Mr. Mock: We should make a flat statement that secondary
uses should always be subordinate to the primary purpose for which
the lands are acquired or retained.
Mr. Udall: You are merely saying secondary uses should be
secondary.
Mr. Mock: That is all I am saying.

The Chairman in the end summed it up: "This is what I
think we want to state: in national parks and in wilderness areas
Pusuc LAND LAW REvIEw COMMSSION, ONE THm OF THE NATION's LAND 45 (1970).
PLLRC staff evaluation paper, "Multiple Use Concepts and Land Use Decisions on
the Public Lands" (Feb. 20, 1970).
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the values that are present should not be destroyed by an overuse
for outdoor recreation purposes. That is all we mean." 7
Moving ahead, I want to make a few comments as one in the
unique position of having participated, not only in the preparation of the Commission report, but also in the congressional effort
to translate the Commission recommendations into law.
Although commonly referred to as the "BLM Organic Act,"
P.L. 94-579, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,, is
really more than a BLM organic act and at the same time it is
less than an implementation of the PLLRC report. The House
Interior Committee's objective was to declare policy for the public
lands and thereby implement a portion of the Commission report,
not to provide an organic act for the BLM solely.
It was never Chairman Aspinall's intention to implement the
Commission report by enactment of one new law, and-contrary
to what the Department of the Interior consistently advocated for
the day BLM was created in 1946 to late 1976, just before P.L.
94-579 came into being-it was never the Committee's intention
to provide nothing more than an organic act.
Functions of the Commission and those of the Congress differ
vastly. The Commission completed its task on schedule and
within its budget and went out of existence according to law.
Among the Commission's blessings were few constraints as to
jurisdiction, although the term "public lands" was carefully defined in the law establishing the Commission, and equally precise
"treaties" were entered into with respect to such things as studying water problems because of the coexistence of a National
Water Commission during much of the life of the PLLRC. Generally, however, the PLLRC could, and did, range far and wide in
seeking solutions to the many problems identified for its study.
Congress, on the other hand, is bound by rigid jurisdictional
rules as to what committee in each House can consider various
matters. It is bound by the vicissitudes of elections and the per7 Author's notes on meeting of the PLLRC, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 1970). The
Chairman's summary is reflected in Puauc LAND LAw REviEw COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF
THE NATION'S LAND 206 (1970): "The values for which national parks and wilderness areas
have been set aside should not be destroyed by an overuse for intensive outdoor recreation
purposes.
43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West Supp. 1977).
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sonalities who gain senior positions in committees. Moreover,
even though Congress has little constraint as to either time or
money, it is nonetheless restrained greatly by the demands of a
busy legislative schedule and the fact that every two years things
have to start all over again. In the case of the House Interior
Committee, this situation has been exacerbated by a turnover of
approximately one-third of the committee's membership every
two years.
Today, of the original thirteen Congressional members of the
PLLRC, only two remain in the Congress-Senator Jackson and
Representative Udall, both strategically placed as chairmen of
the committees having public land matters generally under their
jurisdiction-Energy and Natural Resources in the Senate and
Interior and Insular Affairs in the House.
During the period that the greatest legislative implementation of PLLRC recommendations has taken place-that is, during
the past (94th) Congress-the men who formulated the legislation
were generally not intimately acquainted with the background of
the Commission's decisions.
On the other hand, they had specific problems in mind that
they chose to attempt to solve at the same time they proclaimed
congressional public land policy-such as revision of the grazing
regulations and recognition of the California desert. In these areas
the committee strayed from the implementation concept as envisaged by Mr. Aspinall. It is not that he intended to neglect such
matters as these, but he did not anticipate dealing with them in
the basic policy act; they were to come later, along with other,
"second phase" legislation, such as modifying the 1872 Mining
Act?
Nonetheless, substantial progress was made in achieving legislative implementation of the Commission recommendations, as
was indicated in the activities report of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, from which I quote:
When the Public Land Law Review Commission, which had
been established by legislation reported out by this committee, submitted its report One Third of the Nation's Land to the President
and the Congress in 1970, it was said that between 5 and 10 years
17 Stat. 91, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
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would be required for the Congress to implement such of the Commission's recommendations as it agreed should be accepted by passage of legislation.
Almost as if that estimate was transformed into a timetable the
committee in 1976 reported out, and the Congress and the President
approved, the first three significant pieces of legislation growing out
of the Commission's report.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (Public Law 94579), often referred to as the "BLM Organic Act," represents a
translation into law of many PLLRC recommendations relating to
management of the public domain, administered by the Bureau of
Land Management of the Department of the Interior, and national
forests created out of the public domain, administered by the U.S.
Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture. In addition to specific directives contained in sections on land use planning, withdrawals, acquisitions and exchanges, enforcement authority, and
repeal of many obsolete public land laws, the act contains Congressional policy pronouncements based upon many of the similar recommendations of the Commission.
Principal among the PLLRC recommendations was the view
that: "The policy of large-scale disposal of public lands . . .
[should] be revised . . . while retaining in Federal ownership those
whose values must be preserved so that they may be used and enjoyed by all Americans."
As a direct corollary of this policy statement, the Commission
also recommended that, if the historic policy of disposal of the public lands is to be reversed and those lands are to be retained in
Federal ownership,
it is the obligation of the United States to make certain that
the burden of that policy is spread among all the people of the
United States and is not borne only by those States and governments in whose area the lands are located. Therefore, the
Federal Government should make payments to compensate
State and local governments for the tax immunity of Federal
lands.
The payments in lieu of taxes measure (Public Law 94-565) would
translate the basic principle of this PLLRC recommendation into
law. The formula is a relatively simple one which the committee
expects can be applied with much less administrative cost than the
Commission proposal, which required an appraisement process.
Public Law 94-429, providing for regulation of mining activity
within, and to repeal application of mining laws to, areas of the
National Park System, also derives from a PLLRC recommendation
that Congress continue to exclude some classes of public lands (particularly national parks and monuments) from future mineral development. "We do not favor opening these areas to mineral develop-
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ment," said the Commission; and Congress has now responded by
phasing out such operations in the few parks in which they still
exist.1'

As is the case so many times, a constant problem faced in
implementing the pronouncements contained in the One Third of
the Nation's Land" is one of communication. The language that
the Commission so carefully used is nevertheless capable of different interpretations, depending perhaps most of all on whether
the interpreter favors the Commission recommendation or
whether he opposes it. Someone fighting a Commission position
often seems to speak or understand a language different entirely
from that used by the Commission. And when people cannot
communicate with a common understanding, it takes longer to
attain desirable goals.
,oLegislative and Review Activities of the Committee on Interiorand InsularAffairs
of the House of Representatives During the 94th Congress, H.R. REP. No. 1779, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976).
" PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970).

AN OPERATIONAL VIEW OF THE
By KARL S.
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ORGANIC
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LANDSTROM*

Public land law reform, that long-sought goal, has made a
big step forward. It is timely at this conference to consider the
details of the new Act,' for therein rather than in the policy declarations lies its true significance.
When the Honorable Wayne N. Aspinall addressed the 1962
White House Conference on Conservation, he closed with this
paragraph:
In summary, what I am saying is that Congress will continue
to equate conservation with wise use; will not put out of reach resources that may be required for our national continuance; and that
all the resources will be managed for the benefit of the many and
not the few

These well-chosen words offer a useful standard by which to judge
the merits of the new Act. They reflect the essence of "multiple
use" management of public lands and resources, a concept in
which I have long believed. They suggest the kind of reasonable
balance that should be the goal of laws and regulations enacted
for the use and disposal of public properties.
A crucial element, however, is missing in the summary of
Chairman Aspinall, although I am sure that he has emphasized it
at other times and places. I refer to the important question of the
timeliness of public land actions.
Congressman Aspinall at one time had thought that general
public land law reform, under a "joint effort" agreement with
President Kennedy, would soon be operative "in order to meet the
demands of the 1960's." 3 It now appears that some of the provi* Former Director, Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of the
Interior; Attorney at Law, Arlington, Virginia.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 1977) (this act is commonly referred to as the BLM
Organic Act).
Address by Congressman Wayne J. Aspinall, White House Conference on Conservation in Washington, D.C. (May 24, 1962), reprinted in HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COMMISSION, BACKGROUND AND NEED 1, 5 (Comm. Print 1964).
' Paper by Wayne J. Aspinall, presented at the Conservation Banquet, Utah State
University, Logan, Utah (May 3, 1963), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEw COMMISSION, BACKGROUND
AND NEED 30, 33 (Comm. Print 1964).
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sions of the new "organic act" may not be in full operation until
the 1980's.
Professor Carver's comprehensive treatment of the new
Act'-its general features, its congruities and incongruities in relation to other PLLRC recommendations, 5 and its differences
from other kinds of "organic acts"-has opened the way for me
to offer a specialized treatment of and reaction to the new Act.
Moreover, I believe that the timeliness and untimeliness of the
Act offer an appropriate theme.
I.

RECENT INSTANCES OF DELAYED ACTIONS

The energy crisis, like the environmental quality movement,
is one of a series of events that have focused attention on the
procedure, as well as the substance, of natural resource actions
taken by the government.
For example, consider the case of the Houston Oil and Mineral Corporation's 1977 attempt to acquire and rely on offshore
oil leases. On March 22, 1977, the Houston corporation placed an
advertisement in the Washington Post,' stating that it had invested $8.2 million in offshore leases after a federal district court's
order barring the lease sale had been overturned by a circuit court
of appeals, and after recourse to the Supreme Court had been
denied. The advertisement went on to say that the company had
completed plans, committed funds, obtained permits, and entered into contracts to drill, starting May 1, 1977, only to learn
that the same district court had, on February 17, 1977, declared
the lease sale null and void on account of irregularities in the
filing of required environmental impact statements. The company's statement ended with these probing words: "Now we ask
you-who's really withholding oil and natural gas from the American consumer? We'd like to know your opinion. Or better still,
let your Congressman and Senator know! We are ready when you
are."
I See Carver, The Federal Land Management & Policy Act of 1976: Fruition or
Frustration (this issue).
I PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
I Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
7Id.

,Id.

BLM ORGANIC ACT

This is an example of how poorly-integrated federal laws can
act to contradict each other. The practical application can be far
more cumbersome than the drafters of the legislation ever envisioned.
I hold no brief for Houston Oil, but I think it has a valid
point. Moreover, it is not the only form of industry to be hit by
such a twist of overlapping laws. A similar illustration may be
drawn from the difficulties confronting implementation of the
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970.'
The need for a geothermal leasing authority was recognized
in 1961 when the Office of the Solicitor of the Interior Department
held that the Department lacked the statutory authority to issue
geothermal leases. The necessary legislation to fill this gap in
authority was not enacted until December 24, 1970,1" however.
The Interior Department elected to subject the proposed rulemaking for lease authorization to the environmental impact
statement procedures. As a result, more than two more years
passed before the rules were finally issued in July of 1973," and
finalized in December of that year.12 The first sale of such leases
was held on January 22, 1974. The first leases were then issued,
some thirteen years after the need had first been examined by the
Federal Government. Despite the fact that the Geothermal
Steam Act expressly granted a "right" to the holders of
"grandfather rights" to have leases issued to them by meeting the
highest bid at a lease sale, some of these sales have yet to be held.
Commercial development of geothermal energy from public lands
has not yet begun.
The apparent cause of delay in both of these instances is the
environmental impact statement requirement of the National
Environmental Policy Act [NEPA].' 3 Perhaps the more accurately stated cause is the application of that requirement by the
courts and by the executive branch. And now, a fair question may
1 30 U.S.C.

§§ 1001-1025 (1970).
Id.
38 Fed. Reg. 19,748-79 (1973). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

RONMENTAL STATEMENT FOR THE GEOTHERMAL LEASING PROGRAM,

(1973).
1138 Fed. Reg. 35,029 (1973).
13 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
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be to ask how many new causes of delay will be created by the
new "organic act."
A.

II. PROVISIONS LIKELY TO CAUSE DELAY
Judicial Review

A policy declaration in the Act states that public land adjudication decisions should be subjected to judicial review as a
matter of policy. The word "adjudication" is not defined. This
policy statement, along with others in the Act, has been heaped
upon other relevant policy declarations contained in preexisting
statutes.
My difficulty with the policy statement is that it might be
interpreted as furthering the proposition, urged on the Congress
in earlier versions of the legislation, that not only "adjudicative"
decisions but also "discretionary" decisions should be subjected
to judicial review. Plainly, such a method is not required by current administrative law. Such a review provision would be in
derogation of the long line of precedent establishing that agency
decisions, when discretionary, are not subject to review by the
courts. Moreover, judicial review of discretionary land use decisions would appear to be contrary to the intent of Congress pursuant to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
It is to be hoped that when Congress implements this policy,
it does nothing to restrict the current scope of discretion vested
in public agencies. Otherwise, substantial delays may occur in
the governmental decisionmaking process, and the authority and
independence of executive agencies will be undermined.
B.

Key Definitions

I have already spoken of the new Act's policy statement
which, compared with preceding public land laws, is somewhat
redundant and confusing. This is nothing peculiar to the 1976
Act, for public land legislation has often featured confusing and
conflicting declarations of policy and definitions of key terms.
The objectives of clarity and integration of key terms with others
of similar usage have not been achieved in the new Act. Unfortunately, the Act defines only some of its key terms; other words
and phrases are left undefined as they pertain to this specific
legislation. The obvious problem which is certain to flow from
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this deficiency is that such terms will have to be interpreted by
agencies and the courts, thus resulting in delays and indecision.
Among the undefined terms likely to cause difficulty are ones
such as "land use plan," "management decision," "tract,"
"equitable distribution," "equitable considerations," "chiefly
valuable," "adjoining landowners," "known mineral deposits,"
"no known mineral values," "proper land use," "the public interest," "national significance," "reasonably necessary," "equitable
to the United States and to the holders of grazing leases and
permits," "reasonable compensation," "to the extent practical,"
and "national resource lands." 4 This last term, "national resource lands," presents a particularly interesting history of development and implementation.
The Interior Department originally requested that the term
"national resource lands" be applied by statute so as to permit
the lands and interests in lands exclusively administered through
the BLM to be formally identified. In the interim, usage of the
term has been administratively authorized.
There was an earlier time when the term "national land reserve" had been similarly adopted, based on language used by
President Kennedy in his 1961 Natural Resource Message to Congress.' 5 Use of the term, however, was immediately discontinued,
largely because its use, without express statutory authorization,
was questioned by a Congressman.' 6
The only mention given to "national resource lands" in the
new Act occurs in an obscure provision, section 701(g)(6),' 7 which
" See note 1 supra.
' Address by President John F. Kennedy, Resources Message to the Congress, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23, 1961).
" Comment of Congressman Wayne J. Aspinall during hearings before the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The author was a witness appearing before the
committee and thereafter instructed Bureau of Land Management offices to discontinue
use of the term "national land reserve."
"1Section 701(g)(6) of P.L. 94-579, which has been condensed into 43 U.S.C.A. §
1701(b) (Supp. 1977), provided that:
(g) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the
power and authority of the United States or-

(6) as a limitation upon any State criminal statute or upon the police
power of the respective States, or as derogating the authority of a local police
officer in the performance of his duties, or as depriving any State or political
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provides for a limitation on the application of the Act with regard
to the functions of state and local governments. This location of
the term, not appearing elsewhere, may be viewed as only a drafting error in which the legislators failed to appreciate the existing
meaning of the term "national resource lands." I note, however,
that Senator Floyd Haskell of Colorado included the term in his
senate-floor remarks of March 22, 1977, describing his new bill,
S. 1074,'1 to establish a rangelands rehabilitation program.
C.

Land Use Planning

Professor Carver has stated in his presentation that the land
use planning process has replaced the old process of "land classification" as it was formerly prescribed in the Taylor Grazing Act 9
and expanded in the Classification and Multiple Use Act of
1964. 10 Multiple use management, both as a concept and as a
term of art, came under heavy attack in the PLLRC study, not
so much from the public or the land use professions as from the
Commission's staff. The Commission opted for use of the term
"dominant use,"'" illustrating that some resources may have to
be devoted to a principal use, and are not susceptible to management for competing and conflicting uses.
The fact that Congress has elected to continue the multiple
use management tradition demonstrates the continuing validity
and virility of the concept, however, notwithstanding its difficulty of application in some areas. The concept, first formulated
by Gifford Pinchot over seventy years ago, is still a workable
guide for land use planning. 22
This is not to say that the Act's land use planning provisions
will not cause difficulty, however, for there are complex details
with which administrative agencies must comply. Moreover, one
subdivision thereof of any right it may have to exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction on the national resource lands; or as amending, limiting, or
infringing the existing laws providing grants of lands to the States.
" CONG. REc. § 4571 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1977).
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (1970).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1964).
" See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 48.
22 Keynote address by McArdle (The Concept of Multiple Use of Forest and Associated Lands-Its Value and Limitations) Proceedings, Fifth World Forestry Congress
(1960). But see Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach
to Forest Land Management, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 473 (1967).
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may reasonably expect the agencies' own lawfully promulgated
rules and regulations to add to the complexity. Questions arising
as to the adequacy of compliance with the statutory procedures
or concepts may well form a new cause for litigation similar to the
prolific environmental impact statement cases.
Management Decisions

D.

The language in the new Act prohibits, by implication, the
Department of the Interior from making a "management decision" until an authorized land use plan has been developed. Presumably, such a plan must also be formally adopted under the
Act's procedures. Therefore, few of these decisions may be expected to be forthcoming for a considerable period of time.
A peculiarity of the management decision provisions, as I
read them, is that no decision may be reconsidered, modified, or
terminated until the authorizing land use plan is first revised
under the full procedures specified in the Act. Omitted from the
Act are any provisions for the adjustment of management decisions where, for example, such items as variances may be contemplated by the authorizing land use plans.
This peculiarity may have resulted from a misunderstanding
of the usual relationship, in land use planning and zoning practices, between "plans," which are general in scope and detail, and
"decisions," which are more specific with respect to specified
times, places, and events. This feature of the Act- interlocking
plans and decisions into a single-level concept-will likely cause
confusion and, therefore, delay.
E.

CongressionalReview of ProposedAdministrative Actions

Under the Act, many administrative proposals must wait for
ninety days while Congress considers whether to adopt a concurrent (House and Senate) resolution of nonapproval. This does not
amount to a congressional veto power, and this is fortunate from
my perspective. Such a veto provision was originally passed by
the House committee, but the Joint Conference Committee re2
jected it in favor of the "nonapproval" concept. 1
The congressional-review provision will apply to actions such
2

43 U.S.C. §§ 1713(c), 1714(c)(1), (1)(2), 1722(b) (1976).
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as: (1) The exclusion of one or more "principal or major uses" for
two or more years on a tract of 100,000 acres or larger; (2) a
proposed sale of public lands when the tract is larger than 2,500
acres; (3) a proposed termination of a nonstatutory withdrawal;
(4) any proposed nonstatutory withdrawal exceeding 5,000 acres;
and (5) a proposal not to sell land under the Unintentional Trespass Act. 4
My own view of this development is that Congress should
have confined itself to taking legislative actions, not vetoes, as
prescribed by the Constitution. The veto power is constitutionally
set forth as an executive power, not a legislative exercise, although it may effectively be exercised through the appropriation
power. The "nonapproval" concept, while not amounting to a
veto as that power is ordinarily construed, is nonetheless an encroachment on traditional executive functions.
If it were concluded by the Congress that matters of this kind
could not be properly considered and decided by the executive
branch, then the preferable and more clearly constitutional
method of resolving the issue would have been for the Congress
to withhold the delegation of such discretion to the executive
branch agencies in the first instance. In this regard, I subscribe
to the views of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis,. who recently wrote:
I have the greatest respect for politicians, who perform the indispensable function of translating democratic desires into statutory
law. .

.

. But I also have respect for professional and scientific peo-

ple, who have an altogether different kind of skill. Successful government requires both kinds of skills. Those who have one kind must
be careful not to encroach improperly on the province of those who
have the other kind ...
When the factual component of complex rulemaking has been
worked over by appropriate professional people within an agency,
and when findings have been made on the basis of a record that
includes the results of the procedures of notice and written comments, I think it would be atrociousgovernment if Congress, on the
basis of political pressures, were to change the findings.25

Thus, there remains in the new Act what I believe is an
invalid delegation to the Congress of functions that should be, if
they are not in fact, reserved to the executive branch.
24

Id.

1: Letter from Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to the Honorable Elliott H. Levitas
(Nov. 24, 1976), reprinted in CONG. REC. H961-62 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1977).
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F.

Title Restrictions

The Act authorizes the Department of the Interior to place
in instruments of conveyance "such terms, covenants, conditions,
and reservations" as the Department "deems necessary to insure
proper land use and protection of the public interest."2 This
authorization is good and proper. It is a step that I personally
have advocated for a long time, although not in the phraseology
that has been adopted. However, I believe that confusion and
delay will occur because there is no authorization by which adjustments may be made in restrictions as time and conditions
change. Some type of a variance procedure needs to be provided.
In its absence, the title holders may have to seek private legislation or turn to the courts.
G.

Reserved Minerals

I was among those, like the late Senator Clinton P. Anderson,
who recommended that, when properties are being conveyed to
surface right purchasers from the United States, all of the mineral
interests should be reserved to the Federal Government. This
would be a simple and direct procedure which would avoid the
controversial process of evaluating each and every mineral estate
under conveyed lands. Moreover, it would assure reservation of
valuable mineral interests in the government for the forseeable
future, thus avoiding private speculation or errors in the mineral
evaluation process.
The Act has departed from this concept, establishing a new
and undefined standard of values.? I believe that this feature of
the Act, necessitating individual attention to mineral rights on
land conveyed for other purposes, is ill-advised and will result in
confusion and delay in establishing nonmineral usages.
H.

State and Local Government Land Use Restrictions

The Act provides that sixty days must elapse before a tract
may be offered for sale. This period purports to give the appropriate state or local governmental entities the opportunity to be
advised of the proposed land use change and enact or amend
43 U.S.C. § 1718 (1976).

Id.
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zoning laws or other regulations "concerning the use of such
lands.""
I believe that this provision ignores the elaborate procedures
elsewhere in the Act by which state and local governments are to
be informed and permitted to participate in the formulation of
land use plans. It also seems to rest on a mistaken notion of the
relation of state "police power" to the private land-using activities which may be taking place on public lands under rights
granted through mining claims, mineral leases, or other forms of
tenure .29
The sixty day waiting period is, I believe, unnecessary. Nothing in the Act, or in any other legislation of which this writer is
aware, prevents state or local governments from valid exercises
of the police power so as to embrace private interests in land
although that interest may have been obtained from the Federal
Government. It should not be assumed, although I have observed
state officials who believe it otherwise, that the exercise of the
police power must await complete alienation of title from the
United States.
This principle is illustrated by the operation of Oregon's
Mined Land Reclamation Act. 30 State officials have advised me
that the act is being enforced as to unpatented mining claims,
except in those areas where the state has surrendered all of its
legislative jurisdiction to the United States. Some other aspects
of private land use activities on federal base-title properties, to
which state authority is being routinely applied, include: (1)
Fishing and hunting regulations; (2) conservation of petroleum;
and (3) air and water quality standards.3
Professor Carver has written that Kleppe v. New Mexico 2
has had the effect of making federal jurisdiction under the property clause as broad as the legislative jurisdiction clause of the
Id. § 1720.
For a discussion of this problem, see Landstrom, State and Local Governmental
Regulation of PrivateLand Using Activities on Federal Lands, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 77
(1974).
"

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 517.750-517.990 (1975).

Letter from Stanley L. Ausmus, Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, to Karl S. Landstrom (March 9, 1976).
'

11 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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United States Constitution. It should be remembered, however,
that Kleppe dealt only with wildlife situated on retained federal
lands. The impact of the case should not necessarily extend into
matters concerning state regulation of private property uses, although others may disagree.3 3 In sum, state and local governments should continually update their land use restrictions to
appropriately exercise their authority over private property interests within or on public land tracts.
I. Duplicative Law Enforcement Procedures
The Act requires that there be inserted in any use, occupancy, or development permit an authorization for its termination or suspension upon receipt of evidence that the permittee has
failed to comply with any applicable air or water quality standard. 31 This provision is right in intention, but wrong, I believe,
in application.
If the permittee merely has been charged with a violation,
but no conclusion has yet been reached on the allegation, then it
should be premature to levy a penalty. To revoke a permit without a hearing offends due process. On the other hand, if there has
been an evidentiary hearing and the fact of the violation has been
established, then, I believe, revocation of the permit represents a
second, and duplicative, penalty because the air or water quality
law presumably has already been applied.
J. Rulemaking
The Act does away with the public property exemption from
formal proposed rulemaking insofar as public lands, a form of
public property, are concerned. This has been done by way of the
Act's self-prescribed route of repeal by implication.35 However,
the rulemaking directive to the Interior Department fails to exempt the rulemaking process from the environmental impact
See generally Shapiro, Energy Development on the Public Domain: Federal/State
Cooperationand Conflict Regarding Environmental Land Use Control, 9 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW 397 (1976). See also Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Office, Legal Analysis of Authority of the BLM to Promulgate Surface Mining Regulations for Unpatented
Mining Claims, reprinted in CONG. REC. S2202-06 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1977).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1732(c) (1976).
- Id. § 1740.
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statement procedures of the National Environmental Policy
6
Act.
The question arises as to how extensive will be the required
examination of rules by use of the impact statements. For example, if some or all of the proposed rules promulgated under the
Act are subjected to the impact statement analytical procedure,
will successive stages of the land use planning procedure each
require an impact statement? This, I believe, would be impractical, and the purposes of NEPA would be served by one exposure
of the rules to the impact statement procedures.
There was a time when Professor Carver and I advocated
extending the rulemaking process so as to include at least a part
of the function of exercising administrative discretion in public
land actions. 3 7 But under the Act's planning procedures this may
not be possible.
K.

Grazing Fees

The delay of one year in reaching a legislative settlement of
the grazing fee question has been understandable, inasmuch as
no acceptable solution was available before the Joint Conference
Committee. I think, however, that it is regrettable that the Congress has presented the Agriculture and Interior Departments
with what seems to be a hastily drafted and ambiguous study
directive.
I have suggested to the Grazing Fee Task Force that a determination needs to be made as soon as possible as to the interpretation of the Act's use of the singular in the words "value" and
"fee." Is it intended that the studies may recommend only a
single-level charge per animal-unit-month throughout the western states, or may the studies also consider multi-level charges
that are adjusted to differences in value?38
The task force has advised me that the study is proceeding
as though the Act warrants the latter interpretation. 9 There is
See note 13 supra.
Carver and Landstrom, Rule-Making as a Means of Exercising SecretarialDiscretion in Public Land Actions, 8 ARuz. L. Rv.46 (1966).
"I Letter from the author to the Grazing Fee Task Force, Range Management Staff,
U.S. Bureau of Land Management (Mar. 20, 1977).
11Statement to the author at a grazing fee hearing, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25,
1977).
'
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reason to believe that the Act contemplated the consideration of
multi-level charges, because the study directive requires the two
Secretaries to take into account, among other things, "differences
in forage values."40
The Technical Committee to Review Grazing Fees was mistaken, I believe, in its November 15, 1976 report when it concluded that: "[blasically, the AUM and hence its general market value are the same from area to area since the grazing requirements of the animals and the yearly production cycle of the
ranches are maintained."'" I have submitted to the Grazing Fee
Task Force substantial evidence showing that the market values
per AUM of range forage do indeed differ markedly from place to
place or from condition to condition in the western states.4"
III.

A.

PROVISIONS LIKELY TO EXPEDITE ACTIONS

Interim Rules and Regulations

From an operational viewpoint, perhaps the most constructive action taken by the Congress is its authorization to the Agriculture and Interior Departments to proceed under the preexisting rules and regulations. The Act mandates that the Departments may use such rules and regulations "to the extent
practical" while new administrative decisions are being promulgated pursuant to the new Act.43 This conveniently avoids the
impasse which might have resulted had old rules and regulations
been repealed by the Act and new rules not yet been proposed.
B.

Repeal of Obsolete Laws

The timeliness, as well as the quality, of future public land
actions will benefit from the Act's repeal of numerous laws that
have been considered obsolete or superseded. This has been a goal
of at least one federal agency, the Bureau of Land Management,
almost from the day of its creation in 1946. Substantial effort was
made in the 1960's, based on an understanding between President
Kennedy and Congressman Aspinall." Progress was slowed, however, because of complicated issues presented by pending legisla43 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (1976).
' 42 Fed. Reg. 6,981-88 (1977).
, See note 38 supra.
:3 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1976).
" See note 2 supra, at 119-22.
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tion, such as the interrelationship of existing legislation with the
then pending Wilderness Act.45 Indeed, the goal of streamlining
the nation's existing public land laws may be said to have been
the principal purpose of the PLLRC, its report, and now finally,
the 1976 Act.
This is not to say that the new Act has addressed all existing
legislation. Some laws, unfortunately in my view, remain essentially unaffected by the 1976 Act. For example, the Bureau of
Land Management, in its original "land law reform package,"
had proposed that the new Act address the Mining Law of 1872.46
Similarly, another proposal on the original slate was reform of the
"lottery" provision of the Mineral Leasing Act.47 The 197% Act
does not affect these laws, nor does it dispose of the Desert Land
Act,48 a piece of legislation that has been, in my personal experience, most disappointing. If repeal of the Desert Land Act does
not appear to be a realistic goal, at least attention needs to be
given to an upward adjustment of the notoriously inadequate
statutory price per acre of desert land.
C.

Inventories

The public land inventories should allow for expedited, as
well as better informed, land use plans and decisions. Such a
benefit may, however, take a long time to arrive.
A peculiarity of the inventory directive is that the Interior
and Agriculture Departments are required to give the resulting
information to state and local governments only to the extent that
it will be used by them in planning and regulating the uses of
nonfederal lands in proximity to public lands. This limitation
seems to have been based on a mistaken idea of the relationship
of state "police power" to private land use activities occurring on
federal lands.
Plainly, the state and local governments need up-to-date information regarding the federal lands and their resources, not just
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964).
Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
47 Id. § 181.
"m 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1964).
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information regarding nonfederal lands in their vicinity. I hope
that the Departments will not construe this directive too strictly.
D.

Land Acquisition

The new land acquisition authorization should be advantageous. It should aid and expedite the progress of gaining access
to remote public lands and generally aid in public land management.
E.

Land Exchanges

The new Act authorizes monetary payments to be used in
equalizing land values.4 9 This should expedite such land exchanges and provide for more equitable results.
F.

Law Enforcement

Unauthorized land uses can be detected more easily and with
greater precision. Moreover, enforcement actions can be taken
under express statutory authority, 0 with federal criminal sanctions imposed, rather than relying on disparate and often imprecise state statutes.
G.

Advisory Councils

The new public land advisory councils should serve as more
effective focal points for general-purpose advice concerning public lands, replacing the hierarchy of boards that had been created
by the Taylor Grazing Act. Even though the district advisory
board provisions of the Taylor Act"1 were not repealed, there will,
of course, be only one grazing advisory board per district or equivalent geographic area. I do not see, therefore, that there is any
significant duplication between the general purpose councils and
the district boards. A more troublesome point, however, is the
omission from the advisory boards of any wildlife representative.
Perhaps this omission can be remedied by discretionary administrative action.
H.

Land Retention Policy
The forthright declaration that it is the policy of the Act that
, Id. § 1716(b) (1976).
Id. § 1733.
Id. § 315o (1970).
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public lands be retained whenever possible or necessary should
greatly reduce the time and attention that otherwise might have
been devoted to dealing with whether public lands should be
disposed of in wholesale blocks. The question had earlier been
raised in earnest when the National Livestock Committee on
Public Lands was organized in 1946.2
William Voigt, a long-time opponent of the movement, recently observed that "[t]he nation's public land seems safely
national. 5 3 Additionally, Professor Carver has stated that the
new Act makes it clear that lands should be retained unless specific program interests require their disposition. 54 Although the
intent of the new Act, by implication of its policy statement,
seems clear enough, I am not sure that its practical effect is as
clear as Mr. Voigt and Professor Carver maintain.
The Congress did not, for example, repeal the "pending its
final disposal" provision in section 1 of the Taylor Grazing Act.6 5
Similarly, the Congress has declined to adopt the Bureau of Land
Management's request that the term "BLM lands" be given a
more specific and descriptive statutory title. I conclude that the
Congress does not yet view the "BLM lands" as a necessarily
permanent land management system. From my own viewpoint, I
am not entirely dissatisfied with this result. There are enough
inadequacies in the new Act and in the other related statutes, or
at least in their current operation, to cause me, and perhaps
others, to look with less disfavor upon the possibility of conveying
some of the lands to the states and others to national forests,
national parks, and wildlife refuges.
I.

Mining Claim Recordation

Among the proposals for mining law reform included in the
BLM's original 1949 statement was one that would have required
recordation of mining claim locations and of annual assessment
work in the district land offices. 56 Now, after twenty-eight years,
2

W. VOIGT, PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT 1

(1976).
.,Id. at 325.
" Carver, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: A Summary, 9 RoCKY
MTN. MIN. L. NEWSLETrER 2 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
Conference on Revision of United States Mining Laws: Hearings Before a Special
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Public Lands, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1949).
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the first part of this proposal has become law. In the interim, I
have become convinced that a better solution would be to have
all filings made in the local office of record. This provision, I
believe, will avoid confusion which may arise from the duplicative system of filing in both the local and district offices.
The new provisions, including the penalty imposed for failure
to file, will go far toward accomplishing the original objectives of
the BLM's proposals. Those goals were: (1) To expedite genuine
mining development; (2) to prevent interference with nonmining
uses; and (3) to reduce the extent of unauthorized use in the guise
of mining locations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Within the theme of these comments, it is not the policy
declarations, but the details affecting operational effectiveness
and timeliness of actions, by which the new Act has been examined. For that matter, the policy declarations themselves may
turn out to be a source of confusion in that they have been heaped
upon existing congressional policies without provision for reconciliation of the new policies with the old.
On the basis of Chairman Aspinall's 1962 standards, the new
Act's provisions seem to meet the requirement that conservation
be regarded as a wise use. The resources will undoubtedly be
managed for the benefit of the many and not for the exclusive or
undue advantage of the few. The sound tradition of multiple use
will be continued.
The indication to me, however, is that these objectives will
be attained only slowly. Public land resources which are currently
needed may be slow in being made available.
Oliver Wendell Holmes is quoted as saying: "I find the great
thing in this world is not so much where we stand but in what
direection we are moving." In the Holmesian sense, we are moving in the right direction, but the rate of progress has been painfully slow. On the basis of practical effectiveness and the necessity of taking timely public land actions, the new Act may prove
to be wanting.
There are various ways to implement the Act to help avoid
the possibility of confusion and delay. One important step would
be to limit the applicability of the environmental impact state-

472
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ment process to a single stage of implementation such as, for
example, only after rules and regulations have been promulgated.
Whatever the practical effect of the Act and its application,
need
to deal realistically with it, recognizing its limitations
we
and seeking to minimize their impact on the process of land use
planning.

WATER
FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SINCE

PLLRC

By FRANK J. TRELEASE*
INTRODUCTION

Cyprinodon diabolis, The Devil's Hole pupfish, is alive and
well and living in a striated marble palace in Nevada, located
within a small addition to the Death Valley National Monument
created for his benefit in 1952. "Zippy" is an insignificant little
creature, about three-fourths of an inch long, who inhabits one of
the remnants of the lake that once filled Death Valley. In Pleistocene times, the lake receded and left Zippy behind in a pool of
water in the mouth of a limestone cavern. Other pupfish live in
the few springs and tiny streams running in the valley, but in the
course of 20,000 years diabolis has come to differ from his cousins
many times removed, much as the finches Darwin found on the
Galapagos Islands differ from their South American counterparts. The pool in Devil's Hole contains a submerged sloping rock
shelf, which, for reasons best known to the pupfish, is the only
place suitable for spawning and propagation of their race. In 1966
the Cappaerts, the owners of a nearby large ranch, drilled wells
into the underground formation that supplies or supports the pool
and began to pump water from it to irrigate bermuda grass, alfalfa, wheat, and barley. By 1970 the lowering water threatened
to expose the rock shelf where the pupfish reproduce and thus to
exterminate the last bearers of Cyprinodon diabolis genes.
Zippy has always had friends in high places. Dr. Robert Rush
Miller, curator of fishes at the University of Michigan, and Dr.
Carl L. Hubbs of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography were
instigators of the movement to add the pupfish's home to the
monument.' The National Park Service, the Department of the
Interior, and former President Harry Truman were swayed by
their efforts. In the now famous case of Cappaert v. United
States,' the full weight of the federal judiciary was thrown in on
the side of the insignificant pupfish. The United States Attorney,

2

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
Trusso, Big Trouble for a Tiny Fish, 3 SMrrHsoNAN 48 (1972).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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the Chief Judge of the United States District Court of Nevada,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court of the United States all rallied to the rescue, and the Cappaerts, the Nevada State Engineer, and the Attorney General of
the State of Nevada were routed. The pumping was enjoined; the
pupfish were saved.
The pupfish had not only a reservation of the land surrounding Devil's Hole but also a federal reserved water right for the pool
within the Hole. The federal reserved water right is alive and well
too. It is very like the Devil's Hole pupfish in many ways. It too
is an evolutionary sport. It too lives in Devil's Hole. It too has
friends in high places within the federal bureaucracy and judicial
system.
The federal reserved water right is not like other water rights,
at least not like those in the West. It is not on record, not fixed
in size, not dependent on beneficial use. When the Federal Government withdraws a part of its land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government by implication
reserves enough of the "appurtenant" 3 unappropriated water to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. The water right may
lie dormant for years, and in the meantime the water may have
been put to use by people who have invested funds and effort to
build water-dependent enterprises. Under the doctrine of prior
appropriation their water rights would be safe from others who
might seek to take the water, since the priorities of the latter
would be later and inferior. But the rights are not safe from the
United States. If the Government eventually exercises its reserved right, its priority relates not to the date of use but to that
date, long past, when the reservation was created. When the government takes the water, therefore, the investment and the enterprise of the private water user go down the drain.
Or do they? This is the theory and the prediction. But in the
twenty-one years since the federal reserved water right was invented, or discovered, by the Supreme Court, this has not yet
happened. I am beginning to wonder if the comparison to the
measly pupfish cannot be carried through-if the federal reserved
No case defines or explains this word. It probably means "located" or "bordering
on," possibly "underlying," possibly "nearby."
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water right is also insignificant and worthless. At one time the
federal reserved right was thought to be more like the great white
shark of "Jaws." Reserved rights were seen "as a first mortgage
of undetermined and indeterminable magnitude," as a "sword of
Damocles" hanging over "every title to water rights to every
stream which touches a federal reservation." ' Inspired Senators
and Congressmen rallied to the rescue. Over fifty bills were introduced to neutralize the rights-and nothing happened.' Nothing
happened in Congress, and nothing happened to water users in
the West.

I.

ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE

Although it is now fashionable to say that the first precedents
for the reserved doctrine were the dicta contained in the 1899
United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co.' case and the 1908
Winters v. United States7 Indian case, can testify that no one
regarded these as such prior to Federal Power Commission v.
Oregon' (Pelton Dam) in 1955.
I was there. I took a course in water law in 1938 and got an
A in it. I then went to work for L. Ward Bannister, one of the
negotiators of the Colorado River Compact and lecturer in water
law at Denver University and Harvard University. I helped to
bring his notes up to date. I listened in on discourses he had with
Ralph Carr, Jean Breitenstein, John Reed, and other "irrigation
lawyers" of the old school. I started to teach water law in 1946,
and I was General Counsel for the Missouri River Basin Survey
Commission in 1952. At no time prior to 1955 did I ever hear a
suggestion that the reserved rights doctrine was anything but a
special quirk of Indian water law.
True, there was a notion lurking in the background that since
the United States originally "owned" the water in the West, as
Address by Northcutt Ely to National Water Commission (Nov. 6, 1969).
See Morreale, Federal State Conflicts over Western Waters-a Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUT. L. REv. 423 (1966).
' 174 U.S. 690 (1899). "[A] state cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its
waters, so far at least as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
property." Id.at 703.
7 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
9 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
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it owned the land of the public domain, it might still be the
"owner" of unappropriated water This theory was advanced by
Attorneys General for the United States in a couple of interstate
cases, but it was seemingly rejected in Kansas v. Colorado'" and
was held inapplicable in Nebraska v. Wyoming." In the latter
case the waters of the North Platte were being divided between
the states and the Government asked, on the strength of this
theory, that a separate allocation of water be made to the United
States for its irrigation projects. That argument the Supreme
Court put aside, on the basis that under the Reclamation Act'"
the Government acquired its water rights through the state and
the states therefore stood in judgment for the United States.'
Earlier, in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.," a suit between private parties, the Supreme Court, on
what now seems to be a spurious reading of the Desert Land Act,'5
held that the Act
effected a severance of all water on the public domain, not theretofore appropriated, from the land itself. . . . Congress intended to
establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented
separately; and that all nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws of the states and
territories . . ..

So the western water lawyer, though he may have had some nagging fear in the back of his mind that the United States might
have constitutional power to use water without complying with
state law, or even power to regulate its use, nevertheless felt quite
safe behind the twin shields of the Reclamation Act'7 and the
Desert Land Act.'"
The safety thought provided by the Acts was weakened by
See Bannister, The Question of FederalDispositionof State Waters in the Priority
States, 28 I-hay. L. REv. 270 (1915); Carpenter, Conflict of JurisdictionRespecting Control

of Waters in Western States, 2 RocKy MTN. L. REv. 162 (1929).
10206 U.S. 46 (1907).
1 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
37 6 6
12 43 U.S.C. §§
1- 1 yyy (1970).
325 U.S. at 629-30.
295 U.S. 142 (1935).
,5 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-399 (1970). See F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
LAW, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY No. 5, at 147a-m (1971).
, 295 U.S. at 162.
17
"

See note 15 supra.
See note 12 supra.
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the Supreme Court's Pelton Dam decision in 1955.'1 The Pelton
Dam case did not involve water rights as such. All it held was that
a license from the United States to build a dam on reserved lands
could not be thwarted by lack of state permission. 0 But the language of both the majority and the dissent is susceptible of being
construed as saying that the Desert Land Act's severance of the
water from the public lands did not apply to reserved lands,
which, therefore, still have water attached to them.' It is generally assumed that the power company is now exercising, by some
implied assignment, the right of the United States to use the
water which it reserved from the jurisdiction of the State of Oregon when it reserved the power site. 2 This was even worse than
"ownership of unappropriated water;" it was ownership of
appropriatedwater, if the appropriation had been made subsequent to the reservation.
This case was a real bombshell, and it certainly lit a fire
under western water lawyers.23 Senator Barrett of Wyoming
rushed into Congress with the first of what was to be a long series
of "Western Water Rights Settlement Acts," 4 and a number of
western state water officials and others raised a chorus of protest
at this reversal of what they had always thought to be the law.25
The fire was fueled by an even more direct holding that the
United States need not comply with state water appropriation
statutes .2 A federal district court directly held that the commandant of the Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot need not file
See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
349 U.S. at 443-45. Stripped of dicta, the case does no more than assert federal
supremacy, a slight modification of the rule of First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Power Coop. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
1,349 U.S. at 447-48, 455-56.
2 Carver, The Implied Reservation Doctrine:Policy on Law, 6 LAN & WATER L. REV.
117 (1970); Corker, Let There Be No Nagging Doubts: Nor Shall PrivateProperty, Including Water Rights, Be Taken for Public Use without Just Compensation, 6 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 109 (1970).
z Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill
of 1957, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 604 (1957); Martz, The Role of the FederalGovernment in State
Water Law, 5 KN. L. REv. 626 (1957); Munro, The Pelton Decision: A New Riparianism?
36 ORE. L. REv. 221 (1957).
J 5. 863, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
The most detailed treatment is Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts over Western
Waters-a Decade of "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RuT. L. REv. 423 (1966).
0 Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), aff'd on other grounds,
279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
"
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proofs of completion of wells used on that modern adaptation of
an old military reservation. The Navy had originally filed for and
received permits for the wells but, after Pelton Dam, refused to
complete the state procedures. The court fanned the flames with
the harshest statement yet of federal supremacy and rejection of
state control: That the United States could not be compelled "to
bend its knee to . . .state law and regulation"27 that might
impede its use of its own property for national defense purposes.
About this time the first stirrings of the environmental movement were felt, and the conservationists saw federal reserved
rights as an escape from utilitarian state laws that emphasized
the diversion and damming of streams. Even the Department of
Justice and federal agencies began to look upon the mildest protection of private rights as possibly nullifying existing federal uses
and frustrating federal programs and purposes." So although
many modified successors to the Barrett Bill2 9 were introduced in
the next ten to fifteen years, they lost rather than gained support
as the opposition of these two groups coalesced. Meanwhile the
misreading of the Pelton Dam case, or its misreading of the Desert Land Act,30 came to fruition in Arizona v. California.31 The
chimera became a dragon: Reserved rights for non-Indian federal
lands were declared to exist in real life; indeed, they were not only
identified but quantified. The Havasu Lake National Wildlife
Refuge was allowed a diversion of 41,839 acre-feet per year to feed
its consumptive need for 37,339 acre-feet, and the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge was allowed to divert 28,000 acre-feet and
consume 23,000 acre-feet, all with 1941 priorities.
I. THE PLLRC AND BEYOND
The following year the Public Land Law Review Commission 32 (PLLRC) was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the public lands of the United States and the laws, polirl

165 F. Supp. at 601.

2 F. TRELEASE, supra

note 15, at 145.

See note 24 supra.
" See C. WHEATLEY & C. CORKER, STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND USE
OF WATER RESOURCES ON THE PUBuC LANDS (Prepared for the Public Land Law Review
Commission) 106-12 (1969).
' 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
12 The authorization for the PLLRC and the guidelines for its operation are found at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970).
2
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cies, and practices relating thereto. The development, management, and use of water resources on the public lands was seen as
a part of this assignment, and what has been known as the
Wheatley-Corker Study 3 was commissioned. That study's thorough, in-depth analysis of the reserved rights doctrine and the
reception and treatment given it by the agencies were supposed
to be nonpartisan and dispassionate. Indeed it was, on the surface, yet it left not a shred of respectability to the doctrine. The
Commission, however, put aside academic arguments and lingering doubts, saying they were laid to rest by Arizona v. California,
and urged legislative action to dispel the uncertainties produced
by the doctrine. The Commission recommended: First, a quantification by the agencies of their water requirements for the next
40 years; second, a procedure for administrative or judicial determination of the reasonableness and validity of the agency claims;
third, a requirement that future withdrawals of land carry no
water rights without an express reservation of unappropriated
water; and last, but not least, a provision for compensation whenever a use under an implied reserved right interfered with a state
law water right vested prior to the decision in Arizona v.
California.3 The Commission put its recommendation for compensation squarely on the basis of fairness by recognizing that
''prior to the Supreme Court's decision . . . no water user could
have been on actual or constructive notice of the existence of such
an 'implied' Federal water right." 5
The Commission's first two recommendations ignored the
possibility explored in the Wheatley-Corker report: That federal
implied reserved water rights might be identified and quantified
by state courts and agencies in general adjudication proceedings
along with everyone else's water rights. The federal agencies ignored the Commission's recommendation that they identify and
quantify their own needs. When a Colorado water user summoned
the United States into a Colorado state adjudication case, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the District Court in and for
the County of Eagle acquired jurisdiction under the McCarran
3

See note 30 supra.
PuBuc LAND LAW REVIEW

(1970).
1 Id. at 149.
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Amendment,"6 by which the United States had consented to be
sued in suits for the adjudication of water rights when it was the
owner of water rights acquired by appropriation under state law,
by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise.37 This listing, said Mr.
Justice Douglas, had no exceptions and included reserved rights.
Questions of the validity and scope of reserved rights might be
questions of federal law, but they were questions which might be
decided by a state court, subject to review by the Supreme Court
38
of the United States.
By this time the National Water Commission 39 had been created, and the question of reserved water rights was made a part
of a legal study relating to federal-state relations in water law.4 I
tried in that study to add an economic dimension to the discussion. I pointed out, to my complete satisfaction, that it was nonsense to treasure the doctrine as a source of power, as the Justice
Department and the conservation groups were doing, since the
United States had ample constitutional and statutory powers to
take and use water for all its projects and programs, free from
state interference. The only question, I tried to say, was whether
the United States should pay for water it took from its former
users. If it exercised federal power in the usual way, it would
compensate the water user for his loss, but, if the new found
"implied reservation doctrine" was used, the United States could
take the water without paying for it. My first recommendation
was for a National Water Resources Procedures Act, a procedural
approach which would have combined the features of Eagle
County and section 383 of the Reclamation Act 4 and applied
them to all federal uses: The Federal Government should proceed
in conformity with state law when making any use of water and
follow state permit or court procedures when initiating or perfecting water rights. In other words, it should act as it had thousands
of times in the past when obtaining water for national parks,
forests, reclamation projects, and BLM lands. Conformity to
state procedures did not mean compliance with substantive law,
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
United States v. District Court in and for the County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
Id. at 526.
42 U.S.C. § 1962 (Supp. IV 1974).
,0F. TRtLEASE, supra note 15.
"1483 U.S.C. §§ 371-616yyy (1970).

WA TER

however. Federal supremacy was preserved and state law could
not block a federal project or action authorized by a constitutional congressional statute. The national agency might proceed
despite the state law, using such state forms and formalities as it
deemed desirable to 42give the states notice of the type and amount
of the federal claim.
To this suggestion for procedural comity was added a recommendation for abolition of the no-compensation feature of the
reserved right. The argument of the National Water Commission
(NWC) was quite different from that of the Public Land Law
Review Commission. The main theme of the NWC was that water
law should be put on a sound property basis, that a sensible
system of water rights would not include a bunch of wild cards
in the deck, cards that could be played at any time as trumps to
upset the expectations of water users. The doctrine should be
abandoned, not simply on the fairness rationale argued by the
PLLRC but because of its economic unsoundness, legal fallacies,
and planning incompatibilities. 3
The most that can be said for my efforts is that they dispelled
the myth that reserved rights were a source of federal power and
a valuable conservation tool that gave freedom from state control.
The Department of Justice abandoned its claim to this effect and
came to treat reserved rights simply as valuable property rights
of the Government, valuable because they would save a few dollars of water costs for some federal water uses.
As a result of Eagle County, the federal agencies found themselves in state adjudication proceedings in New Mexico, Utah,
and Idaho, as well as in several other Colorado courts. The Department of Justice felt that these valuable rights should not be
left to unsympathetic state courts and administrators, but should
be protected by the federal courts, and attempted an end run
around Eagle County. The United States had been joined in the
state proceedings in northwestern Colorado but not in southwestern Colorado. Federal lawyers rushed into the federal district
court in Denver and filed a suit to adjudicate all federal reserved
rights from the San Juan River and its tributaries for national
"

NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE

, Id. at 464-68.

FuTuR 459-63 (1973).
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parks, monuments, and forests; rights held on behalf of a couple
of Indian tribes; and some state law rights held for these purposes
and for reclamation projects. Over a thousand water users were
made defendants, the list being headed by Mary Akin, who enjoyed in some measure the advantage held by Abou ben Adam.
The United States district judge first held that he had jurisdiction over the case, as one arising under federal law, but then
dismissed it on the theory that he should abstain from deciding
it since important problems of state law were involved. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that abstention
was inappropriate."
While Akin was in this posture, the Secretary of the Interior,
as Chairman of the United States Water Resources Council,
asked the Department of Justice for its opinion on the National
Water Commission's recommendations and for an alternative
suggestion for a statute. What has come to be known as the Keichel Bill4 5 was drafted, along with a supporting statement." It
would require the head of each water using agency of the United
States to prepare an inventory of all the agency's water rights,
both reserved and appropriated, under procedures established by
the Secretary of the Interior and under statutory guidelines for
quantification. The Secretary would maintain a national inventory of these rights and would inform the states of the water rights
claimed in each. State water officials, or a water user claiming an
injury, might then bring an action for judicial review in the federal courts. Curiously, this was not proposed as an exclusive remedy. State adjudications might still be brought under the McCarran Amendment, and the "race to the courthouse" might proceed.
The supporting statement, except for an erroneous assertion
that the National Water Commission sought state control over
federal activity by its "conformity" recommendation, explained
the bill as a straightforward assertion of federal property rights.
Quantification in this manner was said to be a fulfillment of the
" United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).

U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Proposed Bill to Provide for the Inventorying and Quantification of the Reserved, Appropriative and Other Rights to the Use of Water by the United
States (June 20, 1974 draft).
" Id. Supporting statement at 7-9.
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PLLRC's request, and, as for compensation, it was said that this
might follow the quantification once the United States knew how
much people might be hurt and how much it might be giving
away. This bill was never approved by the United States Water
Resources Council or introduced into Congress. It now rests in the
same limbo that holds the PLLRC and National Water Commission recommendations.
Next came the reversal of Akin. Mrs. Akin lost her alphabetical advantage because she didn't have funds to finance an appeal,
and the case became the polysyllabic Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States.' First the Supreme Court
ruled that the United States district courts did indeed have jurisdiction over an adjudication brought by the Federal Government,
that the McCarran Amendment gave concurrent but not exclusive jurisdiction to the state court."
Turning to the question of abstention, the Court affirmed the
court of appeals' holding that abstention was not proper, that
there were no "difficult questions of state law," and that federal
adjudications would not disrupt an important state policy. Then,
astonishingly, the Court dismissed the case on another ground.
After the federal action was begun, the United States had been
served with process to make it a party in continuing adjudication
proceedings going on in the Colorado Water Court for Water Division 7. It was already in court in Water Divisions 4, 5, and 6. The
matter was one of concurrent jurisdiction, said the Court, and, to
avoid duplication, to carry out the policy of the McCarran
Amendment, and to prevent the piecemeal adjudication of water
rights from the same source in different courts, the federal courts
should give way.50 The case was bolstered by considerations of
forum non conviens (the federal court in Denver was 300 miles
from the river), the fact that no action had yet been taken by the
federal court, and the adequacy of the state court as a forum for
the federal claims, as attested by the Government's participation
in the other state adjudications.
- 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
" Id. at 808-09.
' Id. at 813-17.
Id. at 817-21.
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This brings us finally back to the pupfish case, decided June
7, 1976. Although the Eagle County and Colorado River District
cases had been occasions for restatement of the reserved rights
doctrine, Cappaert v. United States' added some meager substantive clues to the doctrine. To some extent the Court reduced
most of what it said to dicta. It pointed out that the proclamation
setting aside the reservation proclaims that, "WHEREAS the
said pool is of such outstanding scientific importance that it
should be given special protection,"" and said that the water
right reserved was therefore explicit, not implied. 53 However, the
Court went on to give rules for implied reservations and to apply
its statements to the reservation before it, as if it were an implied
one.
I have been told that the Cappaerts, the Nevada water authorities, and their many states' rights friends fought the case to
the death because it was the first case of substantial harm done
by enforcement of a federal water right, and would, therefore,
show the inequitable nature of such rights, and because they
sought a ruling that groundwater hidden beneath the earth could
not be the subject of a reserved right because its presence was
unknown and there could have been no intention to preserve it.
Both arguments were foredoomed.
The "inequitable" argument had always been based on the
following assumed sequence: (1) A reservation was founded, say,
in 1900; (2) in 1950, while the reserved water right lay dormant
and unknown, an appropriator put the water to a valuable and
beneficial use at a considerable cost; (3) the existence of the
reserved right was discovered in 1955 or 1963 to the horror of all
good water users and state governments; and (4) in 1970 the
Government exercised its rights, and the appropriator was
stripped of his water and shorn of his investment without any
claim for compensation. But in the Cappaert case the sequence
is reversed. The reservation was made in 1952, and the water was
then used by the United States to maintain the lineage of its
wards, the pupfish. It was the Cappaerts who in 1970 threatened
"
52

426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 132.
Id. at 140.
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to disturb the status quo and interfere with the prior right and
prior use of the United States.
The Court finally placed federal reserved rights on a property
basis.54 The Cappaerts and the State of Nevada paraded out the
old, hackneyed argument that the Desert Land Act "severed the
water from the land" and subjected it to state law. The Court
took the bait and said that Pelton Dam was the answer, that the
Desert Land Act does not apply to reserved land. "Federal water
rights are not dependent upon state law or state procedures," 56
said the Court, the Cappaerts' patents were "'subject to any
vested and accrued water rights,' " including the Government's
prior reserved rights. While their vested water rights were protected from later federal encroachment, the Cappaerts had no
water rights in 1952.58 The Court did not stress the fact that the
Cappaerts' rights post-dated not only the federal reservation but
also the federal use. This was the real answer, as the Cappaerts
would have been entitled to no compensation even if the recommendations of the PLLRC and the National Water Commission
had been law.
The groundwater argument fared no better. In one sense the
Court ducked it. The reserved water, said the Court, was the pool
in the cavern, and the pool was surface water. True, it was connected to groundwater, and the Court said: "We hold that the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion,
whether the diversion of surface or groundwater."59
The pupfish case shed some light on other troublesome issues. One is intent. In Arizona v. California the Court had said:
"[TIhe United States [who is he?] intended [how? with
what?] to reserve water sufficient for the future requirements
60 In Cappaert the Court repeated the standard formula:
....
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is whether

F.

Prior to Cappaert,the Court had spoken of federal powers, not property rights. See
note 15, at 147j-1.

TRELEASE, supra

426 U.S. at 144.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 140 n.5.
SId.
Id. at 143.
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the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously unappropriated waters
are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation
was created."

But in its preliminary recital of the implied reservation of water
rights doctrine, the Court found no need to speak of intent,
whether implied, expressed, or fictional:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal
purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the
purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a
reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of
the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators."2

Three other aspects of the case should be noted. First, a
water level is maintained, giving some precedent for instream
flows. Second, the Court reiterated the rule that
[tlhe implied reservation of water doctrine . . . reserves only that
amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,
no more . . . . The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the
intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to
preserve its scientific interest . . . . Thus, as the District Court has
correctly determined, the level of the pool may be permitted to drop
to the extent that the drop does not impair the scientific value of
the pool as the natural habitat of the species sought to be preserved."

This too has significance for those claims of the United States
that stream flows may be reserved for instream uses. Such flows
will be the minimum needed to preserve the features of the reservation, not full natural flows. Of course, there may be reservations whose purposes could demand a full natural flow, but there
is some comfort in the recognition that others may share in the
reserved waters, that the reserved right is not a complete dog-in373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
*1426 U.S. at 139.
2 Id. at 138. Compare with Personal Communication, February 17, 1977, from Michael D. White, Esq., of Denver, Colorado, sometime master-referee, "Seven Courts
Case," infra note 66 (stating that "[t]he reservation doctrine is a device invented by the
Court to remedy an oversight of the federal executive and legislative branches in failing
to save or provide a method of saving water for federal purposes").
13426 U.S. at 141.
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the-manger doctrine."4 Finally, the pool on the reservation was
protected by reducing withdrawals from its off-reservation
sources, again significant for instream flows. Such flows could be
reserved not only in streams arising on the federal land but also
in those flowing into the reservation or into and then out of a
private enclave within a reservation. 5
III. QUANTIFICATION-AT LAST
Following the remand of Eagle County, the United States
filed its claims for reserved rights in that case and in several
additional adjudication proceedings pending in other Colorado
courts. These proceedings were consolidated into the "Seven
Courts Case," 6 and all federal claims were referred to a single
master-referee. The litigation covered five river basins, and reserved water rights were claimed for seven national forests, one
national park, three national monuments, fifteen hundred
springs and waterholes, two mineral hot springs and two naval oil
shale reserves. The report of the master-referee contains more
than a thousand pages. It is three inches thick and weighs five
and one-half pounds. It contains not only the typical findings of
fact and conclusions of law but an excellent treatment of the law
of reserved rights as well. Some of the conclusions reached seem
more certain to the master-referee than to me; but he was ruling,
not speculating or analyzing, and his positiveness is suited to his
task.
It appears to me that this mountainous labor has brought
forth a rather small mouse. In all of the northwestern third of the
State of Colorado, the current uses by forests and parks add up
to only 12.981 cubic feet per second of stream flow and 2044.2
acre-feet of stored water. 7 The water rights for these uses cause
no problems; they coexist with existing private uses. The possible
and probable future uses are those which supposedly cause the
" Furthermore, the Court equated Indian reservations with "other federal enclaves."
Id. at 138. This may have significance when the Court comes around to deciding Indian
claims to aboriginal ownership of streams.
" In several Indian cases, upstream diversions could be curtailed to permit Indian
uses of waters flowing past the reservation. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963);
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
" M. White, Partial Master-Referee Report Governing All of the Claims of the United
States of America In and For the State of Colorado (1976).
11Id. at 15.
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concern over reserved rights. Conditional decrees for these future
uses show that they may eventually total 35.963 cubic feet per
second and 6352.39 acre-feet of impounded water. Out on the
range land the reserved springs and waterholes are found to have
a total flow of 15.39 cubic feet per second and impoundments of
7,223 acre-feet. 8 Not all of this is reserved. These amounts are
subject to reduction when evidence is submitted to show the precise amount of water reasonably necessary to fulfill the needs of
graziers who use the water-holes. These reserved waters are de
minimis; they represent no water at all compared to the total flow
of five rivers. It is true that these amounts do not include the
minimum flows and levels for streams and lakes in the parks and
forests. Evidence on these was postponed, and they will eventually be fixed at some future date prior to 1981. In the forests,
however, these recreational, fish and wildlife reservations will
have such a late priority as not to constitute a threat to current
uses, if the master-referee's ruling on the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 19609 holds up. In his opinion, the Creative Act of 189110 established the forest reserves for the purposes
of watershed protection and production of timber. The Organic
Act of 1897" expanded the description of these purposes but
added nothing to them. The opinion reasoned that although the
forests may have been used from the beginning for hunting, fishing, recreation, camping, and cattle range these were uses, not the
purposes for which the forests were established. Not until the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 were "outdoor recreation" and "wildlife and fish" stated as statutory purposes for
which the forests were maintained." If this reasoning holds (and
the master-referee presented a convincing case), then the priority
date of instream flows for these purposes is June 12, 1960, long
after most diversions and impoundments within the forests were
made. Minimum flows will be superior to uses initiated after that
date, and might interfere with some future uses high up in the
headwaters, but this is not a total loss to private uses, since the
reservations will preserve and pass down the flows for use below
PId.
19 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
70 Id.
7

7

§ 471.

Id. § 475.
See note 69 supra.
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the forest boundaries.7 3 Although most western streams are
formed on the national forests and run down from them, some
streams run into them, and some leave them, flow through a
private enclave, and then back into the forests. Post-1960 appropriations of these waters, on private lands before they enter or
reenter forests, could be reduced by the forests' need for minimum flows.
But even these effects will not be felt if another ruling of the
master-referee holds up. One section of the 1897 Organic Act is
now 16 U.S.C. § 481: "All waters within the boundaries of national forests may be used for domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of the State wherein such national
forests are situated, or under the laws of the United States and
the rules and regulations established thereunder."7 4 This, said the
master-referee, subordinates all of the United States' reserved
rights on national forests to Colorado water rights for domestic,
mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, whether such rights bear
priority dates before or after the date of the reservation of the
waters appurtenant to the forests.
Another court has made a ruling quite inconsistent with
these Colorado conclusions. An Idaho trial court, adjudicating a
"minimum flow" for fishing, fire protection, and esthetic purposes on a forest established in 1907, gave the flow a 1907 priority
date and quantified it as the full natural flow of the stream, in
order to preserve the forest in its original condition." If carried
to extremes, this ruling would mean that all ditches in the national forests would have to be closed, all reservoirs emptied. I do
not believe that this can be sustained. 16 U.S.C. § 481 may not
be as far-reaching as the Colorado master-referee found it, but at
least it indicates that private uses can be made within the forests.
Furthermore, it seems very difficult to find an intent in 1891,
1897, or even 1960 to preserve the national forests in their pristine
"' The continental divide runs north and south through Colorado, dividing not only
the water of the state but the people of the state. The effect noted above may make the
people of Denver very unhappy, since they may be unable to capture some water at
elevations high enough to make transdivide diversions feasible, but this may be offset by
a corresponding happiness of the people of the western slope.
16 U.S.C. § 481 (1970).
'5 Soderman v. Kackley, No. 1829 (Dist. Ct., Caribou County, Idaho, Jan. 8, 1975),
appeal docketed, No. 12482 (Idaho Sup. Ct., Feb. 20, 1975).
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condition as parks or wilderness areas. Not even the Devil's Hole
pupfish is entitled to the maintenance of the natural conditions
which existed at the time of the creation of his preserve in 1952.
The Supreme Court in Cappaertexplicitly stated:
The pool need only be preserved, consistent with the intention expressed in the Proclamation, to the extent necessary to preserve its
scientific interest . . . . Thus, . . . the level of the pool may be
permitted to drop to the extent that the drop does not impair the
scientific value of the pool as the natural habitat of the species
sought to be preserved."6

Applying this rule to the national forests, it hardly seems possible
that the Government could assert an intention to reserve full
flows when its officers soon issued use permits for such ditches
and dams and permitted uses to so impair the streams for forest
purposes as to require a rollback of uses to restore as "necessary"
that which has been foregone for many years.
Minimum flows for park purposes may be more likely, but
they do not seem to create a very large problem in Colorado."
Rocky Mountain National Park is on the headwaters. But one
substantial claim to instream flows in the Yampa River for Dinosaur National Monument could, if sustained, create problems for
upstream energy companies which have conditional decrees for
water for coal development.
The master-referee's report does not touch the largest possible federal reserved right, that for development of the Naval Oil
Shale Reserve. A claim for 200,000 acre-feet-a tidy bit of
water-was submitted. No evidence was submitted on this claim,
however, and at a pretrial conference the claim was simply put
aside, and the master-referee has now referred it back to the
court. It, therefore, remains as a bug-a-boo. But gossip has it (a)
that new research shows that this figure is much too high, and not
nearly as much water will be needed for extraction of the oil as
was first thought; (b) that since the Reserve nowhere touches the
Colorado River, the water is not "appurtenant," and the claim to
a reserved right may be withdrawn or denied; so that (c) if, or
when, the United States undertakes to develop the oil shale as a
national enterprise or leases of the oil shale are negotiated with
11426 U.S.
"

at 141.

See M. White, supra note 66 at 343, 374.
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oil (energy) companies, the developer must appropriate or buy its
water like any other lessee of oil shale on neighboring BLM lands.
A few years ago the big threat was thought to be that Mineral
King, a huge proposed Walt Disney Inc. ski resort on the Inyo
National Forest in the Sierras, would claim the forest's recreational prerogatives. But the Forest Service has abstained from
assigning its recreation right to concessionaires there and in New
Mexico, and I know of no current threats of this nature. It is
possible, of course, that other types of reservations may take substantial quantities of water. The federal reserved water rights
quantified for the National Wildlife refuges in Arizona v.
California sound big-annual diversions of 41,838 and 28,000
acre-feet producing consumption of 37,339 and 23,000 acre-feet.
But these are drops in the lower Colorado bucket, at most threefourths of one percent of withdrawals, although they admittedly
might loom large elsewhere. Furthermore, a second look at the
facts in the Report of the Special Master shows that these waters
are needed for artificial marshes and irrigated feeding grounds to
be substituted for natural areas destroyed by channelizing the
river; and it is a fair guess that this water is no more than that
which was formerly soaked up by, and evaporated from, the original natural river bottom areas.78 At one time the Fish and Wildlife
Service claimed the full flow of one of the Oregon streams feeding
the Malheur Refuge and demanded that fifty-year-old irrigation
ditches be closed, but that demand has been dropped.
CONCLUSION

I am coming to believe that "the Feds" were right all along.
In 1964, at the height of the debates over the "Western Water
Rights Settlements Acts,"79 it was pointed out that "not a single
case of harm has been reported,"" that "for all of the outcry...
not one state, not one county, not one municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come
forward to plead and prove that the United States . . . has deS. Rifkind, Special Master's Report, Arizona v. California, at 95 (1960).
See note 24 supra.
Hearings on S. 1275 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigationand Reclamation of the
Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. 39 (1964) (statement
of Senator Clifford P. Anderson).
"
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stroyed any private right."'" Twenty-two years after Pelton Dam
this is still true.
The actual measurement of National Forest uses in Colorado
shows how small they are, and the quantification of future forest
uses shows that most fears from this source are groundless. Federal officials have refrained from pressing large claims or assigning them to private enterprises carrying out federal functions.
Minimum flows are located for the most part where they can do
the least harm, and the courts are unlikely to order, and the
federal agencies are likely to abstain from enforcing, large instream flows that would force a rollback of longstanding uses that
have done no harm.
I find precious little common ground with Mr. Walter Kiechel and very few things that he and I agree upon. But he puts
forth an idea in a sentence of the supporting statement to the
Kiechel Bill that I think makes sense: "Surely until many more
cases of actual interference are discovered than have been reported so far it is more appropriate that any meritous problems
of this kind which may be found to exist be treated by special
relief legislation.""2 Why not wait? A particularly atrocious case
of uncompensated damage to waterfront property finally brought
the downfall of the navigation servitude in section 111 of the
Flood Control Act of 1970.3 Why not wait for such a case of real
and substantial harm from the implied reservation doctrine?
Maybe Kiechel's special relief bill could be turned into general
legislation. Such a case would be far more effective than the
bogies we have been conjuring up.
So I no longer jump when the old tattered-sheet specter is
thrust at me, and I am tired of leaping into action at every call
of "Wolf!" In the future, I intend to devote my waning energies
to real problems like why the Cappaerts and the United States
do not act like ordinary water users with a protection of diversion
problem, and work out a physical and legal solution that will
allow irrigation, yet preserve the water level and, thus, permit the
Cappaerts and the pupfish each to do their thing.
Id. (statement of Nicolas B. Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General).
, See note 46 supra.
" F. TRELEASE, supra note 15, at 189-96.

COMMENTS ON "FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS"

By JEROME C. MuYs*
In its 1970 report to Congress and the President,' the Public
Land Law Review Commission evaluated the problems posed by
the so-called reservation doctrine of federal water rights as follows:
The result has been apprehension in the western public land
states that the doctrine will have the effect of disrupting established
water right priority systems and destroying, without compensation,
water rights considered to have vested under state law. Moreover,
the uncertainty generated by the doctrine is an impediment to
sound coordinated planning for future water resources development.'

Consequently, it recommended "legislative action to dispel the
uncertainty which the implied reservation doctrine has produced
and to provide the basis for cooperative water resources development planning between the Federal Government and the public
land states."'
The Commission enumerated four specific legislative actions
that it felt essential to accomplish that goal, concluding that
Congress should:
1. Provide a reasonable period of time within which Federal land
agencies must ascertain and give public notice of their projected
water requirements for the next forty (40) years for reserved areas,
and forbid the assertion of the reservationclaim for any quantity or
use not included within such public notice.
2. Establisha procedurefor administrativeorjudicialdetermination
of the reasonableness of the quantity claimed, or the validity of the
proposed use under present law.
3. Provide that procedures for creation of future withdrawals and
reservations require, as a condition to claims of reserved water
rights, a statement of prospective water requirements and an express reservation of such quantity of unappropriatedwater; and
4. Require compensation to be paid where the utilization of the
* Mr. Muys is presently a partner in the firm of Debevoise and Liberman in Washington, D.C.
PUBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970).
2

Id. at 144.

2Id.

Id. at 147-49.
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implied reservation doctrine interferes with uses under water rights
vested under state law prior to the 1963 decision in Arizona v.
California.I

Three years later, the report of the National Water Commission identified the same problems with the reservation doctrine,
but decided not to endorse the proposed remedy of the Public
Land Law Review Commission, which it found disadvantageous
in two respects: (1) the expense of quantification; and (2) the
likelihood that government officials would inflate federal claims
under the quantification procedure. 5
Consequently, it proposed that the uses on federal reserves
be brought into conformity with state law, in accordance with the
basic thrust of the Commission's broader recommendations in the
field of federal-state water rights, by requiring the federal agencies to file their reserved rights claims with the state agencies.,
With respect to uses existing on the effective date of the proposed
National Water Rights Procedure Act,7 the federal agencies would
be entitled to a priority date for their existing uses as of the date
of the original reservation of the federal lands. Uses on federal
reserved lands subsequent to that date would receive a priority
date as of the initiation of the actual use. The Commission also
recommended that compensation be required where existing
water uses under state law are displaced by uses under reserved
water rights.8
Professor Trelease evaluates recent developments in the
water rights field with respect to the reserved rights doctrine and
generally finds that the problems which both the Public Land
Law Review Commission and the National Water Commission
were concerned about still have not yet ripened into any kind of
serious threat to existing or potential water users. Therefore, he
NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE

FuTuRE 467-68 (1973).

Id. at 464-66.
Id. at 462. This proposed act, as recommended by the National Water Commission,
would require:
(1) the conforming of Federal water rights to the form of State law, (2)
Federal use of those substantive State laws that advance the Federal purpose, and (3) Federal observance of those State procedures which do not
impair the substance of the Federal right. The Act would establish a policy
of compensation for the holders of State water rights if the Federal Government takes their water for its programs.

Id.
Id. at 467.
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concludes that perhaps the solutions recommended by both commissions might really be unnecessary. To support his thesis he
cites the results of several river basin adjudications in Colorado
under the McCarran Amendment 9 in which a number of the federal reserved water rights in five river basins have been adjudicated by a water master, subject to review in the Colorado
courts.' 0 While I share his hope that the special master's recommendations will be finally approved, the final result remains uncertain. In addition, there are substantial claims for federal reserved water rights for minimum flows and naval oil shale reserves in those basins which have not yet been adjudicated, but
have simply been deferred to later stages of the litigation." These
involve large volumes indeed,"' as Professor Trelease recognizes,
but he reports that the government may not be able to sustain
them because the Colorado River may not be "appurtenant" to
a reserve that never touches it. He also states that some National
Forest officials were not assigning claims for reserved recreational
rights to ski resorts, implying that perhaps a similar practice
might be followed with respect to any reserved water rights that
might be established for the oil shale reserves. This does not
particularly hearten me. I do not think that the fate of existing
water users should have to hinge upon how a particular federal
official decides to exercise his discretion in asserting a federal
reserved water right. Moreover, I do not think we can continue
to expect this kind of self-restraint on the part of all federal water
officials. Indeed several years ago some Forest Service regions
were allowing Forest supervisors to delegate a portion of a National Forest's presumed reserved water right to special use permittees. There have also been contentions in some quarters that
the Federal Government ought to assert a broad range of water
rights on federal reserved and, indeed, unreserved public lands
where actual uses have been made or are contemplated.' 3 With
respect to the situation in Colorado, moreover, it is important to
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
M.

WHITE, PARTIAL MASTER-REFEREE REPORT GOVERNING ALL OF THE CLAIMS OF THE

(1976).
" Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC (this issue).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AND FOR THE STATE OF COLORADO
12 Id.

," See, e.g., Muys, Legal Problems Involved in Developing Water Supplies for Energy
Development, 8 NAT. RESOURCE LAW. 335, 340-42 (1975).
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remember that not all western states have a comparable comprehensive stream adjudication system in operation, although Professor Trelease informed me this morning that Wyoming has just
enacted one. In most of the other states water rights are administratively determined, subject to judicial review, and there is no
provision for an ongoing adjudication in which all rights can be
determined under the McCarran Amendment.
Most important, I think that implementation of the Public
Land Law Review Commission's recommendations for administrative quantification under Congressional guidelines, including
provisions for judicial review, is still essential for meaningful
water resource development planning in the West, particularly
when we are faced with the substantial water requirements for
energy development throughout all of the Rocky Mountain Region. Similarly, the reasonableness of a number of interstate compact water allocations that have been made over the last half
century appears to be under increasing scrutiny. It is quite obvious that many of those compact allocations were made without
any recognition of the impact of federal reserved water rights on
the allocations made to each state. I know from my review of the
minutes of the meetings of the negotiators who produced the
Upper Colorado River Compact that federal and Indian reserved
water rights were not a significant component of the asserted
state requirements which were the foundation of the individual
state percentage allocations of the Upper Basin supply. Consequently, if there is to be any amendment of such compacts as has
been suggested in some quarters, it would seem essential to have
a better idea of the magnitude of federal reserved water rights
throughout the West than we have to date, and indeed than we
can expect to have even under the most expedited kind of adjudication such as that recently completed in Colorado.
So, in my view, giving full recognition to all the developments that Professor Trelease has enumerated, I still find the
basic problems presented by the reservation doctrine not only
unresolved but no less troublesome than they were when the Public Land Law Review Commission and the National Water Commission made their recommendations. Furthermore, I continue to
believe that the procedure proposed by the Public Land Law
Review Commission is the best way to deal with the problem. It
mandates an administrative quantification process, which is al-
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ready being conducted by some of the federal agencies, 4 with
appropriate judicial safeguards so that we can at least produce a
ballpark figure for the magnitude of the claims that are potentially subject to the reservation doctrine throughout the West.
With respect to the fears voiced by the National Water Commission that federal officials might make exorbitant inflated claims,
I think Professor Trelease's evaluation of the general reasonableness of the claims made thus far by the Federal Government in
the Colorado adjudications is pretty good evidence that, initially
at least, the federal agencies have kept their claims at a reasonable level. Consequently, I have no reason to believe that they
would do otherwise if Congress directed the quantification of
these claims by the Secretary of the Interior.
Therefore, my conclusion is that it is time for Congress to
implement the recommendations of the Public Land Law Review
Commission and that an appropriate starting point is the socalled Kiechel bill that was prepared in the Justice Department
several years ago to provide for quantification of all federally
reserved water rights, including Indian water rights."5 That proposal has met with widespread opposition in the West for a variety of reasons, but nevertheless I believe that it is basically a
sound approach, although I strongly disagree with its failure to
provide compensation for pre-1963 vested water rights which
might be displaced by federal reserved water rights. Such compensation is essential, as a matter of equity, to all existing water
rights holders and should be an integral component of any quantification legislation.
An example of what may be expected in the absence of legislation authorizing a system of quantification is found in the Federal Register of March 17, 1977,16 in which the Secretary of the
Interior published proposed regulations stating the scope of his
proposed approval of the creation of water codes by individual
Indian tribes for the allocation of their claimed reserved water
11A Task Force was at work in the Interior Department toward the close of the last
administration attempting to make administrative quantification of reserved rights for a
number of Indian reservations in order to facilitate meaningful water resource planning.
" See Kiechel, Inventory and Quantificationof Federal Water Rights-A Common
Denominator of Proposalsfor Change, 8 NAT. REsOURCE LAw. 255 (1975).

" 42 Fed. Reg. 14885 (1977) (to be codified in 25 C.F.R. § 260).
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7 to Indirights, under the doctrine of Winters v. United States,"
ans and non-Indians for use on each reservation. The proposed
regulations would essentially permit each tribe to establish unilaterally the magnitude of its claimed reserved rights under Secretarial guidelines which substantially expand the scope of such
rights as announced by the Supreme Court to date, thereby adding even greater confusion to an already complex and controversial problem. They punctuate the need for Congress to establish
guidelines for the quantification of federal reserved water rights
claims as the first step to a permanent solution of the problem.
17207 U.S. 564 (1M08).
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REAL LIVE PROBLEM OR

Two

FOR THE WANING

ENERGIES OF FRANK J. TRELEASE
By

CHARLES CORKER*

In early March Frank Trelease sent Jerry Muys and me a
draft of his paper entitled Federal Reserved Water Rights Since
PLLRC. He said that he was giving us his "general tenor" and
something to disagree about.
What surprised me was what he said about the "reservation
doctrine" in his conclusion: "I no longer jump when the old
tattered-sheet spector is thrust at me, and I am tired of leaping
into action at every call of 'Wolf.' In the future, I intend to devote
my waning energies to real live problems like -. "
Maybe I misread a word he had substituted for one crossed
out. It might be "waking energies," or "waxing energies." I hope
it is "waxing energies." I hope Trelease waxes, not like the moon
waxes before it wanes, but like Jehovah waxed-to wit, He waxed
exceeding wroth-after He had to stamp out heresies among the
Children of Israel-again, and again.
Trelease is surely right in saying that all the water diverted
as a result of the "reservation doctrine," leaving out Indian water
rights, is de minimis. It is a quantity beneath the accuracy of a
stream gauge. It is what a bird, a butterfly, a deer, or a backpacker drinks from a stream without need of permission. The rest
of the water flows from the National Forests and the National
Parks subject to the law of gravity.
At least I don't want Frank Trelease to worry about that.
And instead, I want him to get angry. The reservation doctrine
Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle.
See Trelease, Federal Reserve Water Rights Since PLLRC (this issue). Maybe the
uses on the federal wildlife refuges on the Colorado River main stream are not de minim is.
At any rate, that part of the decree in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), will
probably never get implemented. The 1941 priorities on the Arizona side are good, but on
the California side, the 1941 priorities are as dry as the Sahara. Implementation will
require piling up the water on the river's left bank, like Moses piled up the Red Sea. The
job will be harder than the one Moses had, because Moses had to keep the sea piled up
only long enough to let the Israelites through and could let it go to drown some Egyptians.
This has to be a permanent Pile Up. If the great Pile Up happens, it will probably scare
the ducks to death. The tourist attraction should be watched best from the California side
of the river.
*
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is a rhetorical, chimerical phantasmagoria. It is the product of a
fabricated legislative history. It is a perversion and a prevarication.
The reservation doctrine risks attempts by undereducated
lawyers and well-meaning judges to remake American water law
without ever having understood it. There is no possibility that
such attempts will succeed. There is no more danger that they
will damage water law itself than that they will wreck an essential
mechanism of our federal system, which is a sophisticated relationship of state and federal law.
For his first offense, I would not seek to disbar the federal
lawyer who invokes the reservation doctrine. Even at second offense I would follow humane precedent, and accept his resignation from the bar with prejudice. I would thereafter even consider
his reinstatement after suitable penitence. As punishment such
a lawyer should do what Trelease and I have both done-he
should read the full legislative history of the Desert Land Act of
1877,2 and other statutes which Justice Sutherland misread and
distorted in California-OregonPower Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co. 3 in 1935. You have to read it all before you can say
that nothing is there, but I can say it. No one in the nineteenth
century could reasonably have thought that Congress intended to
establish, or that Congress had the power to establish, a system
of water rights in the states. The exceptions are readers of Lux v.
Haggin' in 1886. In its origin, the California doctrine announced
by that case was as mythic as Goldilocks and the Three Bears.
This is so for two reasons. They can be quickly and simply
stated without exploring any legislative history. The first is that
water rights have to be administered, wherever water rights are
at all important. Federal officials and agencies to administer
water rights have never been created. Federal judges cannot ad2 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19
Stat. 377). As originally enacted, the Desert Land Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, § 3, 19
Stat. 377 (amended to include Colorado by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 8, 26 Stat. 1095)
was inapplicable to Colorado. Has anyone ever thought that prior appropriation did not
exist in Colorado?
3 295 U.S, 142 (1935). Compare the quite different view of the statutes in the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose decision the Supreme Court affirmed, CaliforniaOregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1934).
69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884), 10 P. 674 (1886).
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minister water rights without a federal administrator.. There
never has been a federally administered system of water rights,
but every state where water is scarce has adopted and administered such a system.
The second reason is even more basic. Water law is not a
discrete and separate branch of the law, but is part of the law of
real property. State law differs as to how, and whether, water
rights can be transferred separate from land, but it is clear that
most transfers of water rights are accompanied by transfers of
land in every state. Water rights, irrigation ditches, and access
to a source of water supply are an inseparable whole. The parts
cannot be totally independent. Practically, if not conceptually,
real property law is far beyond the power of Congress to preempt.
Conceivably Congress could invoke the Commerce power, the
power to spend money for the general welfare, or some other
power and enact, or compel states to enact, say, a statute of
frauds for property, or render the existing statutes of frauds inoperative. It is most unlikely we shall ever find out, because Congress has no conceivable reason to attempt it.
There is no general federal common law. This has been established since 1812. 5 In Swift v. Tyson' Justice Story persuaded his
colleagues in 1842 to apply a federal common law in bills and note
cases, and such like, in the federal diversity jurisdiction. This
federal common law endured for 96 yearsi until Erie R.R.7 overruled Swift in 1938. Federal common law in this context was
grossly unfair, because a plaintiff by choosing either the federal
or the state courts could choose his rule of substantive law.
So long as Trelease and even a few of his students survive-and we are all his students, I suspect-there is not much
direct danger to water rights. However, there is danger to the
federal system itself. That danger is illustrated by the three years
which separate Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona' from Oregon v.
United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842). Justice Brandeis wrote the Court's opinion and in Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), decided the same day, reaffirmed
the existence of a federal interstate common law by which the Supreme Court resolves
interstate disputes.
414 U.S. 313 (1973).
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Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 9 decided last January. With only
one justice dissenting, Bonelli decided in 1973 that "federal common law" should supply the rule to decide a boundary issue between Arizona and an upland owner where the Colorado River
had shifted locations.
How does a lawyer find out what the "federal common law"
of accretion and avulsion is when he has just one case to go on?
After two arguments, Bonelli was expressly overruled in Corvallis
Sand & Gravel. It was a good thing. Hereafter, the rule of accretion of navigable streams will continue to be found in state law.
The possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States at
this time in its history could construct a meaningful federal common law intelligible to all federal and state courts in the land is
quite unlikely.'I Happily, the Court gave up the effort before great
harm had been done.
From August 7, 1953 to January 3, 1975-twenty-two
years---a fossilized state law existed on the outer continental
shelf, beyond the power of the state legislatures, which had created this state law as it had existed on the earlier date, to amend
it." In the interim, United States v. Sharpnack'2 made clear that
Congress can incorporate by reference future state law as well as
state law at a fixed moment of time. Now, since 1975, current
state law controls all the necessary legal relationships on the
outer shelf where federal law is lacking. This history demonstrates dramatically that federal law, in our federal system, is not
1 97

S. Ct. 582 (1977), overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
10Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Forward: The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959), is the most impressive attempt I know to put in terms
understandable to lawyers at the Supreme Court bar how little time the Court is likely to
give to any particular case. "The two hours which the Justices spend ... in listening to
the contentions of counsel must amount to nearly half and often more than half of the
time which those Justices who write no opinion in the case are able to devote to it. And
they far exceed the total time which can be devoted to the average adjudication without
oral argument." In the 1958 Term there were only 1,763 dispositions. The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REV. 126, 129 (1959). In the 1975 Term, there were 3,806 dispositions. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 56,279 (1976).
1 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1970), incorporating by reference for cases not covered by
federal law the law of adjacent states for the continental shelf. In 1975, this section was
amended to incorporate the law of the adjacent state as it might exist from time to time.
Id. (Supp. V 1976).
2 355 U.S. 286 (1958). The case overcame the former objection that federal incorporation of future state law was an impermissible delegaton of federal legislative power.
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a competing system of law. Rather, federal law is altogether lacking in vast foundational areas like the law of contracts, torts,
domestic relations, and water rights. To substitute nonexistent
federal law for state law is not to introduce the centralized federal
tyranny, sometimes feared. Instead it would introduce a state of
no law at all-until the vacuum could be filled in some unpredictable way.
"Reservation doctrine" deserves the name neither of doctrine
nor of law. Most reserved rights asserted rest on implication.
There is no justification for a prudent government ever intentionally to rely on implications for the existence, quantity, priority,
and nature of its right or rights enjoyed by its people. Due to its
inherent uncertainty, the doctrine serves beneficiaries of the implied right badly, just as it badly serves prudent water users who
have no means of learning of either the existence or the nature of
the senior but "implied" water right.
Trelease, as no one else, can exorcise that evil and subversive
ghost, the reservation doctrine. Water will continue to be a central concern in the United States, and a water law based on
decisions of a court whose justices do not understand these simple
facts about the relationship between federal and state law is dangerous to the federal system. You will recall the Dred Scott case
from history. 3 The Court held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional because Congress has no power to legislate under the
property clause 4 with respect to the Louisiana Territory and federal territory to the west. The clause applies only to the federal
territory which was part of the nation when the Constitution
became effective in 1789. It took the Civil War to root out the
heresy of that case.
The reservation doctrine also connects with the federal property clause. The property clause cannot perfrom its function, nor
can the federal system operate, if water flowing from reserved
public lands is not subject like other water to a nondiscriminatory state law. A single water law for the nation would
be impossible even if the Constitution expressly compelled it.

*

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 16 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

' "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and

regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
....
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Diversity of state laws, particularly in water law, is essential to
the well-being of the nation.
None of these problems will use up more than a few kilowatts
of Trelease energy. Indian water rights, however, are more complicated. The Winters v. United States 5 case in 1908 is a
"reservation doctrine" case. It is also, and more appropriately, a
prior appropriation case. There is no doubt that when Congress
creates an Indian reservation it can appropriate water in amounts
necessary to carry out the particular purposes of the reservation.
If there is no unappropriated water, it can condemn needed water
rights by paying for them. If authorized by Congress, there is no
need to seek a state license for the United States to appropriate
water. There is no need for a federal appropriation to conform to
state requirements of diligence. There is no need for a federal
appropriation to compel even a diversion, if the water is more
beneficially used in the stream rather than diverted from it.
Congress can dictate, and where it has not done so, federal
administrators can be permitted to choose to take advantage of
both state administration and state recording of water rights. A
state cannot discriminate against appropriations by the United
States in favor of appropriations by its own citizens. Why then
do we need a reservation doctrine?
The Government has the power of eminent domain in aid of
any permissible federal purpose. It can acquire all water rights
needed for a public purpose by paying for them. Why should it
not do so? The reservation doctrine is important only when the
Government seeks to acquire a water right at the expense of its
citizens without paying for it. The only good reason is de minimis,
transaction costs, and all that.
Most non-Indian water rights are, as Trelease says, de
minimis. The same is not true of Indian water rights. Unfortunately, there is no forum appropriate for their adjudication. Federal judges lack the expertise with which state judges are or can
be provided. However, there is no federal counterpart to the office
of State Engineer, as created by Elwood Mead. State court
judges, on the other hand, are usually elected and they are more
susceptible to pressure than federal judges-particularly against
", 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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hostile Indians. They are badly paid in comparison with their
federal counterparts. Mechanisms are needed by which water
right settlements can be negotiated between Indian tribes and
their neighbors.
This is one great big real life problem we might generate for
Trelease to solve. De minimis non curat lex, et vice versa. In
translation this says, the law disregards trifles, but it does not
lightly regard trifling with either water rights or the law thereof.
Excelsior! Trelease!!

TIMBER
TIMBER RESOURCES

By

EDWARD P. CLIFF*
INTRODUCTION

When Professor John Carver, Jr. invited me to participate in
this symposium, he indicated that I should assess the work of the
Public Land Law Review Commission and comment on the future
of public timber management, the interrelationships of public
and private forestry in the light of the new legislation, executivelegislative conflict, and cooperation with the states.
To clarify the accomplishments or lack thereof made toward
the Commission's objectives, I will first briefly review some of the
major events of the past decade that indicate a dramatic change
in public opinion of resource values and that have resulted in
decisive legal and administrative actions. Second, I will review
the actions taken that bear on specific timber management recommendations of the Commission and some of the other recommendations relevant to the management of timber resources.'
Third, I will discuss the highlights of the two new laws that are
most important to future management of the national forests: the
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974
[RPA, 2 and the National Forest Management Act of 1976
[NFMA].3

The past seven years since the Commission presented its
report [PLLRC Report] have been a period of dramatic change
* Former Chief of the Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; presently
employed as a forestry and land use consultant in Alexandria, Virginia.
The author expresses deep appreciation to the members of the staff of the Forest
Service who furnished background information for this paper and reviewed the draft, and
to Joseph D. Cummings, Deputy Director, Natural Resources Division, Office of the
General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, who checked the legal interpretations
of the legislation discussed in the paper and the citations. Special credit and thanks are
due to Melvin L. Yuhas, Director of Land Classification for the Forest Service, and a
former member of the PLLRC Staff, for his invaluable assistance in assembling information and in helping prepare and edit this article.
I PuBLic LAND LAW REVIEW COMNUSSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
2 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
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in public interests, values, court decisions, legislation, and the
decisionmaking process of federal agencies. It has also been a
period of public awakening to environmental values, a period of
growing concern over future availability of scarce resources, and
a period of controversy.
The administrative process has been opened to increased
public scrutiny and litigation. On the wave of public interest,
frustration, and concern for protection of the environment, Congress in 1969 passed the National Environmental Policy Act,4 the
most action-forcing and pervasive new law affecting natural resource agencies. The Forest Service has had twenty-nine lawsuits,5 now closed, concerning NEPA requirements, eleven of
which involved timber sales.6 There are twenty-nine additional
lawsuits pending,7 seven of which involve timber sales.'
Before the late 1960's, public land administrators had enjoyed relative immunity from lawsuits for administrative action.
Suits had to be based on violation of the law, abuse of discretion,
or arbitrary and capricious action,' which were often difficult to
prove. The concepts of administrative law then .prevailing dictated a restrained role for the courts, while administrators had
wide latitude for exercise of agency discretion. The court's inquiry, if allowed at all, was narrow. With the liberalization of the
courts and the new laws, agencies have been propelled from an
era of relative immunity from judicial involvement into one in
which it has become the expected. This has had a substantial
impact on agency decisions and activities.
In the years since the Commission's report, extensive environmental legislation was passed including the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,10 the Clean Air Act,"
and the Endangered Species Act of 1973.11 In 1975, Congress
3
passed the Eastern Wilderness Act.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
29 law suits.
11 law suits.
29 law suits.
7 law suits.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
1033 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1111973).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
Ii 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. IV 1974).
,3 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (Supp. V 1975).
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In 1973, Congress passed the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973," which included provisions for forestry incentives,' 5 designed to encourage a higher level of reforestation, forest
protection, development, and management by small, nonindustrial, private and nonfederal public forest landowners. Unfortunately, this highly important program has not been adequately
funded.
In 1974, the Forest Service's Environmental Programfor the
Future'6 was released for public review and comment. In the same
year, the RPA'7 was enacted. Congress intended this law to assure
adequate planning and funding to meet immediate and future
forest and rangeland resource needs. The law greatly stimulated
Forest Service planning activity and brought considerable encouragement to forest industries and conservationists alike that
it would result in consistently adequate funding support for balanced forest resources management in the National Forest System.
Early in the 1970's, opposition to clearcutting s became a
dominant issue. In 1972, the Senate Public Lands Subcommittee
of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held lengthy
hearings on clearcutting and issued recommendations, the
"Church Guidelines."' 9 The clearcutting issue was brought to a
head in West Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton League, Inc.
v. Butz, 0 where the authority of the Forest Service to clearcut
under the Organic Act of 189721 was challenged. The decision in
favor of the plaintiff severely limited timber harvest in the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction, and threatened to affect
" Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 13, 16, 45
U.S.C.).
, 7 C.F.R. §§ 701.27-.45 (1977).
" FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM FOR THE
FUTURE (1974).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
" "Clearcutting" is "[a) silviculture system in which the old crop is cleared over a
considerable area at one time; regeneration is generally by artificial means." PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT 538 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY PANEL
REPoRT].
" SENATE SUBCOMM.

ON PUBLIC LANDS,

CLEARCUTrrNG ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS,

COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,

S.Doc. No. 505, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).

522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), affg 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
, 16 U.S.C. §§ 475-482 (1970).
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other areas as well. This prompted Congress to enact corrective
legislation, the National Forest Management Act.2
Several major studies of the nation's timber resources have
been conducted since the PLLRC Report was issued. After nearly
three years of study, the President's Advisory Panel on Timber
and the Environment made its report in 1973,23 concluding that
"the demand for wood can be met, in harmony with environmental protection, if we give high priority to the timber-growing and
cultural measures that will guarantee our future timber supply
into the 21st century and beyond." 4 The National Commission
on Materials Policy also made its report in 1973.25 With regard to
timber supply problems, it concluded that at current levels of
management, prospective supplies would not be adequate to
meet our needs in the upcoming decades. During the same year,
the Forest Service issued its periodic national assessment on the
timber situation.Y
I.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

ON THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission and members of the staff who worked so
long and hard in developing the report of the Commission should
be pleased with the Resources Planning Act of 1974,2 s the National Forest Management Act of 1976,19 and the BLM Organic
Act.30 These laws embrace some of the most important principles
advocated by the Commission and fulfill a surprising number of
its key recommendations as they relate to management of the
National Forest System and National Resource Lands administered by BLM. For example, throughout its report, the Commission emphasized that Congress should more actively exercise its
prerogatives to establish policy and statutory guidelines for man2

Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976).
ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 18.
Id. at 33.
NAT'L COMM'N ON MATERIALS POLICY, MATERIAL NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT TODAY

AND ToMoRwow (1973). See also E. CUFF, TIMBER: THE RENEWABLE MATERIAL (1973).

" E.
27

CLIFF, supra note 25, at 2-5 to 2-7.

FOREST SERVICE, U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE OUTLOOK FOR TIMBER IN THE

UNITED STATES (1973).

- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
n Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
3
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 43, 48, 49 U.S.C.).
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agement of federal lands. 3' This has been substantially accomplished by these three laws.
The following is an analysis of what has happened with regard to Commission recommendations on timber resources and a
brief look at the response of RPA and NFMA to the recommendations on land use planning and the environment.
A.

Timber Resources

The Commission made nine major recommendations, numbered 28 through 36, and ten supplementary recommendations on
timber resources.32 Most of these have been accepted or rejected
by legislation or agency action since 1970. The present situation
with regard to these recommendations is shown by first quoting
each, verbatim, and then stating the action taken to date.
Dominant Use Timber Production Units
Recommendation 28: There should be a statutory requirement that
those public lands that are highly productive for timber be classified
for commercial timber production as the dominant use, consistent
with the Commission's concept of how multiple use should be applied in practice.n

No legislation has been enacted to provide for classification
of highly productive timber land for commercial timber production as the dominant use. In passing RPA and NFMA, Congress
rejected the dominant use principle 3 and reaffirmed the principles of multiple use set forth in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act of 1960.31 The BLM Organic Act 3 also established multiple
use and sustained yield as guiding principles of management for
the public domain lands administered by the BLM. Throughout
the deliberations on the NFMA, the various committees consistently sought to assure a balance among the various renewable
resources so as to avoid having any one use, particularly timber,
' PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 73, 77, 80, 81, 123.

Id. at 91-103.
Id. at 92.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6662, 6671; S. REP. No. 686, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4060, 4070.
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1970).
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 43, 48, 49 U.S.C.).
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become dominant. 7 Section 6 of NFMA, in fact, appears to put
timber use in a "residual" position, allowing its use only when it
does not interfere with or degrade other resource uses.Y The law
also requires the identification of lands not suited for timber production3 1 and precludes harvest of other than salvage or insect
infested timber from such lands."
In the provisions of the BLM Organic Act for congressional
review of management that excludes a use4' and withdrawal review, 2 Congress once again reflected reservations it has had
about exclusive uses. Although Congress has not adopted a concept of "dominant use" for timber, it has, through wilderness and
national recreation area legislation, recognized wilderness or recreation as the predominant use on certain lands with attendant
prohibition or restriction of timber harvest.
There has been no consideration by Congress of a Federal
Timber Corporation. The recommendation was predicated upon
congressional acceptance of the dominant use concept for highly
productive commercial timber land, which Congress did not endorse.
Financing
Recommendation 29: Federal programs on timber production units
should be financed by appropriations from a revolving fund made
up of receipts from timber sales on these units. Financing for development and use of public forest lands, other than those classified for
timber production as the dominant use, would be by appropriation
3
of funds unrelated to receipts from the sale of timber.

The revolving-fund approach to financing the timber program in the National Forests was considered by Congress as part
of the timber industry's proposed Timber Supply Acts of 1969
and 1971 and was rejected." While not tied to dominant timber
'7

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 893, supra note 34; S. REP. No. 686, supra note 34.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(k) (West Supp. 1977).

'Id.

0 Id.

43 U.S.C.A. § 1712(e)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1714(a).
13 PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 95. The Commission also suggested that direct
appropriation of funds be used for timber production on other forested lands and that
financing of timber production programs outside of the appropriation process be ended.
'

Id.
" See S. REP. No. 832, 91st Cong., lst Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 156, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
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production units, Congress has authorized the use of a revolvingfund method for timber production and timber sale road construction to a limited extent.4 5
Congress has expanded the authority to use backdoor financing. In the period since the Commission report was submitted, the
Administration has proposed and the Congress has acted to place
greater reliance on purchaser construction for the development of
the National Forest transportation system but under more strict
controls." As a result, authorization and appropriation are now
required for purchaser credit just as they are for other forest road
and trial funds.
Section 18 of the NFMA removed limitations on collections
under section 3 of the 1930 Knutson-Vandenberg Act 47 and expanded the purposes for which funds collected thereunder could
be used.
Use of Economic Considerations
Recommendation 30: Dominant timber production units should be
managed primarily on the basis of economic factors so as to maximize net returns to the Federal Treasury. Such factors should also
play an important but not primary role in timber management on
other public lands.4"

In both the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 and
the BLM Organic Act, Congress declared it the policy of the
United States that management be on the basis of multiple use
and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law."9 Multiple
use was defined in part as the "harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources without permanent impairment
of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment
with consideration being given to the relative values of the resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will
give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output."0
," The NFMA provides for revolving-fund financing for preparing and administering
salvage sales, 16 U.S.C.A. § 472a(h) (West Supp. 1977), and for financing construction of
timber sale roads when purchasers who qualify as "small business concerns" elect for the
Forest Service to construct such roads. Id. at § 472a(i).
16 U.S.C.A. § 472a(i)(2).
16 U.S.C. § 576b (1970).
PLLRC REPoRT, supra note 1, at 96.

16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970); 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)( 7 ).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(c) (West Supp. 1977).
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The RPA, as amended by NFMA, directs the Secretary of
Agriculture to promulgate regulations that set out guidelines for
land management plans that insure consideration of economic
and environmental aspects of various systems of renewable resource management, 5' and that insure that timber will be harvested from National Forest lands only where the harvesting system to be used is not selected primarily because it will give the
greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output of timber."2 However, it is clear that economic factors should not be ignored. The
law requires that the Secretary must formulate and implement a
process for estimating long term costs and benefits to support
53
program evaluation requirements of the Act.
During the deliberations on NFMA, the "marginal lands"5
issue was centered on a concern that timber investments should
be cost effective.55 The "marginal lands" provision was rejected
because of difficulties and uncertainties about how it would be
carried out. The NFMA directs that the Secretary shall identify
lands not suited for timber production, considering physical, economic, and other pertinent factors, and shall assure that, except
for salvage sales or sales necessary to protect other multiple use
values, no timber harvesting shall occur on such lands for ten
years. 5 The lands are to be returned to timber production when
they have become suitable thereafter.57
Economic Factors
Recommendation 31: Major timber management decisions, including allowable-cut determinations, should include specific consideration of economic factors. 5'

In NFMA, Congress did not settle on solely economic criteria
for timber management planning. This was clearly indicated by
(a) mandating the use of culmination of mean annual increment
16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv).
53 Id. § 1604(l)(1).
11"Marginal lands" are those on which the estimated cost of production will exceed
estimated economic returns.
" See, e.g., S. REP. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 6662, 6696.
- 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(k) (West Supp. 1977).
"

57 Id.
59

PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
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to set rotation ages;5" and (b) limiting the sale of timber to a
quantity equal to or less than a quantity which can be removed
from such forest annually in perpetuity on a sustained yield
basis.6 0 This generally reinforced the existing policy of nondeclining evenflow.A' Application of these policies in combination will
not necessarily result in maximum economic returns.
Section 11 of the NFMA12 provides some flexibility in applying the nondeclining evenflow policy by authorizing the Secretary
to depart from the long term sustained yield average sale quantities by decades and annually within a ten-year period, so long as
the departure is consistent with multiple-use objectives of the
land management plans. In addition, the Secretary may substitute timber cut in salvage sales for timber that would otherwise
be sold or, if not feasible, sell such timber over and above the plan
volume.63
The law also permits increases in harvest levels resulting
from intensified management practices such as reforestation,
thinning, and tree improvement if consistent with the MultipleUse Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.4
Sales Procedures
Recommendation 32: Timber sales procedures should be simplified
wherever possible."

Little has been done to simplify sales procedures. In fact,
they have become more complicated in providing for log export
control and substitution prohibitions found in recent appropriations bills and in meeting the increased requirements for environmental protection and improved utilization.
With regard to long term timber sales in Alaska, Congress
" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(m)(1) (West Supp. 1977).

" Id. § 1611.
" Nondeclining evenflow is the production from a unit of land of the same amount

of timber each year for an indefinite period of time.
- 16 U.S.C.A. § 1611 (West Supp. 1977).
'3Id.
" Id. § 1604(g)(3)(D).
0 PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 98. In particular, the Commission noted the
problems caused by the long-term commitments of public land timber in large sales in
Alaska. Id.
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has now mandated the updating of these contracts with appropriate revisions in contract timber prices.6"
Methods of Sale
[T]he method of selling timber on the lump sum, or cruise, basis
[should] be adopted generally by the Federal land management
agencies when selling timber. 7

Efforts by the Forest Service to expand the use of lump sum
or tree measurement sales 8 met with strong opposition from segments of the timber industry; they were also rebuffed by Congress, through instructions from the House Appropriations Committee that prohibited use of funds appropriated for timber sales
for expansion of tree measurement sales in old growth stands.
Such sales in old growth stands have been limited to a volume
equal to that sold in the past or to sales necessary to develop
improved techniques for this type of sale.
Access Road Construction
Recommendation 33: There should be an accelerated program of
timber access road construction.'

Limited increases in funding have been provided. The Forest
Service received the following appropriation increases in the road
construction program to facilitate advanced roading to meet resource management objectives: Fiscal Year 1970, $35 million; Fiscal Year 1971, $46 million; Fiscal Year 1972, $46 million; and
Fiscal Year 1977, $75 million.
Dependent Communities and Firms
Recommendation 34: Communities and firms dependent on public
land timber should be given consideration in the management and
disposal of public land timber.70
16 U.S.C.A. § 476(b) (1973).
67

PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 98.

"Lump sum" is a method of determining the basis of payment when selling timber.
This method estimates the total volume of timber in a sale as the basis for payment. The
tree-measurement method bases payment on the measurement of the volume of each log
removed from the forest. See id.
IId. at 99.
7I Id. The Commission also suggested that the Sustained Yield Forest Management
Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C. §§ 583-583i (1970), be repealed, PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at
100, that the ban on exports of public land logs be continued, id., and that steps be taken
to give small firms advantages in obtaining public land timber when conditions warrant,
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The Forest Service and BLM have continued their long established practices of planning timber management around support of dependent communities and industries. This has been a
primary consideration by the Forest Service in setting up its timber management planning on a working-circle basis and by the
BLM in O&C dependency zones. Sustained-yield units set up in
the past were also in the interest of assuring stability for dependent firms and communities. Set-aside timber sales for small
business have been continued to encourage small business ventures and to help assure their stability.
The Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944. ' One
cooperative unit and five federal units were established under the
law, but no additional units have been established since October
10, 1950. The Act has not been repealed, but on May 29, 1957,
the Secretary of Agriculture announced the Department's policy
to discontinue, for the foreseeable future, further establishment
of both federal and cooperative sustained-yield units under the
law. The contractual rights and obligations of the United States
in the cooperative agreement with the Simpson Logging Company for the Shelton Sustained Yield Unit will be continued. The
five established federal units will be continued for the present.
The desirability of their further continuance will be examined at
intervals of not more than five years. The NFMA, which is generally more specific in direction than the Sustained Yield Unit Act,
will govern the administration of lands within the sustained-yield
units.
Control of Log Exports. The so-called Morse amendment of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968,72 which limited log exports
from federal lands west of the 100th meridian to 350 million board
feet annually, expired December 31, 1973.13 A rider to the agency
appropriation laws has continued to restrict exports. 4 The restriction applied originally to Fiscal Year 1974 but was renewed
for 1975, 1976, and 1977.15 The rider prohibits use of the appropriations made under the laws for any sale made of unprocessed
16 U.S.C. §§ 583-583i (1970).
Pub. L. No. 90-554, § 401, 82 Stat. 960 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 617 (1970)).
16 U.S.C. § 617 (1970).
, Act of Oct. 4, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-120, § 301, 87 Stat. 429.
Act of July 31, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-373, § 301, 90 Stat. 1043.
'
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timber from federal lands west of the 100th meridian in the contiguous 48 states that will be exported or used as a substitute for
private land timber exported by the purchaser. Certain quantities, grades, and species of timber determined to be surplus to
domestic lumber and plywood needs are excepted.
Small Business Size Limit. The Forest Service consummated
a new timber set-aside agreement with the Small Business Administration in 1970 that recognizes the 500-employee limit. Size
standards were reviewed through hearings by the Small Business
Administration in 1975, but no change was made. 6 The NFMA
section 14(i) gives small businesses an added advantage by permitting them to elect to have the Federal Government build required permanent timber roads costing over $20,000, provided the
estimated cost of the road is added to the sale price of the timber.77
Sealed vs. Oral Bidding. Section 14(e) of the NFMA now
requires sealed bidding on all sales except where the Secretary of
Agriculture determines otherwise by regulation.78 The Conference
Report states that the regulations "shall accord the Secretary the
discretion to employ oral bidding or a mix of bidding methods
when protection of the economic stability of dependent communities or other considerations indicate the advisability to do so."' ,
Acquisition and Disposal
Recommendation 35: Timber production should not be used as a
justification for acquisition or disposition of Federal public lands.'

There has been no change. Purchase of lands under the
Weeks Law of 1911, as amended, 8 still requires that the lands
acquired under the law be necessary for the regulation of the flow
of navigable streams or for the production of timber in watersheds
of navigable streams."
11 Small Business Timber Set-Aside Program:Hearings to Review the Small Business
Set-Aside Program, Before the Subcomm. on Small Business of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).

16 U.S.C.A. § 472a(i).
7'Id. § 472a(e).
S. CoNF. REP. No. 1335, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 11976] U.S. CODE
CONG.
'1

& AD. NEws 6721, 6737.
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 101.
16 U.S.C. §§ 480, 500, 513-519, 521, 552, 563 (1970).
Id. § 515.
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Environmental Impacts
Recommendation 36: Controls to assure that timber harvesting is
conducted so as to minimize adverse impacts on the environment on
and off the public lands must be imposed.Y

NEPA, 84 NFMA, 5 the Clean Air Act," the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,8" the Endangered Species Act," and the
Roadless Area Review by the Forest Service, various Executive
Orders, the 1972 Church Committee Guidelines,"' use of the
courts by environmental groups, and administrative actions have
imposed many constraints on timber harvesting activities, all of
which aim to reduce adverse impacts of timber harvesting on the
environment.
Controls to minimize adverse impacts off public lands have
not been imposed by the Forest Service. It is not necessary to
revise Forest Service timber sale contracts in order to enforce
pollution control standards outside the National Forests. Private
industry has no choice but to comply with NEPA, Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts, and applicable state and local laws and regulations.
The Environment

B.

The Public Land Law Review Commission gave considerable
emphasis to the protection and enhancement of environmental
quality. Chapter 4, "Public Land Policy and the Environment,"
of the Commission's report contains 12 recommendations. Both
RPA and NFMA contain provisions for environmental protection
in planning for and managing the National Forests. RPA, for
example, requires that the Renewable Resource Program "shall
" PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 101. Specifically, the Commission concluded that
processing plants using timber from public lands should be required to comply with
federal, state, and local environmental quality standards. Id. at 102.
,1National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970), as
amended by Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424.
91Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (to be codified in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 1I 1973).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. IV 1974), as amended by Act of June 30, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-325, 90 Stat. 724 and Act of July 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
'

SENATE SUBCOMM.

" PLLRC

REPORT,

ON Pusuc LANrs, supra note 19.
supra note 1, at 67-88.
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be developed in accordance with the principles set forth in the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."' The policy guidelines in the
NFMA include environmental safeguards.92 It appears that the
environmental requirements in these two Acts are in substantial
conformity with the major thrust of most of the Commission recommendations on the environment.
11.

THE FOREST AND RANGELAND RENEWABLE RESOURCES PLANNING

ACT OF

1974

The RPA 3 has been hailed as the most important single piece
of legislation for the Forest Service since the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960,1' or even, since the Organic Act of
1897."6 Yet, as praiseworthy as RPA may be, it provides no new
program authority for the Forest Service.
The RPA was born of conflict, confrontation, and frustration.
The stage was set for greater public involvement in federal decisionmaking by the passage of NEPA.9 The growing environmental awareness of the public and intensified competition for use of
public lands gave rise to increasingly effective and pervasive
demands from affected parties for greater participation in federal
program formulation. The controversies over wilderness and
other restrictive land classifications, clearcutting, the level of
timber harvest, and program balance provided the climate in
which the RPA was born.
Legislative attempts to strengthen individual programs such
as timber management and wilderness preservation generated
more controversy. The annual appropriation process, while resulting in increased levels of Forest Service funding, failed to
correct obvious imbalances in the overall program or to deal effectively with such problems as the large backlog of needed reforestation and the need for more intensive forest management. It was
becoming increasingly evident that closer and more logical ties
" 16 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. IV 1974).
1
" 16 U.S.C.A. § 604(g) (West Supp. 1977).

, 16 U.S.C.
" 16 U.S.C.
16 U.S.C.
" 42 U.S.C.

§§
§§
§§
§§

1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
528-531 (1970).
473-482, 551 (1970).
4321-4347 (1970).
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were needed between the program activities and proposals and
the credible and explicit evaluation of alternatives.
Of equal or perhaps even greater importance was the incessant tug-of-war between Congress and the executive branch of the
Federal Government for budget control. The substantive committees of Congress were frustrated in their efforts to solve the problem of insuring high enough budget requests and appropriations
for the programs they supported. Following several unsuccessful
attempts to enact definitive national timber supply legislation,
Congress dealt with the problem of funding all Forest Service
programs by passing RPA, which ties funding to comprehensive
long-range planning.
A.

RPA Requirements

The RPA directs the Secretary of Agriculture to assess periodically the national situation of the forest and rangeland resources, and to submit, at regular intervals, recommendations for
long-range Forest Service programs essential to meet future needs
for those resources."7 The program recommendations are to cover
all the activities of the Forest Service."8 The first such Assessment99 and Program'0 0 were completed by the end of 1975, as
1116

U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 1974).

Id.
Ix
"
FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, RPA, THE NATION'S RENEWABLE RESOURCEs-AN ASSESSMENT (1976) (hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENT).
RPA requires that assessments shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) Analysis of renewable resource demands and supplies, considering
also international resource situations and trade and emphasizing trends in
demand, supply, and price;
(2) inventories of present and potential renewable resources together

with evaluations of opportunities to improve supplies in view of investment
costs and direct and indirect returns to the Federal Government;
(3) a description of Forest Service programs, their interrelationships,
and their relationships to other public and private activities;
(4) discussion of important policy considerations, laws, regulations, and
other factors expected to influence significantly the use, ownership, and
management of renewable resources.

16 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 1974).
The NFMA amended the assessment direction in RPA to require reporting of fiber
potential, wood utilization by mills, wood wastes, and wood product recycling. Pub. L.

No. 94-588, § 3, 90 Stat. 2949, 2950 (1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1601).
These assessments are to cover renewable resources of all forest and rangelands, not
just the National Forests. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 1974).
101FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, RPA, A RECOMMENDED RENEWABLE
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required by the law.' 0'
Because of the size and complexity of the job, the Assessment
must depend heavily upon the cooperation of all renewable resource agencies, owners, and others working in the field. In any
event, the law specifically requires such cooperation by the Forest
Service and expressly prohibits duplication of Assessment and
Program activities carried on by others.'
The law addresses program funding in three ways. First, it
requires that the President transmit to Congress, with the Assessment and Recommended Program, a Statement of Policy which
RESOURCES PROGRAM (1976) (hereinafter cited as PROGRAM). The RPA requires that the
Renewable Resources Program:
shall provide in appropriate detail for protection, management, and development of the National Forest System, including forest development roads and
trails; for cooperative Forest Service programs; and for research. The Program shall be developed in accordance with the principles set forth in the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
16 U.S.C. § 1602 (Supp. IV 1974).
The law as enacted in 1974 required that the Program include, but not be limited to:
(1) Inventory of specific needs and opportunities for both public and
private programs, distinguishing between capital investments and operational costs;
(2) identification and analysis of specific program outputs in terms of
benefits and costs;
(3) discussion of priorities for alternative programs based upon analysis
of benefits and costs;
(4) analysis of personnel requirements to satisfy current and ongoing
programs.
Id.
The NFMA amended the law to require that program recommendations include
evaluation of major Forest Service programs, extension of program opportunities to nonFederal land owners, incorporation of environmental considerations, recognition of interdependence between renewable resources, and evaluation of impacts of imports and exports of logs on timber supplies and prices. Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 5, 90 Stat. 2949, 2952
(1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1602).
For a summary and analysis of the 1975 Assessment and Program, see U.S. FOREST
SERvICE, DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, A SUMMARY OF A RENEWABLE RESOURCE ASSESSMENT AND A
RECOMMENDED RENEWABLE RESOURCE PROGRAM (1976) (hereinafter cited as SUMMARY).
"' 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602 (Supp. IV 1974). Early in 1976, the Assessment and
Program were transmitted to the President and through him to the Congress. Time constraints and other pressing business prevented major consideration of these documents in
the 94th Congress by the responsible congressional committees. Major attention on the
recommendations contained in the program is anticipated in the 95th Congress. The
Assessment and Program must be updated by 1980, a new Assessment must be made every
10 years, and the Program must be revised every 5 years. Id.
02 16 U.S.C. § 1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
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expresses his intentions with respect to framing budget requests
0 3
for the Forest Service for the five or ten year period ahead.
Second, when the President's budget is transmitted to Congress
each year, it will be accompanied by a budget explanation describing the relationship between the budget request and the Program. 0 1 Third, it also requires interdisciplinary approaches to
resource planning and maintenance of a continuing inventory of
all National Forest resources and lands as a part of the Assessment. By the year 2000, all "backlogs" of needed work on the
National Forests are required to be reduced to a current basis. 05
Thus, a management process has been designed to assure coordination among long term goals, action programs with specific
goals, budgets tailored to necessary programs, and annual evaluation of accomplishments.
B.

The Recommended Renewable Resources Program

The Renewable Resource Program' presented in 1976 calls
for intensification of efforts that will yield long-term benefits
equal to or above investment costs. The recommended program
focuses on three areas:
(1) Dispersed recreation opportunities will be emphasized along
with a moderate allocation of National Forest lands to statutory
wilderness designation;
(2) Timber and Range Programs shall give priority to the most
cost-effective resource management opportunities;
(3) Program efforts relative to wildlife and fish, land and water
stewardship, and human and community development shall be enhanced."'
"3 Id. § 1606(a). Congress may revise or modify the Statement of Policy transmitted
by the President. Id. If serious differences exist, the law's procedural guidelines can lead
to discussions between executive and legislative leaders to clarify and resolve issues. Id. §
1606(b).
The law also calls for an annual evaluation report on Forest Service progress and
accomplishments to assist in future negotiations and decisionmaking. Id. § 1606(c).
1" 16 U.S.C. § 1606(b). The only specific authorization level included in the 1974 law
is found in Section 2(b). Id. § 581h. This amendment not only raised the annual appropriation authorization limit from $5 million to $20 million but also expanded the scope of the
activities authorized by this section to include all renewable resources, in contrast to the
former primary emphasis on timber. The NFMA amended RPA to provide specific direction on reforestation and set a $200 million authorization level for reforestation. Pub. L.
No. 94-588, § 4, 90 Stat. 2949, 2951 (1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1601(d)(3)).
"
16 U.S.C. § 1607 (Supp. IV 1974).
"3
"

PROGRAM, supra note 100.
See SUMMARY, supra note 100.
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The recommended program for timber resources is premised
on the fact that timber consumption is growing faster than timber
supply. Emphasis is therefore placed on increasing timber supplies through research, protection, and management practices.
Special attention is given to the opportunities for increased production that exist on land owned by private, nonindustrial own08
ers.'
C.

Planningfor 1980

Planning is now underway for development of the required
1980 RPA Assessment and Program. A draft Assessment Element
Outline and Proposed Alternative Program Directions and National Goals have been prepared. Personnel have been assigned
to organize and lead studies of each assessment element and to
provide leadership in Program development.
Although a major public review process was implemented
during the 1975 Assessment and Program effort, the Forest Service intends to emphasize even more effective participation in both
activities by non-Forest Service organizations, including universities, as well as organized interest groups. It needs the benefit of
special capabilities and points of view represented by all capable
and affected parties. As plans evolve, they will be given wide
circulation for comment and recommendations.

III.

AcT

197609
In August 1975, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
a 1973 district court decision limiting Forest Service authority to
sell timber on the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia." '0 In the decision, the courts interpreted a provision of the
Organic Act of 1897"' as allowing that only "dead,
[physiologically] mature, or large growth" trees, individually
marked for cutting, could be sold."' The decision was extended
by the Forest Service to the nine National Forests under the
jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. The agency estimated that
THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT

OF

See id. at 21-22.
,OSPub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
W'
1975), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
"'
522 F.2d at 948.
"'
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nationwide application of the decision would have resulted in a
fifty percent reduction in National Forest timber harvests. The
court recognized the impact of its decision and suggested legislative remedy for this outdated portion of the 1897 Act. The Monongahela decision spurred additional litigation in other jurisdic13
tions.
Rather than appeal the Monongahela decision further, the
executive branch decided to seek corrective legislation. The Forest Service, the timber industry, the Society of American Foresters and other professional and conservation organizations stressed
the crucial need for statutory authority to use scientifically accepted forestry measures, including clearcutting where appropriate. Environmental groups favored highly prescriptive legislation.
Congress set about the task of reconciling the differences.
The result was a workable compromise which provides broad policy guidelines with the latitude necessary to use technical forestry
skills, scientific knowledge, and professional judgment to manage
the National Forest System. However, Congress did not provide
the Forest Service with carte blanche. It incorporated into law a
number of specific policies and guidelines that previously had
been left to administrative discretion. In a word, Congress decided to exercise more actively its authority in guiding federal
forest policy.
A major part of the NFMA is devoted to extending and
strengthening the RPA." 4 The focus is on land management planning,"' timber management actions," 6 and public participation
,, E.g., Zieske v. Butz, 412 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Alas. 1976).
I
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
,' 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (West Supp. 1977). Land management planning direction is
the core of the law. Regulations will be issued describing the process for development and
revision of land management plans.
Management guidelines will be issued to deal with overall National Forest land management and require that lands be identified according to their suitability for resource
management. These guidelines will ensure that economic, environmental, and ecological
aspects are consistent with the 1960 Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528531 (1970), and with NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Each National Forest System unit will be required to prepare, with the aid of interdisciplinary teams and public participation, an integrated, comprehensive land management
plan to be revised at least every 15 years.
"i The law repeals the section of the Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970), that
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in Forest Service decisionmaking."' It reaches beyond the 187
million acres of the National Forest System to recognize the importance of scientific research and cooperation with state and
local governments and private landowners. Thus, it addresses all
three major areas of Forest Service operations in carrying out its
national forestry leadership role-management of the National
Forest System, research, and cooperative forestry assistance to
state and private landowners.

IV.
RPAII s

EVALUATION OF

RPA

AND

NFMA

NFMA1 9

The
and
are good legislation. They give the
Forest Service a new charter to redeem more effectively its natural resource management responsibilities in the public interest.
The two laws provide a sound basis not only for management of
timber but also for balanced management of all the other renewable resources in the National Forest System.
NFMA provides the strongest policy direction on National
Forest management that Congress has ever given. However, while
providing this policy direction, Congress has-wisely, in my judgthe courts had interpreted to mean that timber could not be sold unless it was dead,
physiologically mature, or of large growth and individually marked. 16 U.S.C.A. § 476
(1973). Court cases based solely on violation of the timber sales provision of the Organic
Act, such as the Monongahela case, West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v.
Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973), are now
moot.
The Act provides new statutory timber sale authority and validates existing sales
provided that such sales comply with Forest Service silvicultural plans and sales procedures in effect at the time of sale. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472a, 476 (1973). Sealed bidding will be
required for timber sales except where the Secretary determines otherwise by regulation.
Id. § 472a(e)(2).
The Act also gives the Secretary of Agriculture the authority and flexibility needed
to manage the timber resources in accordance with scientifica~y sound silvicultural principles. Congress determined that a relatively even, sustained harvest of timber in perpetuity was the appropriate public policy and, in effect, mandated a nondeclining evenflow.
Id. §§ 581h, 1600-1610. Clearcutting will be permitted when it is determined, through the
planning process, to be the optimum method for meeting the objectives of the land management plans. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F).
17 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604. The law requires the Secretary of Agriculture, by regulation,
to establish procedures, including public hearings where appropriate, to give federal,
state, and local governments and the public adequate notice of, and opportunities to
comment upon, the formulation of standards and guidelines applicable to Forest Service
programs. The Secretary is also to establish and consult with advisory boards.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
"' Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (to be codified in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C.).
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ment-endorsed the concept that silvicultural prescriptions
should be left to the professional land manager. Also, it has given
the agency a certain amount of flexibility in applying the policy
guidelines to fit the varied physical, environmental, social, and
economic situations within which decisions must be made.
With the enactment of RPA, NRMA, and the BLM Organic
Act,12 0 the prospect for making advances in timber management
on the public lands is greatly improved over the situation prevailing during the past several years. The RPA provided for long-term
planning and a new budgetary approach for carrying out the resource plans on the National Forests. NFMA provides general,
flexible policy guidelines for the use of all the scientific forestry
tools at the land manager's disposal.
The shadow of doubt cast by the Monongahela decision 2' has
been swept away.The controversies of the past several years have
focused the attention of the public, the Congress, and the executive branch on forestry issues as never before. The climate for
progress is good. Just how much progress will be made will depend largely on how skillfully the professional land managers use
their new tools. The ball is in their court.
While the outlook for progress is good, it would be foolish to
believe that the recent legislation has solved all problems and
that there will be clear sailing ahead. The executive-legislative
conflict is likely to continue, especially in the budgetary field.
Fiscal Year 1978 will be the first budgetary year in which the RPA
Assessment' 2 and Program 2 1 will be considered in depth by the
Congress. The budget requests for forestry of both the outgoing
and the new Administrations are disappointing. There has been
little response to the RPA proposals for expansion of forestry
activities, and in fact the budget proposed reductions in appropriations for forest roads and for state and private cooperative programs, and elimination of funds for forestry incentives on private
lands. The congressional response is still to come.
'1 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 43, 48, 49 U.S.C.).
"I West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1975), aff'g 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. W. Va. 1973).
' ASSESSMENT, supra note 99.
'2 PROGRAM, supra note 100.
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The budgetary issue is a tough nut to crack. After all, the
long range program calls for doubling the Forest Service appropriations by the decade 1981-1990 and almost tripling them by 20112020.124 This is big money, and it is difficult to get substantial
program increases in the face of all of the other urgent demands
on the Federal Treasury. What is needed is strong, sustained
public support for the Renewable Resources Program, and this
seems to be lacking. Forestry has been suffering from an image
problem, and timber management for commercial use has an
especially bad public image. Reversing this image and gaining
strong public support for the sound, comprehensive RPA Program
and similar programs on other federal lands are among the greatest challenges facing foresters, the forest industry, and all others
who want to see the Nation's forest lands make a maximum contribution.
NFMA is a new beginning, not an end. The law solved some
problems but sets the stage for more. As it finally emerged, the
law is a compromise of strongly divergent viewpoints. It is a good,
workable compromise, but it is almost certain that special interest groups who did not get everything they wanted or dislike the
way the law is administered will attempt to have it changed.
The law was deliberately worded to preserve options for the
forest manager. Although highly desirable, this flexibility will
invite further controversy and litigation. Identifying "land not
suited for timber production";" 5 determining "optimum" and
"appropriate" methods of timber harvest; 2 establishing "overall
multiple-use objectives" in preparing land use plans; 17 determining "culmination of mean annual increment";12 and interpreting
the wording in the law that allows some departure from the
"quantity which can be removed from [a] forest annually on a
sustained-yield basis" or "nondeclining evenflow"' 12 9 are examples
of matters that may be hotly debated and certainly will be closely
watched by interested parties. Already there is controversy over
"'
"

See SUMMARY, supra note 100, at 26.

16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(k) (West Supp. 1977).

27

§ 1604(g)(3)(F).
1604(g)(2)(B).
Id. § 1604(m)(1).

'

Id. §§ 1611-1614.

"'
2

Id.

Id. §
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the issue of sealed versus oral bidding for timber sales.'30 The
intense competition for land for various uses will be a continuing
source of controversy.
It is hoped that large-scale and continuing public involvement at all stages of planning and development of regulations and
guidelines, as mandated by the law, will help bring about improved public understanding and more ready acceptance of administrative decisions. However, even with the best possible efforts to gain understanding, some of the issues involved are so
complex and fraught with emotion that it is realistic to .believe
that we will see at least some features of the law tested and
interpreted in the courts.
V. A LOOK AHEAD
I have been in the forestry profession forty-six years. I have
seen many changes in forest management in this country, most
of them for the better. I have been engaged in many battles and
have the scars to prove it. It has been fun, and I would not have
missed it. The only regret is that I am not forty-six years younger,
because I believe we are just entering the Golden Age of Forestry,
the age of intensive forest management, in this country, and I
would like to be a part of it. I would like to see how my predictions
for the years 2000 and 2020 turn out.
There have been a number of indepth reports and studies of
the timber supply and demand situation in the United States
since 1970, the most recent being the timber chapter of the RPA
Assessment."' There are some substantive differences in content
and objectives among the reports, but the main conclusions about
timber supply and demand are in substantial agreement. The
analysts generally agree that demands on United States forests
for wood will increase substantially, with the amount of increase
dependent largely on price. The Forest Service estimates that if
real price remains constant relative to other goods and services,
consumption will more than double by year 2020. Roundwood
supplies, however, are likely to fall short of the potential demand
by about one-third, unless substantial investments are made in
timber production and utilization technology.
'
'A'

Id. § 472a(e)(2).
ssEsSMENT, supra note 99.
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This country has the potential of doubling the production of
timber by 2020, and it can be done without damage to the environment. Our forest lands have the biological capacity to do this.
We have the required technical and scientific knowledge, or can
develop it.
The National Forests, with eighteen percent of the Nation's
commercial forest land and fifty one percent of the softwood sawtimber, are growing wood at less than half of full potential. Forest
industry lands, which comprise about fourteen percent of total
commercial area, generally are considered to be the most intensively managed of all, but they are growing wood at only about
sixty percent of the average attainable in fully stocked natural
stands. Imagine the result if they were fully stocked with genetically improved trees capable of growing thirty to forty percent
faster than unimproved trees. And that is only one of the intensive management measures available.
The greatest opportunity to increase timber growth, and the
most difficult one to attain, lies with the 59% of all commercial
timber land-nearly 300 million acres-owned by farmers and
miscellaneous private citizens. Good management could more
than double the timber produced on these lands.
A doubling of timber production in the next forty-three years
will require widespread application of intensive management
practices on all commercial forest lands of all ownerships. This
would include prompt reforestation of all deforested and understocked lands, intensive timber culture such as thinning for optimum spacing, fertilization where needed, use of genetically improved planting stock, and more effective protection of forests
against losses from fire, insects, and disease.
Existing supplies can be stretched by more complete salvage
of dead and dying timber, more complete utilization of mill
wastes and logging residues, improved efficiency in harvesting
and manufacture, improved design of structures, more use of
preservatives to prolong the life of wood in use, and more recycling and reuse of paper products and solid wood.
We need to strengthen research programs to extend our
knowledge about growing and using wood. We have hardly
scratched the surface in developing technology. For example, we
have genetically improved only about a dozen of our 200 or so
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commercial tree species, and research on fertilization is still in its
infancy in this country.
The state and private cooperative programs of the Forest
Service should be greatly expanded. As a starter the Forestry
Incentive Programs12 designed to assist nonindustrial forest landowners should be fully funded.
The RPA Program'33 presented to the President and Congress
last year should be funded in its entirety, not just the timber part
of the program. We should have learned from past experience
that pressing for expanded timber production on the federal lands
without balanced attention to the other resources, including the
environment, will not go very far.
All of these things will cost a great deal of money-eventually
about three times as much as is being spent now on federal forestry programs. Can the nation afford it? I say we can't afford not
to make the required investments in soundly based resource management and development. If the Nation fails to increase timber
production to full potential, it will be paying the bill anyway, in
the form of higher costs for housing, pulp and paper products, and
energy consuming wood substitutes.
With energy shortages in prospect, right now seems to be a
good time for the country to exercise its option to grow more
wood. Wood has many environmental advantages over competing
nonrenewable materials, and its energy demands are lower. Environmentalists should be among the staunchest supporters of a
strong timber production program in this country.
We do have a choice. For me that choice is not hard to make.
132

7 C.F.R. §§ 701.27-.45 (1977).
100.

'" PROGRAM, supra note

COMMENTARY

By

RALPH

D.

HODGES, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Ed Cliff has presented a perceptive review' of legislative
events since the Public Land Law Review Commission Report2
was released in June, 1970. He has done a good job of discussing
the PLLRC's forest management recommendations and the administrative and congressional action, or lack of it, on each of
them. I do not intend to subject each of Ed's points to an exhaustive examination but instead will emphasize and reinforce a number of them and offer a somewhat different slant on others.
First, I'd like to emphasize a point former Chief Cliff made
concerning timber demand and supply. In 1973, three authoritative reports by the President's Advisory Panel on Timber and the
Environment,' the National Commission on Materials Policy,4
and the Forest Service5 all came to essentially the same conclusion. That conclusion was that, at current levels of forest management, projected timber demand will considerably outstrip supply.6
Nothing has happened since these 1973 reports to alter
projections of future demand for wood. In fact, recently revised
projections for soaring future energy costs have, if anything,
tended to strengthen the position of wood in comparison to nonrenewable and energy intensive substitutes such as steel, aluminum, and concrete. Virtually all major competitors to wood de* President, National Forest Products Association, Washington, D.C. This commentary was prepared with the assistance of National Forest Products Association forester,
Douglas W. MacCleery.
E. Cliff, Timber Resources (this issue).
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
' PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF THE

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1973) [hereinafter cited
as PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL].
' NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MATERIALS POLICY, MATERIAL NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
TODAY AND TOMORROW (1973) [hereinafter cited as MATERIAL NEEDS]; E. CUFF, TIMBER:
THE RENEWABLE MATERIAL (1973).
' FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE OUTLOOK FOR TIMBER IN THE
UNITED STATES (1973) [hereinafter cited as OUTLOOK FOR TIMBER].
a Id. at 179-213; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supranote 3, at 56-76; MATERIAL NEEDS,

supra note 4, at 4C-8.
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pend upon resources that are not only depletable but which also
have greater energy requirements per unit of production than
does wood.
The prospects for increasing demand for wood look as solid
as ever. The timber supply picture, however, is considerably less
certain. It is made so, in part, by the fact that demands for the
many other uses of the forest have also been soaring. All evidence
supports a continuation of this trend. The 1975 Resources Planning Act Assessment7 projected the following increase in demand
between 1970 and 2000 for various uses of the forest:
Remote camping
Birdwatching
Small game hunting
Fresh water fishing * "
Forest-range grazing
Timber
Water (consumptive use)

33%
38%
21%
56%
50%
73%
23%

Although the Forest Service projects demand for timber to
clearly outstrip demand for the other listed uses, prospects for
meeting this demand remain cloudy. This is due to uncertainties
over public and private commitment to the long-term programs
and financing required to increase the intensity of forest management.
It is also due to the public's perception that use of public
lands for timber production unacceptably degrades the value of
the forest for non-commodity uses. This public perception, although erroneous when sound scientific multiple-use management practices are applied, is fostered and reinforced by preservation interest groups, some of whose long-term objective seems
to be the elimination of commodity uses from the National Forests and other public lands.
The long-term outlook for timber supply was speculative at
the time of the PLLRC, and it remains so today, as it always will.
Two recent, far-reaching pieces of legislation, the 1974 Forest and
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA)9 and the
I FOREST

SERVICE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,

RPA,

THE NATION'S RENEWABLE RE-

SOURCES-AN ASSESSMENT 1975 at 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENT].
OUTLOOK FOR TIMBER, supra note 5, at 179-213.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
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1976 National Forest Management Act (NFMA),' 0 contain not
only the opportunities for easing the pending timber supply crisis
but also the potential for frustrating and unnecessarily compounding it.
I. NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976
The National Forest Management Act of 1976" has the potential for easing the controversy that has surrounded the National Forests for the past decade or more. In passing this legislation, Congress perceived that Forest Service timber management
objectives were at times achieved at the expense of other uses of
the National Forests. Yet, it is significant that, for the most
part, Congress was overwhelmingly supportive of the land management job the Forest Service has been carrying out since 1973
when the Church Committee clearcutting guidelines 3 were
adopted as agency policy."
The 1976 Act endorses and implements many current Forest
Service timber management policies. While recognizing the
need to set forth general policies for the protection of all resource
values, Congress supported the concept of retaining flexibility for
professional judgment out on the ground. Congress specifically
considered, but rejected, highly prescriptive bills that were supported by influential interests'5 in both the House and Senate.' 6
Virtually all moderate conservation groups,'7 as well as the
forest industry, rejected the concept of writing rigid land management prescriptions into law." The National Forest Management
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
Id,
2 Senate Hearings on S. 3091, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14494-97 (1976); H.R. REP. No.
1478, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 10-14 (1976); S. RE. No. 893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 711 (1976); House Hearings on H.R. 15069, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. 10136-94 (1976).
" SUBCOMM.

ON PUBLIC LANDS OF THE SENATE INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAMIS COMM.,

S. Doc. No. 505, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
11FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL FORESTS IN A QUALITY ENVIRONMENT-ACTION PLAN (1972).
'" Coalition to Save Our National Forests, Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, Friends
of the Earth, and others.
* Hearings on S. 2926, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Sen. Randolph); Hearings on
H.R. 11894, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Rep. Brown).
* Wildlife Management Institute, Society of American Foresters, and American Forestry Association.
" See Senate Hearings on S. 3091, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, 105, 116, 518, 564, 570
CLEARCUTrING ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS,

(1976).
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Act generally reflects this objective." However, in view of the
events of the past few years, it is clear that the nation's conservation policy has been written as much in the courtroom as it has
in the halls of Congress.
A narrow court interpretation 20 of the 1897 Organic Act was
the major reason the National Forest management issue was
taken up by Congress in the first place. Narrow and restrictive
court interpretations of the National Forest Management Act
could again cloud the nation's timber supply picture.2 ' Although
a Sierra Club spokesman has stated that court challenges will be
delayed until the Forest Service is given a chance to implement
the new law, two suits claiming violations under the National
Forest Management Act has already been initiated by preserva22
tion groups in Texas and Arkansas.
Only time and the courts will tell whether the Forest Service
will be permitted to administer the National Forests in the way
Congress intended 3 when it passed the 1976 Act-under a broad
set of environmental policy guidelines affording considerable flexibility for professional judgment to adjust management practices
to local needs and specific ground conditions.
I.
RESOURCES PLANNING ACT
The 1974 Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA) 21 set up the framework for a national planning
process by requiring: (1) periodic assessment of the demand and
supply situation for all renewable resources of U.S. forests and
rangelands, 21 and (2) development of a Forest Service program for
meeting projected demands for these resources in an environmentally sound manner.26 The first assessment and program were
1116 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (Supp. 1977).
2' Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422 (D. W. Va. 1973).
" Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975); Zieske
v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258 (D. Alas. 1975).
2 Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Butz, Civ. No. TY-76-268-CA (E.D. Tex.,
filed July 2, 1976); Arkansas Soc'y for the Preservation of Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Bergland, Civ. No. 77-6007 (W.D. Ark., Feb. 18, 1976, dismissed Mar. 22, 1976).
11 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. V 1977).
24 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
5

Id.

" Id.
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released to the public in March, 1976.27 Although far from perfect,
due in part at least to the brutal time constraints set up in the
1974 Act, it represented an outstanding first step in comprehensive planning for the future. Unfortunately, at the time it was
released, the Congress was immersed in legislative proposals to
correct the Monongahela crisis and to restore Forest Service authority to sell timber, which led to the 1976 Act. As a consequence, the ninety-fourth Congress gave little attention to the
1975 RPA documents.
An additional handicap was the lack of support the recommended program received from the Ford Administration. President Ford's 1978 budget proposal for the Forest Service,2" which
was left essentially unchanged by President Carter,2 9 virtually
ignores the budget levels recommended by the March, 1976 RPA
Program document 3l and, in fact, proposes rescinding some key
Forest Service programs-such as the Forestry Incentives Program. 3' Fortunately, in 1977 the RPA Recommended Program has
been used by congressional resource and appropriations committees as a basis for proposing substantial increases in the President's 1978 budget recommendations.
At a recent appropriations subcommittee hearing, 32 Forest
Service Chief John McGuire expressed the concern that, unless
the RPA Recommended Program goals and funding levels are
given more consideration in the congressional budgeting process,
the Resources Planning Act will become obsolete as a budget
planning tool. I share Chief McGuire's concern. The next Resources Planning Act Assessment and Program, which are due in
1980, will be particularly critical to the success or failure of the
resources Planning Act process.
III. TOWARD A NATIONAL FORESTRY POLICY
The RPA could be an ideal vehicle for developing a comprehensive national forestry policy based on sound scientific princi27ASSESSMENT, supra note 7; FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, RPA, A
RECOMMENDED RENEWABLE RESOURCE PROGRAM

"' See THE BUDGET

(1976) [hereinafter cited as

PROGRAM].

OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1978,
See FISCAL YEAR 1978 BuDGET REVISIONS, February 1977, at 7 (1977).
PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 26.

at 13 (1977).

7 C.F.R. §§ 701.27-.45 (1977).
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Interim and Related Agencies of the House
Comm. on Appropriations,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 848 (1977).
SI
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pies and having broad public acceptance. This potential, of
course, is not yet realized. We all need to help to make the process
work properly.
A prerequisite for a national forestry policy is a rational assessment of the potential contributions to the nation's timber
supply by the major ownership classes- industrial, public, and
small private.
Industrial ownerships are already leading the way in the application of scientific forestry principles to the practice of forest
management. Although containing only thirteen percent of the
nation's commercial forest land, industrial lands currently contribute thirty-four percent of the annual U.S. supply of softwood
sawtimber. All that really needs to be done to insure that industrial ownerships continue to contribute their share to the nation's wood supply is to avoid governmental policies that discourage timber management by creating economic disincentives.
Some current proposals could do just that. I am referring to such
matters as: (1) Onerous and unnecessary requirements for federal
permits for such things as logging road culverts;3 (2) the potentially disruptive effect of rural planning; 34 (3) unnecessarily restrictive state forest practice acts; and (4) other such government
actions ostensibly designed to achieve lofty ideals but which in
reality impose unnecessary burdens on timber growing.
This leads us to the second major ownership class-the fiftynine percent of the commercial forest land that is held by small
private owners. Virtually all of the government policies described
above, if not properly implemented, could also create major disincentives to the practice of forestry on small woodlands. However,
the owners of these lands face a whole range of other disincentives
beyond those confronting the industrial sector. These include: (1)
The small size of holdings which make some intensive forest management practices more costly;35 (2) absentee ownership; (3) ownership objectives that may not be compatible with intensive for" See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 404, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Miskovsky &
Van Hook, Regulation of Forestry Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, 9

NAT. RESOURCES LAW.

645 (1976).

1, Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 208, 86 Stat. 816 (1972); Miskovsky & Van
Hook, supra note 33.
" PRESIDENT'S Aiwisoaw PANEL, supra note 3, at 91-92.
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est management; 8 (4) inability or unwillingness to make necessary long-term financial commitments that are further penalized
by the inheritance tax system; 37 and (5) unavailability of technical advice. Despite these and other difficulties, the small private
holdings contribute thirty percent of the annual U.S. softwood
sawtimber supply.
There is a great potential for improving the management of
these small holdings and I fully support government programs
designed to achieve this objective-such as forestry incentives, 39
technical assistance," and tax reform. But I do not believe that
small private woodlands hold the key to meeting increased demand over the short term-between now and the year 2000.
These lands tend to have significant deficiencies in growing
stock (timber volume per acre) as compared with the third major
ownership class, the National Forests, which have a significant
surplus in growing stock. 4 The 1973 Report of the President's
Advisory Panel on Timber and the Environment concluded that
the inventory and stocking of timber on small private woodlands
is not sufficient to provide for a significant increase in timber
supply. 2 In fact, the report concluded that there is insufficient
inventory on nonindustrial private holdings to sustain even present removals.4 3 Another conclusion was that even if tree planting
programs are increased right now, there would be no significant
effect on timber supply until after the year 2000."4
Clearly, timber that is not already relatively close to maturity will be unavailable to meet demand during the next quarter
century. The real key to meeting projected future demand for
timber lies in the public ownerships, particularly the National
Forests. The National Forests contain over half the total softwood
sawtimber inventory in the nation and are growing at only thirtynine percent of their potential 4 -the worst performance of all
"

Id. at 92.

Id.
"Id.
3

7 C.F.R. §§ 701.27-.45 (1977).

,o PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 3, at 240-46.

"Id. at 92.
"

Id. at 90-94, 283.

13 Id.
44 Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 54

ownership classes. The timber is already there; it does not have
to be grown.
When the National Forests are evaluated against the previously listed factors which are obstacles to intensive forest management on nonindustrial private lands-size of holding, level of
available technical expertise, and the lack of investment incentives-the obvious reversal of conditions speaks eloquently for the
desirability of increasing the commitment to forest management
on federal forest lands.
We are all well aware of the interest groups that wish to
significantly reduce or eliminate timber harvest from the National Forests. If this is done, increasing costs will be borne by
consumers. The inevitable consequence of a stable or reduced
supply of any commodity in the face of soaring demand is always
increased prices. This would be wasteful and unnecessary. I am
convinced that the National Forest can and should contribute
more than they have in the past to U.S. timber supply, and that
they can do so in an environmentally sound manner which gives
protection to other resource values.
IV.

A.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Dominant Use Timber Production Units

One of the more signifcant PLLRC recommendations was
that lands which are highly productive for timber should be classified for commercial timber production as a dominant use."5 I
was disappointed that Congress, in the NFMA,4 7 failed to provide
policy guidance aimed at classifying National Forest lands for
specific purposes and management intensities. Such classification, which hopefully will result from the planning process developed to implement the NFMA, is needed to meet increased demands for all resource uses. It is also essential to attract private
investment and to assure Administration support for the appropriations necessary for intensive forest management.
The 1973 Forest Service "Outlook" report indicated that out
of a total of almost 500 million acres of commercial forest land in
, Id. at 78.

* PLLRC REPoRT, supra note 2, at 92-95.
* Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).

TIMBER

this country, only 10%, or 52 million acres, is in the 120 or better
site-productivity class.4" Prime timber land is an exceedingly
scarce commodity. The nation has a great stake in assuring that
forest management is given major consideration on areas that are
most productive for this use.
I disagree that section 6 of the NFMA"9 places timber use in
such a "residual" position, allowing its use only when it does not
interfere with or degrade other resources uses. Section 6, in addition to providing guidance on the land management planning
process, directs the Forest Service, through the regulation process, to develop guidelines for land management planning which
will achieve the goals of the RPA Program within the silvicultural
and environmental constraints described in the section.
The environmental objectives set forth in section 6 are designed in general to ensure that timber production will not
"irreversibly" 50 damage soil, slope, and other watershed conditions or "seriously and adversely"'" affect water conditions or fish
habitat. The silvicultural guidelines in section 6 are essentially
identical to the recommendations of the Church Committee on
clearcutting 2 which have been Forest Service policy since 1973.11
B.

Economic Factors and Considerations

I disagree with the conclusion that the NFMA substantially
rejects the use of economic considerations in the determination
of allowable harvest levels in the National Forests. The legislative
history of section 1151 of the Act indicates that, although nondeclining yield will be a general National Forest policy, significant
departures from the harvest limitations contained in the language
of the first part of the section will be permitted for a number of
reasons including, but not limited to, reducing high mortality
losses, 55 improving the age class distribution of the forest,5" and
protecting the economic stability of local dependent communiOUTLOOK FOR TIMBER, supra note 5, at 302-09.
0 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i).
5, Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
52 Clearcutting on Federal Timberlands, supra note 13, at 9.
3 NATIONAL FOREsTs IN A QuA'rrY ENVIRONMENT, supra note 14.

122 CONG. REc. H11,836 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1976).

Id. at H11,845.
"'Id.
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ties.571 Such departures must be consistent with the principles of
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.58 Additional direction for the use of economics is contained in section 6(1) of the
1976 Act 5 which mandates that program proposals be supported
by an evaluation of long-term costs and benefits.
Clearly, the door is still open to use economic factors or other
appropriate criteria to set allowable harvest levels as long as other
resource values are protected. The unanswered question is
whether the Forest Service will use the discretion available to it
in this area. Evidence indicates that relaxation of present harvest
scheduling policy will be necessary in some areas of the West
(such as Oregon) to avoid significant reductions in timber supply
between now and the year 2000. Such relaxation is necessary to
permit the old-growth timber, which predominates in National
Forest lands, to be used while the young-growth timber on other
ownerships is permitted to reach economic maturity.
C.

Access Road Construction

There has been disappointingly little action on the PLLRC
recommendation to develop an accelerated construction program
for timber access roads." A good transportation system, constructed at an early date, is important for the efficient management of all National Forest resources. It is essential for the efficient salvage of mortality losses, which in 1970 amounted to almost six billion board feet in the National Forests alone. The
problems caused by inadequate road appropriations were recognized in congressional discussion of the NFMA, but no legislative
action was taken. Congressional appropriations increases in this
area for fiscal year 1977 seem to recognize the problem and provide some cause for optimism.
CONCLUSION

I agree that we could be entering the Golden Age of Forestry.
Whether we are in fact depends upon a number of factors. One
of the most important of these is whether foresters and professional land managers will assume leadership positions in society
Id. at S17,274.
Id. at H11,845.
, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(1)(1) (Supp. 1977).
U PLLRC REPORT, supra note 2, at 99.
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as spokesmen for a reasonable approach to solving what often
appear to be hopelessly conflicting land use demands. For some
reason foresters have sometimes been reluctant to speak out in
the past. We need to be much more active in public education.
This country has the potential for doubling the production of
timber by the year 2020 and doing so without damaging other
resource values. Timber management, if properly practiced, does
not conflict with most other uses of the forests. In fact, it compliments and enhances many uses, particularly wildlife and wildliferelated recreation.
Whether we are entering a Golden Age also depends upon the
quality of the job that professional foresters and other land managers actually carry out on the ground. The spotlight will be
focused not only on foresters' words but also upon their deeds.
The mistakes of the past will no longer be tolerated by a critical
public. All the public education and eloquent speeches will be
worthless if we fail to carry out our commitment to a quality job
of forest management on the ground.
We also need to develop programs to assure that all of the
nation's lands, whether in public or private ownership, will be
available to meet future demands for forest products and other
renewable resources. The National Forests, with half of the softwood sawtimber in the nation, must assume a key role in meeting
this future demand, at least between now and the year 2000.
Programs to provide technical assistance and investment
incentives to small private landowners need more emphasis than
they have received in the past. Existing governmental policy and
proposed changes need close scrutiny to determine whether they
will impose economic disincentives to timber growing on private
lands.
A key to the intensification of forest management practices
is a commitment from the Administration and Congress and the
long-term investments and programs called for in the RPA Program.' Such commitments must be made or there will never be
a comprehensive national forestry policy.
The road ahead will be long, rocky, and full of surprises and
undoubtedly some disappointments. Achieving the goal will be
11ASSESSMENT,

supra note 7; PROGRAM, supra note 27.
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difficult but well worth the effort. In the end, society can only
benefit from a rational approach to our natural resource problems. It can only be harmed by irrational, vascillating, and
whimsical treatment of these problems.

COMMENTS ON "TIMBER RESOURCES"
By

STEPHEN

H.

SPURR*

Edward P. Cliff's analysis, of events consequent to the report
of the Public Land Law Review Commission' in 1970 provides an
invaluable insight into the fate of the Commission's recommendations, the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 3 and the National Forest Management Act of
1976.1 As Chief of the Forest Service from 1961 to 1972, Cliff
played a key role in the evolution of U.S. forest policy during
these critical years. His evaluation is both perspicacious and
accurate.
Inevitably, Mr. Cliff concentrates upon the management of
national forest lands from the viewpoint of an insider. My role,
in apposition, is to view these same events as a less well-informed
but, upon the same token, perhaps more disinterested onlooker.
The report of the Public Land Law Review Commission' appeared at a time when our current national environmental policy
was taking shape under the National Environmental Policy Act 6
and the Environmental Protection Agency, when public outcry
over clearcutting, particularly in the Monongahela and Bitterroot
National Forests, was reaching a crescendo,7 and when shortages
and high prices of wood products were having a disturbing impact
on housing and other inputs to the cost of living! It is not surprising, therefore, that the serious review of "old-line" public land
policies and problems was more or less lost in the onrush of new
issues and new developments.
* Professor, Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at
Austin.
See E. Cliff, Timber Resources (this issue) [hereinafter cited as Timber
Resources].
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 2.
* 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
E. CLIFF, TIMBER: THE RENEWABLE MATERIAL 4-6 (1973) (prepared for the National
Commission on Materials Policy) [hereinafter cited as TIMBER: THE RENEWABLE
MATERIAL].

' See Task Force on Softwood Lumber & Plywood, Findings & Recommendations 1
(June 18, 1970) (White House Press Release, June 19, 1970).
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What is surprising, however, is the relevance of the recommendations of the Commission seven years later after so much
water has flowed over the dam. The report is still current and its
recommendations are still generally defensible.
The main thrust of the Public Land Law Review Commission's recommendations was toward land management planning
as the process for decisionmaking by public land managers acting
under general policy guidelines set by Congress. This process has
been utilized as the heart of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act,' the National Forest Management Act, 0
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.11 In
this regard, the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission has been most influential. At least, it has been anticipatory
of future developments.
Certainly, the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission was the first of several key studies. It was followed within
three years, after its appearance in 1970, by the Church guidelines on clearcutting,12 the report to the National Commission on
Materials Policy, 3 the report of the President's Advisory Panel on
Timber and the Environment," and the Forest Service's study. 5
These studies provided a background for long-range planning of
federal forest lands unmatched in the history of our forest policy.
That the recommendations of these disparate groups had
much in common was not purely happenstance, nor was it necessarily totally due to the converging of various lines of evidence.
All depended for a statistical base upon the forest survey carried
out by the Forest Service," and all were limited, therefore, by the
inadequacies imposed on this basic data source by a shortage of
'16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1610 (Supp. IV 1974).
10 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be

codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
" Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16,
22, 25, 30, 40, 43, 48, 49 U.S.C.).
"

SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS,

COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,

CLEARCUTrING ON FEDERAL TIMBERLANDS, S. Doc.
'" TIMBER: THE RENEWABLE MATERIAL, supra
"

No. 505, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
note 7.

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT,

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT

11FOREST
UNITED STATES

16Id.

SERVICE,

(1973).

U.S.

REPORT OF THE

(1973).

DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE OUTLOOK FOR TIMBER IN THE

TIMBER

time and money. If American forest policy is to be formulated on
a sound base, clearly one of the greatest needs is a revived and
revised forest survey, in which heavier and more recent sampling
would provide estimates of present and future forest products
supply, in terms of both present and potential future standards
of utilization. Furthermore, the forest survey should more accurately evaluate not only timber products, but also other forest
products such as wildlife, fish, recreational capabilities, grazing
potential, and water supply. The Forest Service itself is well
aware of these needs. 7 It has simply lacked the wherewithal to
meet them.
Coming back to the report of the Commission, 8 it may seem
that recent legislation has fulfilled a surprising number of the
Public Land Law Review Commission's key recommendations as
they relate to management of the National Forest System and
National Resource Lands administered by the Bureau of Land
Management. However, this is not borne out by the point-bypoint review of the nine major recommendations related to timber
resources. 9 Basically these relate to the proposal for dominant
use timber production units'" and the emphasis on economic considerations in timber sales on public lands." My own review confirms Mr. Cliff's in that, on most of these points, Congress has
either rejected the Commission's recommendations or there has
been little change in Forest Service principles and practices attributable to the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission.
The sober truth is that the concept of dominant use timber
production on federal lands has become less popular, less feasible,
and less likely to be adopted in 1977 than it was in 1970. Much
the same can be said of multiple use over the same period of
years. Despite the logic and reasonableness of the Public Land
Law Review Commission's report and the support of many of its
recommendations by the President's Advisory Panel on Timber

"
ig

"

Id. at v-vi.
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 2.
Id. at 92-103.
Id. at 92-96.
Id. at 96-98.
Timber Resources, supra note 1.
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and the Environment in 1973,3 dominant use for growing timber
has been rejected by and large by the people and by our political
process as well. It is not that the concept of dominant use for
other purposes has been rejected. Quite the contrary, dominant
use for wilderness has gained measurably both in terms of political support and in area covered. The concept of dominant use has
been forwarded by the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act."' Perhaps the
most ironclad of the dominant use reservations programs, however, has been that set into action by the Endangered Species Act
of 1973.5
The trend toward dominant use for all purposes except timber is illustrated by the Forest Service's estimate of future wilderness withdrawals, as detailed in the Program2 6 submitted in accordance with the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources
Planning Act of 1974.27 The Program recommends that about 25
to 30 million acres of wilderness be set aside by 2020.28 This would
more than double the present area of wilderness. 9 Additionally,
timber harvest will be banned or greatly restricted on large areas
because of steep and fragile slopes,M endangered species, 31 protection of water courses, 3 or because of economic submarginality. It
is apparent that multiple uses, which would include timber harvest, will be prohibited on large areas of national forest lands.
"

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF THE

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON TIMBER AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1973).

24 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1970 & Supp. II 1972 & Supp. IV 1974).

- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. IV 1974). At the moment, it would seem that land
use to protect an endangered species takes complete precedence over all other uses. To
cite but one example, 40 acres of old growth are set aside in the Texas National Forests
around every nesting hold occupied, or perhaps once occupied, by the red-cockaded woodpecker.
2 FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, A SUMMARY OF A RENEWABLE RESOURCE
ASSESSMENT AND A RECOMMENDED RENEWABLE RESOURCE PROGRAM (1976).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1602 (Supp. IV 1974).
FOREST SERVICE, supra note 26, at 17.
2

Id.

" The term "steep and fragile slopes" is used by the Forest Service to identify areas
of concern under the National Forest Management Act of 1976 which specifies that
"timber will be harvested from National Forest System lands only where-(i) soil, slope,
or other watershed conditions will not be irreversibly damaged .... " Pub. L. No. 94588, § 36(g)(3)(E), 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)).
See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. IV 1974).
22 See Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1970 & Supp. 11 1972 &
Supp. IV 1974).
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Admittedly, the Forest Service has been adept at redefining
and reinterpreting the concept of multiple use to keep it as the
guiding principle of its land management, and this concept has
been reinforced by the passage of the National Forest Management Act of 1976.3 However, I submit that multiple use in the
sense of accommodating all uses is in fact becoming constantly
less prevalent in our national forests. Not only is timber seldom
the dominant use, but it is tending to become a less-than-equal
use. The National Forest Management Act specifies, for instance,
that harvest cuts designed to create even-aged stands can be used
only when logging is carried out "in a manner consistent with the
protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and esthetic resources . . . . -13Conceivably, any changes in these aspects of the ecosystem-and changes are bound to result from any
harvest of timber-could be used as grounds in litigation to stop
the logging operation.
The trend, therefore, is toward dominant use of nontimber
resources of our national forests and away from multiple use including the harvest of timber. I am not passing a value judgment,
but rather stating that multiple use is a concept that is losing
validity, at least in its original formulation. The doctrine of dominant use put forward by the Public Land Law Review Commission 35 has been accepted in principle, but it has been applied
increasingly to uses other than timber production. Only time will
tell the extent to which our nation's federal lands will be used to
produce timber as a renewable natural resource.
13 Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (to be codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
' Id. § 6(g)(3)(f)(v) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(3)(F)(v)).
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 2.
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THE MINING LAW:

PLLRC

RECOMMENDATIONS-

WHAT HAPPENED TO THEM?
By

ROBERT EMMET CLARK*
INTRODUCTION

We are aware that the report of the Public Land Law Review
Commission (PLLRC)I is now almost seven years old. My discussion deals with only a small but very important part of that report
contained in chapter seven. That short chapter covers all mineral
resources, including leasable minerals, except those on the Outer
Continental Shelf which are covered separately in the report. 2
Most of you know my attitude toward the patent-location
system established in the 1872 Mining Law. 3 If you do not, I refer
you to the footnote, beginning on page 130 of the report, in which
four members of the Commission joined.' At the outset it should
*

Professor of Law, University of Arizona.

PuBLic LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
I Id. ch. 11. Throughout the report there are other references to minerals and mineral
related problems in the management of the public lands. My discussion will not include
the mineral leasing laws except by way of passing reference and comparison.
3 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54
(1970)) (commonly referred to as the General Mining Law).
The footnote reads:
Commissioners Clark, Goddard, Hoff, and Udall submit the following
separate views: The Commission is unanimous in agreeing that existing mineral law should be modified. Many excellent changes are recommended in
this report. However, it is our view that more fundamental changes are
required. In particular, the dichotomous system that distinguishes
"locatable" from "leaseable" minerals should not be continued.
The recommended modifications preserve the location-patent approach
devised more than 100 years ago. It served an earlier period but cannot, even
as modified, provide an adequate legal framework for the future. Only minor
surgery on the Law of 1872 is recommended in this report. In our view a
general leasing system for all minerals except those which are made available
by law for outright sale should be adopted. Such a system would:
1. Continue to encourage orderly and needed resource exploration and
development.
2. Insure better management and protection of all public land values
and enhance human and environmental values.
3. Establish a fair and workable relationship between economic incentives and the public interest.
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be emphasized that I have not changed my belief that a leasing
system for all minerals is preferable. Eventually, I believe, such
a system will take shape to everyone's advantage.
My discussion will divide the subject matter into three uneObjections to the location-patent system are numerous, obvious and, in
large measure, admitted by industry and government. Many wholesome
proceduralchanges are recommended in this report. But these essential features of the early system are preserved:
1. Hard mineral explorers may go on the public lands and search for
minerals except where particular lands are withdrawn or their use restricted.
2. Mineral developers may obtain fee title to the minerals and, if they
desire, may purchase so much of the surface as may be needed for a mining
operation.
In the past these developers have paid no direct charge to the United
States for the removal of locatable minerals. The Commission has recommended that royalty payments be made.
A sound, workable mineral leasing system has been part of the law since
1920. It represented an arduous congressional effort extending over a generation and there is general agreement that the system has worked reasonably
well. Leasing and permit systems are the law of many states which own
public lands. This approach to the exploration and development of all minerals on the public lands of the United States should be adopted, except where
minerals are sold outright.
As we understand it, those who oppose the idea have three basic objections: 1) under the present leasing system the Secretary of the Interior has
uncontrolled discretion over what land will be made available for mineral
development; 2) under the present leasing system the leasehold interest does
not provide sufficient security interest for the raising of investment capital
since developers are subject to ex post facto regulation; 3) under the present
leasing system small developers are handicapped in the competitive bidding
situations as the cash bonus offer is the only bidding tool available and small
developers may suffer from a lack of capital.
We recognize the legitimacy of these objections and would propose these
modifications to the present leasing system: 1) that the Congress list values
the Secretary of the Interior will consider when deciding to lease available
land and give a right of judicial review for abuse of discretion; 2) that leases
be protected from ex post facto regulation of the mineral operation and that
the life of the lease be equal with the productive life of the mineral deposit;
3) that in competitive bidding situations the Secretary of the Interior be
authorized to consider the royalty offered as well as the cash bonus offered
when awarding a lease.
These proposals may not convince vigorous advocates of the locationpatent system of the merits of our position. However, to those who maintain
that a leasing system for hardrock minerals is inherently incapable of providing sufficient incentive for the mineral development of our public lands, we
suggest that quick reference be made to mineral development of Indian
lands, where just such a system has worked well, and to the state leasing
systems.
PLLRC REPORT 130.
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qual parts: First, a review of the PLLRC recommendations regarding hard minerals and the patent-location system, for the
purpose of judging any changes since the recommendations were
made; second, a discussion of the specific legislative changes
made in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 19761
and their relation to the General Mining Law; third, a short conclusion reemphasizing the desirability of implementing a general
leasing system instead of making patchwork changes in an effort
to continue the patent-location system. I feel free to do this for
two reasons: (1) I have reexamined my position stated in the
1970 report and believe the need for a leasing system is greater
than ever, and (2) the Secretary of the Interior has stated publicly
that he wants to change the General Mining Law.
The real question is, change it to what? A general leasing
system for all minerals, such as the states have, seems to be the
most sensible answer.
Some of you may not have had time to read the pertinent
statements and recommendations in chapter seven of the PLLRC
Report, so I will quote a number of them, summarize others, and
I will include some passages from the report in order to put them
in context.
I. HARD MINERALS AND THE PATENT-LOCATION SYSTEM
"Public land mineral policy should encourage exploration,
development, and production of minerals on the public lands."'
No one can quarrel with that statement, although the figures and
information following it are somewhat dated. One sentence in the
text stands out and takes up the theme of my discussion:
"Accurate data concerning production of the metallic and other
minerals subject to claim location under the General Mining Law
are not available since there are no Federal records segregating
production among private, state, and Federal lands."' We all
know that most of the metallic minerals produced in the United
States except iron come from the Western States. We also know
that this mild statement in the report relates to the fact that the
I Pub.

L. No. 94-579, §§ 101-707, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified in scattered sections

of 7, 16, 30, 40, 43 U.S.C.).
PLLRC REPoRT 121 (emphasis in original).
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Federal Government does not know how many mining claims
there are, or where they are, or in what condition they are. But
more on that when we get to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.8
The PLLRC Report states that: "Mineral exploration and
development should have a preference over some or all other uses
on much of our public lands." Some of the gloss on that statement which follows in the report may not be acceptable to everybody, but in general the statement is straightforward and
unobjectionable.
Next we see the statement that: "The Federal Government
generally should rely on the private sector for mineral exploration, development, and production, by maintaininga continuing
invitation to explore for and develop minerals on the public
lands."' The statement is current and accurate enough in 1977,
although succeeding statements in the text relating to the need
"to develop nationwide geological information"" are more relevant today than in 1970, as are the comments in the report on the
2
impact of mining on the environment.
These prefatory observations lead to the first numbered recommendation in the Mineral Resources Chapter, Recommendation 46: "Congress should continue to exclude some classes of
public lands from future mineral development.' 3 This obviously
refers to present law and policy which exclude mining and leasing
in National Parks, Monuments, and other specified areas. And
following this recommendation we find a strong statement regarding the need for the Federal Government to provide "reliable
information concerning . . .mineralization" in areas excluded
from mining, and the report urges that surveys to determine mineralization be undertaken at federal expense "since private enterprise without assurance of development rights will not have
the incentive to finance such surveys."' 4 Some may doubt the
accuracy of that statement, but it leads directly into RecommenSee text accompanying notes 53-76 infra.
PLLRC REPORT 122 (emphasis in original).
Id. (emphasis in original).

Id.
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"

Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 123-24.
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dation 47: "Existing Federal systems for exploration, development, and production of mineral resources on the public lands
should be modified."' 5
In the first sentence of the text following the recommendation, the novice is introduced to the "three distinctly different
existing policy systems providing for the exploration, development, and production on the public lands."'" The first is, of
course, the patent-location system in the Mining Law of 1872,11
the focus of our inquiry here. The second is the leasing system
established in 1920,18 and the third is the outright sale or disposal
system for particular minerals under legislation passed in the
1940's and 1950's.' 9
The report explains that the second and third systems are
leasing or permit systems. The report exposes the confusion over
which law or laws are applicable to these types of lands held by
the United States and recommends uniformity in the law: "We
believe that Federal mineral legislation, if our recommendations
are adopted, should be equally applicable to all federally owned
land where the type of mineral activity involved is permitted by
law. "I' No one can disagree with that statement, and when we
look at the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 we
will see how pertinent that statement is.
The next several paragraphs of the report admit the abuses
and deficiencies of the patent-location system, stating: "The 1872
law offers no means by which the Government can effectively
control environmental impacts. Other deficiencies include the
fact that claims long-since dormant remain as clouds-on-title,
and land managers do not know where claims are located." 2 ' This
is a matter taken up in the 1976 Act.
The report then anticipates the desire of some, including
myself, for a change to a leasing system:
IS

Id. at 124.

16Id.
" The General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970). See note 3 supra.
" Mineral Lands Leasing Act, ch. 85, §§ 1-38, 41 Stat. 437 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§
181-287 (1970)).
" Materials Act of 1947, ch. 406, 61 Stat. 681 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-615
(1970)).
PLLRC REPORT 124 (emphasis in original).
21 Id.
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For all of these reasons, some have advocated the replacement
of the existing system by leasing, the only other system now in effect
for the exploration, development, andproductionof major minerals.
In addition to the general deficiencies of the Mining Law, there
are other weaknesses from the standpoint of the using industry in
that there is (1) no certainty of tenure before meeting the qualifications for a discovery of a deposit, even though large expenditures are
involved in exploration and development before the discovery can
be proved; (2) no certainty at this time as to what constitutes a
discovery; and (3) inadequate provision for the acquisition of land
for related purposes such as locating a mill. For these reasons, and
because operators believe they must continue to obtain title to mineral deposits even if not the surface of the land, the industry generally prefers amending rather than replacing the 1872 Mining Law.
We see merit in both the positions-maintenance of the
location-patent system and a leasing system-but believe that a
system should be established that incorporates the desirable features of both."

At this point the report takes on the tone of advocacy in favor
of the patent-location system or a hybrid system that is not a
hybrid but looks very much like the same old 1872 horse but with
some new brass studs in his harness.
The public interest requires that individuals be encouraged-not merely permitted-to look for minerals on the public
lands. The traditional right to self-initiation of a claim to a deposit
of valuable minerals must be preserved. This does not weaken or
dilute our concern for protection of the environment or other public
land values, because we believe that we have other means with
which to safeguard the environment against major adverse impacts.
Unless a public land area is closed to all mineral activity, we
believe that all public lands should be open without charge for
nonexclusive exploration which does not require significant surface
disturbance. However, we also conclude that different conditions
should prevail if the prospector desires an exclusive right or if heavy
equipment is to be used that will result in significant disturbances
of the surface."

This takes us to Perfecting a Claim and Recommendation 48:
Whether a prospector has done preliminary exploration work or not,
he should, by giving written notice to the appropriate Federal land
management agency, obtain an exclusive right to explore a claim of
sufficient size to permit the use of advanced methods of exploration.

Id. at 124-25 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 125-26 (emphasis in original).
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As a means of assuring exploration, reasonable rentals should be
charged for such claims, but actual expenditures for exploration and
development work should be credited against the rentals.
Upon receipt of the notice of location, a permit should be issued
to the claimholder, including measures specifically authorized by
statute necessary to maintain the quality of the environment, together with the type of rehabilitation that is required.
When the claimholder is satisfied that he has discovered a commercially mineable deposit, he should obtain firm development and
production rights by entering into a contract with the United States
to satisfy specified work or investment requirements over a reasonable period of time.
When a claimholder begins to produce and market minerals, he
should have the right to obtain a patent only to the mineral deposit,
along with the right to utilize surface for production. He should have
the option of acquiring title or lease to surface upon payment of
market value.
Patent fees should be increased and equitable royalties should
be paid to the United States on all minerals produced and marketed
2
whether before or after patent. '

The report goes on to state:
As indicated above, the General Mining Law provides inadequate protection to the explorer until he has made a discovery of a
valuable mineral deposit. Throughout his prediscovery prospecting
effort, he is subject to adverse actions by Federal land managers
allocating the land for other uses such as withdrawals from mineral
entry for an adminstrative site. With regard to third parties, he is
protected only to the extent that he can prove the area was in his
actual possession, which may be difficult under prevailing legal concepts. This approach is inadequate for a typical exploration effort
today because an area large enough to warrant the expenditures for
modern technological methods will nearly always be much larger
than that which can be held effectively in actual possession. As we
have noted, Federal policy should invite mineral exploration in
order to encourage future mineral discoveries.'

Basically, Recommendation 48 suggested five changes in the
law: (1) Notice to Federal Government and exclusive exploratory
rights and payments of rentals; (2) permits to explorer that include protection of the environment; (3) development and production rights after making a discovery; (4) when production assured a patent to the mineral deposit and use of the surface; and
U

Id. at 126.
(footnote omitted).

11 Id.
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(5) an increase in patent fees and "equitable royalties" before and
after patent. This recommendation and the supporting text contained the seeds of changes that have been introduced in Congress and in the BLM Organic Act of 1976 and to which we will
return.
There was no disagreement in 1970, and there can be none
now, over the following statement: "Unlike the present Mining
Law, claims should conform to public land subdivisions in all
cases. In many cases, mining claim descriptions under existing
law are totally inadequate to permit Federal agencies or other
interested persons to find them on the ground. "2 Nor was there
disagreement over the recommendation "that locators be required to give written notice of their claims to the appropriate
Federal land agency within a reasonable time after location. "27
Similarly, "[t]o prevent speculation and assure diligent effort,
an explorer should be required to pay rental, subject to offsetting
credits for the actual performance work completed. "2
The report advocated specific terms for an exploration permit:
Congress should: (a) establish the maximum size of an individual exclusive exploration right and the aggregate acreage held by
one person; (b) specify the period of time for which that exploration
right is granted; and (c)establish performance requirements designed to assure diligent exploration as a condition of retaining or
renewing the exploration right."n

These terms seem to be entirely reasonable and practical, as is
the suggestion that "[t]here should not be any distinction between lode and placer claims, and no extralateralright to minerals outside of claim boundaries should be acquired."30 The same
applies (as evidenced by the provisions of the 1976 Act) to the
notice requirement: "[Pleriodic written notice to Federal and
county officials of compliance with performanceobligations owed
to the United States should be required as a condition to validity
of each mining claim. "3
Id. (emphasis in original).
v Id. (emphasis in original). This requirement did not exist until the 1976 Act was
passed.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. c(emphasis in original).
Id. at 127 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
31

31

Id.

1977
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The report advocated protection of the environment and
noted the lack of "adequate regulations defining the relative
rights of the Federal Government and the locator" with respect
to surface values on unpatented mining claims. The report
doubted that such regulations could be enforced "since present
law does not require written notice of claim locations to land
management agencies. '"32
In our view, this situation is not consistent with reasonable
measures to protect surface values, or to maintain environmental
quality in the vicinity of such claims. Upon receipt of the required
notice of location, a permit should be issued to the locator, subject
to the administrativediscretionexercised within strict limits of congressionalguidelines, for the protection of surface values. While an
administratorshould have no discretion to withhold a permit, he
should have the authority to vary these restrictions to meet local
conditions. It is our view that protection of environmental values
must cover all phases of mineral activity from exploration, through
development and production, to reasonable postmining
rehabilitation.The conditions to be included in permits and other
instruments later in the process, except as necessary to accommodate circumstances in a particular locality, should have been estalished through the formal rulemaking procedure we recommend in
the chapter on Administrative Procedures.Y

The concluding comments on the environment are remarkably up
to date, as the drafters of the 1976 Act must have been aware.
Where mineral activities cause a disturbance of public land,
Congress should require that the land be restored or rehabilitated
after a determination of feasibility based on a careful balancing of
the economic costs, the extent of the environmental impacts, and
the availability of adequate technology for the type of restoration,
rehabilitation,or reclamation proposed. Rehabilitation does not
necessarily mean restoration, but rather the maximum feasible effort to bring the land into harmony with the surrounding area.
Up to the time commercialproduction commences, exploration,
development, and productionplans should be reviewed by the land
managing agency for consideration of environmental factors, but
administratorsshould be required to approve or disapprove the
plans within a reasonable time. '

The report continues by proposing development and produc3 Id.

Id. (emphasis in original).

Id. (emphasis in original).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 54

tion rights and takes notice of United States v. Coleman 5 by
referring to the discovery and the prudent man test as the "legal
test of current marketability at a profit ' 3 which is a momentary
return to an advocacy position over the correctness of that Supreme Court decision. The Commission goes on to say:
To us it seems clear that Federal land agencies are poorly
equipped to judge what is a prudent mineral investment, and this
issue should be closed when the mineral explorer is prepared to
commit himself by contract to expend substantial effort and funds
in the development of a mineral property. 7

The proposed development rights would do away with the discovery requirement, and these rights "should extend to the area
necessary for production," and there is nothing wrong with that.
The report recommended that "to avoid windfalls and to
prevent misuse of the mining laws for nonmineral purposes" patents should restrict surface-use rights to those uses "necessary for
the extraction and processing of the minerals to which patent has
been granted." This limited use of the surface would include
"settling ponds, mills, tailings, deposits, etc." 39 However, the report proposed that:
Mineral operators. . . should have the option of acquiringtitle
or a lease to the needed land areas when they are willing to pay the
market value of the surface rights. We recognize that there may well
be circumstances in which the required investment would be so large
that business judgment would dictate the need for fee title. In some
cases, a lease may be preferred for that purpose, particularly if it is
only necessary to permit more extensive use of the land than is
conferred by the mineral patent alone.
Ifthe mineralpatentee does not acquiretitle to the surface, the
right to the mineral interest should terminate automaticallyat the
end of a reasonableperiod after cessation of production.0

The report points out that under the Mining Law of 1872 patents
are obtained at nominal cost, and minerals may be extracted
before and after patent without any payment at all. The report
states that:
390 U.S. 599 (1968).
PLLRC REPORT 128.
3

Id.

3

Id.

n Id.

Id. (emphasis in original).
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[W]e consistently recommend that every user of the public lands
should pay for his right or privilege ....
We note that payment to the United States is now required for
minerals obtained from the public lands under mineral leasing acts"
and the Materials Act ....
11
The mining industry usually pays for hard rock minerals taken
from private lands and non-Federal public lands either through a
royalty or a lump sum payment . . . . We believe that royalty
should be collected on production both before and after patent.3

The report goes on to express the need for increasing mineral
patent fees (still $2.50 and $5.00 per acre) "at least enough to
cover administrativecosts associated with issuance of patents."I'
The report recommends uniform federal requirements for
locating claims in this language: "Locatorsshould not be required
to comply with state laws relating to the location and maintenance of valid mining claims other than those provisions requiring recordation."I' At present, "[s]tate laws on this subject vary
widely and many are obsolete or archaic in light of modern technology." 6 We will return to point out this deficiency in the 1976
Act.
The elimination of long-dormant mining claims received the
close attention of the Commission. We were told that there were
about 5.5 million such claims, due in part to the oil shale litigation which was pending and not fully resolved by the Oil Shale
Corp.47 decision, or by the regulations issued following that case
and United States v. Winegar,4 8 decided by the Interior Board of
Land Appeals. However, the report recommended: "Congress
should establish a fair notice procedure (a) to clear the public
lands of long-dormant mining claims, and (b) to provide the holders of existing mining claims an option to perfect their claims
under the revised location provisions we recommend. "' How

much the 1976 Act has done in that direction will be examined
in the next section of this discussion.
' See note 18 supra.
,2 See note 19 supra.
, PLLRC REPORT 128.
Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 129-30.
I'
Id.

Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
16 IBLA 112, 81 Interior Dec. 370 (1974).

PLLRC

REPORT

130.
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Chapter seven of the PLLRC Report supports the establishment of a system that incorporates the desirable features of both
the patent-location and leasing systems. 0 And yet, in the conclusion it is stated that "[t]he location-patent system we recommend will, in our opinion, correct the deficiencies and weaknesses
of the existing Mining Law while, at the same time, continue to
provide incentive for the exploration, development, and production of valuable minerals. ,,",At that point, four of us, with all due
respect and modesty, entered our differing views. 2 Although we
believed that many of the measures recommended were and are
sound and necessary, the result was the same location-patent
system. It is obvious that while the report talks of combining
features of a leasing system, it shows us the same old patentlocation horse dressed up in new tack.
1976
It is obvious from this review that many of the recommended
changes have not been made during the six or seven years since
the PLLRC Report was submitted. Some legislative changes have
been made, of course, and now important ones are contained in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 51 passed
in the closing days of the last Congress. The Mining and Minerals
Policy Act of 197011 did not get into the specifics of the Mining
Law which interest this group.
The changes made by the 1976 Act relate mainly to the recording requirements for mining claims and the abandonment of
such claims. Other changes, also important in the exploration for
minerals on the public lands, are scattered through the new statute.
The 1976 statute is a compromise between S. 507, which
would have streamlined federal authority and contained a provision requiring the patenting of mining claims within five years,
and H.R. 13777 (and its amendments), which was more favorable
to the grazing and mining interests. The statute as enacted folII.

FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF

" Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 130.
s See note 4 supra.
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 16, 30,
40, 43 U.S.C.).
Pub. L. No. 91-631, 84 Stat. 1876 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1970)).
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lows the House bill, and its amendments, more than the Senate
version, although the Senators were able to strengthen some of
the environmental provisions.
In general, the law provides more oversight authority for
Congress and requires that the Director of the BLM be subject
to Senate approval. 5 These and other features relate only indirectly to the mining law. For example, the retention policy advocated by the Commission is expressly adopted56 unless disposal of
public lands will be in the national interest. The public lands are
to be managed in a manner that "recognizes the Nation's need
for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the
public lands including implementation of [the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 19701 .

. . ."I

The Act redefines "public lands" to include interests of the
United States "without regard to how the United States acquired
ownership," except on the Outer Continental Shelf and in relation to Indian lands and some lands in Alaska. 8 This change was
advocated by the PLLRC. The Act contains a power of disposal
or sale,59 which replaces the expired Sales Act of 1964,0 and Title
II of the Act mandates land use planning.
Withdrawals of public lands have always drawn the attention of the mining community. Henceforth, withdrawals will be
restricted in size and accomplished through a review process with
the approval or concurrence of Congress." The conflict over congressional acquiescence and the implications of the Pickett Act"
may be quieted somewhat by a section that repeals that doctrine
along with a number of old statutes. 3 Reservations and conveyances of mineral and other interests are covered in section 2094
which also permits sales of mineral interests under specified con43 U.S.C.A. § 1731(a) (Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1701(a)(1).
'7 Id. § 1701(a)(12).
Id. § 1702(e).
" Id. § 1713.
Act of September 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-608, 78 Stat. 988 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1421-1427 (1970)).
" 43 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (Supp. 1977).
62 Act of June 10, 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 and
43 U.S.C.
§8 141-143 (1970)).
Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704, 90 Stat. 2792 (1976).
43 U.S.C.A. § 1719 (Supp. 1977).
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ditions to surface owners who will pay fair market value plus the
administrative costs incurred. 5 Rights of ingress and egress are
expressly preserved for mineral locators."
There are other changes of peripheral significance, but the
main thrust of change in the 1976 Act is found in section 3147
which covers the recording requirements. The new law requires
the filing of documents within three years from the date of the
Act (Oct. 21, 1976) and annually before December 31st of each
year thereafter. The Act requires the filing of "either a notice of
intention to hold the mining claim . . . an affidavit assessment
work performed thereon, on (sic) a detailed report provided by
[30 U.S.C. §28-1]. ' ' 68 Copies of these documents must be filed
"in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary ....
?"I
Regulations adopted January 20, 1977, have designated the state
office of the BLM for this purpose.7 0 The legislation covers the
filing requirements, and the regulations further clarify what shall
be filed and where, including a map. These requirements will not
"require the owner of a claim or site to employ a professional
surveyor or engineer . . . . "' Claims within the National Park
system are covered in section 3833.2-1. The regulations specify
the form of a notice of intention to hold a claim, or group of
claims, and claims for which patent applications are pending are
excluded. Notice of the transfer of claims is required,7 2 as is evi73
dence of annual assessment work.
One of the most important features of the new law is the
declaration that
[tihe failure to file such instruments

shall be deemed conclu-

sively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or
tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not be considered a failure to
file if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under
other Federal laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if the
'

Id. § 1719(b)(2).

" Id. § 1732(b).

,7 Id. § 1744. Section 315 of the Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1745 (Supp. 1977), authorizes the
Secretary to file disclaimers of interest in order to remove clouds on title to public lands.
Id. § 1744(a)(1).
a Id. § 1744(a)(2).
1043 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2 (1977).
7, Id. § 3833.1-2(9).

Id. § 3833.3.
7' Id. § 3833.2-1.

1977
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instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not all of
the owners of the mining claim . . .

This provision was not contained in the original House bill.
The conference report on the bill states that "[t]he Senate bill
(but not the House amendments) contained a provision for requiring application for patent within 10 years of recordation. The
conferees did not adopt this provision."75 It is worth noting that
the original S. 507 section 104(b) read: "Any claim recorded pursuant to subsection (a) for which the claimant has not made
application for patent within five years after the date of enactment of this Act or the date of location of a claim, whichever is
later, shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall
be void."
CONCLUSION

The recording requirements in the new law are a major step
toward finding millions of mining claims of which perhaps less
than one-sixth are active claims. This is the first step in a cleanup process. The regulations issued following the oil shale decision77 are also aimed at cleaning up long-dormant claims and will
help remove clouds on titles to public lands.7"
Unfortunately, the clean-up efforts and the new 1976 law do
little toward bringing about the substantive changes recommended by the majority of the PLLRC who favored keeping the
patent-location system. For example: The new Act does not provide for exploration rights which would do away with reliance on
pedis possessio; no law has been enacted covering development
and production rights as recommended; nor is there a provision
for royalties before and after patent as recommended by the Commission. The PLLRC recommended that patents should include
only the mineral body; that has not been done. There is no uniform federal legislation for location work as was recommended.
The distinction between lode and placer claims continues un43 U.S.C.A. § 1744(c) (Supp. 1977).
11H. CONt. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6233.
" S. 507, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b) (1975).
" Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970).
Later decisions will also aid this process. See Roberts v. Morton, 549 F.2d 158 (10th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Winegar, 16 IBLA 112, 81 Interior Dec. 370 (1974).
74

566
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changed along with the existence of extralateral rights which the
PLLRC said should be abolished. These and other features remain in the Mining Law which I believe the mining industry
would like to see removed or changed.
However, as I said at the beginning, a leasing system would
take care of these matters very satisfactorily.79 Support for my
statement is found in the functioning of the Mineral Leasing Act
which has been the law since 1920. The patent-location approach
was a good and faithful old horse, but he does not run well with
the new technology, and he ought to be retired.
See CongressionalRecord, H.R. 5831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 2778
(1977) (a bill introduced by Rep. Ruppe (Mich.) to modify the present location-patent
system and also to require payment of a royalty to the U.S. on minerals produced). See
also CongressionalRecord, H.R. 9292, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 10124 (1977)
(a bill introduced by Rep. Burton (Cal.) to substitute a leasing system for the present
system).

MINING LAW TRENDS
By H. BYRON MOCK*
INTRODUCTION

Bob Clark, Phil Hoff, and two other colleagues included a
fine and well-reasoned caveat in the report of the Public Land
Law Review commission.' I have too much respect for their opinions to challenge them without quite a bit of thought. However,
they adopt the basic premise that the Mineral Lands Leasing
System is so good that it will accomplish all things. Mineral
leasing will supposedly fill our need for energy and resource development, provide for the opportunity for the creation of new
wealth, and make it economically possible to develop new mines.
But it just isn't so.
The Mining Law of 18722 is so continually under this kind of
attack, there must be something good about it.3 How else can we
* Partner in Mock, Shearer, and Carling and President, Mineral Records, Inc., Salt
Lake City, Utah.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 130, 132
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
2 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 4, 1866, ch. 166, 14 Stat.
86, as revised by Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-15, 17 Stat. 91, and subsequent
amendments).
For at least thirty years, many of us have had personal familiarity with charges that
the Mining Law of 1872 is obsolete, antiquated, outdated, misused, against the public
interest, a windfall to some citizens, and even un-American. These criticisms are not new.
See T. VAN WAGENEN, INTERNATIONAL MINING LAW (1918). The congressional proceedings
at the time the Mining Law was altered by passage of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of
1920, ch. 85, §§ 1-38, 41 Stat. 437 (current version codified in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.), expressed many criticisms. Some of these reasons had caused Congress to terminate the mineral leasing system for lead and copper mines on public lands. Act of July
11, 1846, 9 Stat. 37.
The lead and copper leasing laws had been passed in 1807, Act of March 3, 1807, 2
Stat. 448, but proved ineffective in the Mississippi Valley lands the United States had
acquired from France. The repeal left a vacuum. No law provided for access to the mineral
deposits on the public lands when the United States acquired vast western lands from
Mexico and England. Mining prospectors became technical trespassers, although the
miners did not care. Their status was not formally cleared until passage of the Mining
Law in 1866, Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 251, revised in 1872. That law is still basically
intact. It plugged a loophole that Congress had left in the laws of public lands. Although
the government officially owned the land, there was no express prohibition against or
provision for citizens finding and keeping the minerals. The miners recognized the situation. Since they were not prevented from asserting ownership of the minerals they discovered, they did so. The Mining Law of 1872 granted citizens the right to explore and mine
without further permission.
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explain the
miracle of its survival? Continued life in the 1872
"antique" 4 may be because it reflects national needs and concerns
that are worth preserving and that demand the return of selfinitiation to our other natural resource laws. The "burial" of the
General Mining Law is premature. Resuscitation and restoration
could be best for America.
Before we throw the dirt on the casket of this King of Resource Laws, either by mal-regulation, direct and full repeal, or
amendment that takes its heart, let us see what is good about the
Mining Law of 1872. Before we statutorily accept and confirm the
"creeping dicta" emasculation of the Crown Prince, the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920,1 let us examine whether it is an adequate replacement for the development of the resources of this
country and the development of new wealth and opportunity for
its people.
We must look at how the laws work in actual practice, not
how they may or should work. In this day of "cost-benefit ratios"
and "net returns" and such other analysis as "maximizing the
optimum," I would like to join the semantic game and contribute
a new concept. What about a "public interest impact statement"
on certain laws and procedures?
An "impact statement" on the manner of administering public lands is awesomely complex. But that is no reason to dodge
The law also recognized the need for curbing chaos and providing reasonable rules to
divide equitably the opportunity among citizens. Local mining camp and local government rules were allowed to continue in force unless in conflict with laws of the United
States. Under those rules the miners sought, found, developed, and profited from the
mineral wealth found in the lands of the United States. Not all got to keep what they
earned. There were brutal abuses of the rights by loophole and bullet law, but there was
mining. The national wealth was increased and the economic health of the nation substantially underwritten then and later.
One criticism of the Mining Law of 1872 is an alleged lack of adequate return to the
"Government," namely, no royalty. Much of the economic contribution made to the
country was prior to the passage of the income tax amendment in 1916. Since that time,
the United States has become a "carried working interest" beneficiary through the income
tax. Imposing a royalty would not increase the net return to the United States. Because
of management costs of the Interior Department, the net return to the United States
Government could be reduced.
' S. UDALL, THE MINING LAW-AN ANTIQUE IN NEED OF REPEAL (1969); letter from
Secretary of the Interior Udall to the Public Land Law Review Commission (Jan. 15, 1969)
(with enclosed proposed bill urging substitution of leasing for the location system).
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, §§ 1-38, 41 Stat. 437 (current version
codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
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it. I am reminded of Brigham Young when he was asked if the
Mormons came West willingly. He said, "Yes, we came willingly
because we had to." That is exactly the reason miners are accepting the current rules and regulations. I will not call it blackmail,
but I will call it armtwisting. If you have a right to apply for a
lease, or a permit, or a patent, but you cannot get it until you
agree to conditions that you think are unreasonable or economically exorbitant, you will probably agree nonetheless, "because
you have to."
There is so much said against the Mining Law of 1872; what
is right with it?' One element the law retains, despite rules and
regulations, is the right to "self-initiate" a claim on public lands.
That right once existed under many laws. 7 Today, in practice as
6 Statements directly supporting "free enterprise" systems, property rights, individual rights of self-determination, specific constitutional rights, state and local government
responsibilities, the Americanism of profits, the human characteristics of government
officials, and many "apple pies" were proposed for inclusion in the PLLRC Report; most
were not included.
Those familiar with Washington and its ways can identify the graveyards of many
good and basic laws and executive orders that were lost, not because they were not stressed
or pushed, but because they were ignored. They faded away and died. In a recent example,
look at President Ford's directive to federal agencies that each prepare an "Economic
Impact Statement" before issuing rules and regulations. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed.
Reg. 41,501 (1974) (titled "Inflation Impact Statement"); Exec. Order No. 11,949, 42 Fed.
Reg. 1,017 (1977) (extended the life of the Order and renamed it "Economic Impact
Statement"). See also OMB Circular A-107 (Jan. 28, 1975) for operating policy under
Exec. Order 11,821. The attention it received is shown by the Department of Interior's
proposed regulations on surface mining, issued December 6, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 53,428
(1976), wherein Interior, without preparing required guidelines, said no "inflation" statement was needed. Arguably, however, the regulations would have an impact on the Interior budget and personnel requirements as well as increase recovery costs for mining
companies, with a resulting inflationary impact on consumer prices. The dispute is not
over, but it shows that all executive orders are not equal.
I The homestead acts allowed occupancy without advance permission. The practice
was to occupy and develop land by actually working it; to remain in possession as the
homesteader developed; and to go to the government only for a patent. The classification
section of the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 ended homesteading. 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1970)
(originally enacted as Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, § 7, 48 Stat. 1272, as amended
by Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 842, tit. I, § 2, 49 Stat. 1976).
Certain rights-of-way once were granted along section lines to the one who built; no
more. The so-called BLM Organic Act of 1976 repealed these rights-of-way. Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-579 § 706, 90 Stat. 2793-94. See 43
U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (Supp. 1977).
The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 limited existing users of forage on the public lands
to a small group of preference permittees. Prior to 1934, such users had been "implied
permittees" with a destructive race by all to "eat it off first." Today, the erosion of
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well as legal authorization, the Mining Law of 1872 stands alone
with that right to self-initiate. Such law is the "last survivor" of
the resource development herd of laws. This right is not only the
major element of the mining laws, but it may be the keystone
which is needed once again in all public land programs.
A.

I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE MINING LAW OF 1872
Mineral Lands Are Not Available Under Other Laws

"In all cases lands valuable for minerals shall be reserved
from sale, except as otherwise expressly directed by law."' This
has always meant that mineral values are dominant and that
Congress does not intend to allow them to be subordinated to
other values in public land use.
B.

Purchase of Nonmineral Lands Is Prohibited

"[N]o location of a mining claim shall be made until the
discovery of the vein or lode wihin the limits of the claims located."' Congress specified that mining laws cannot be used to
take land for other purposes. No one can use mining laws to get
lands from the United States Government unless he has done
"dependency by use" (the Class I right) and "dependency by location" (the Class H right)
is all but complete.
The Mineral Land Leasing Act of 1920 provided a preference to the "first qualified
applicant" for leasable minerals such as oil and gas when not classified by the U.S.
Geological Survey as in a "KGS" or "known geological structure." Today, the status of
such preference is unknown. There is a priority to such applicant only if a lease is in fact
issued. The Government may elect to issue no lease at all, apparently for any reason. If
rejected, the former "First Qualified Applicant" must commence again, maybe too late.
The prospecting-permit system originally granted a two-year period, with a possible
maximum extension of two more years. A preference lease was promised if adequate,
timely, and successful exploration was completed. Today, applications for prospecting
permits are dismissed without processing, and several years ago all pending ones were
denied by then Secretary of the Interior Rogers C.B. Morton. The Act is dead without
Congress firing a gun. The permit system is not endangered, it is dead. Even more critically, permittees who thought they had completed successful exploration and deserved a
preference lease were kept dangling, and dangling, and dangling, until "government"
could find grounds for denying the lease on post hoc ground rules. Where originally a
permittee could continue to mine without trespass while his preference lease application
was processed, even if later denied, that door was slammed by amendment to 43 C.F.R.
§ 3521.4-1 (1976), making "mining operations carried on prior to the effective date of a
lease ... an act of trespass."
30 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
Id. § 23. It should be noted that although there is no "vein or lode" in a placer claim,
the same requirement of "discovery" is applied to determine the validity of a placer claim
location.
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enough work to locate a mineral. The fact that mining laws have
been used to acquire title for other purposes may be an abuse that
needs correction, but proper administration of the present law
should be sufficient.
Particularly, we should recognize that the desire of Americans for "their piece of land" is strong. Our laws should provide
for satisfaction of this desire. Who should be condemned because
Americans have used (abused) the mining laws to acquire land
when no other road lay open?
C.

Exploration Is Authorized and Invited

"[Aill valuable mineral deposits in land belonging to the
United States . . . shall be free and open to explorations and
purchase . . . [and] lands in which they are found to occupation
and purchase .... ."I" "Free and open to exploration" was the
authorization for a citizen to go on the public land unless specifically prohibited. This is direct permission for mineral exploration. It is the law that citizens have a right to free mineral exploration and development in non-withdrawn public lands.
The authorization may not have meant economically "free,"
but it certainly seems to frown on improper and unreasonable
restrictions imposed on a whim-either economic or otherwise
obstructionist.
D. Access for Exploration Is Subject to Local Rules
The law says exploration and occupancy of federal mineral
lands shall be "under regulations prescribed by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining
districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent
with the laws of the United States."" As long as locators comply
with federal law, and with state limitation and local regulation
''not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their
possessory title, [they] shall have the exclusive right of posses.... " The fact of parasion and enjoyment of all the surface
mount title in the United States is specifically declared irrelevant
IId. § 22.
Id.
" Id.

§ 26.
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in possessory actions between citizens. The governing law is that
13
of the situs state.
These laws clearly state the distinction between possessory
rights for exploration and the right to purchase the mineral resources and land in which they are found. The rules for disputes
between parties over possession are left to local control; the paramount title of the United States remains. Federal law governs all
rights to purchase minerals by patent of the land where they are
located. The law also provides for local rules for locations, recording, and required work to hold possession. These local regulations
are all subject to certain federal statutory requirements. 4
The cooperative administration by state and federal governments of mining on public lands has been criticized by industry
because local adjustments created a variety of rules rather than
one standard. Government employees criticized this approach
because it provided for a local voice in administration of "our
land." The emerging concept of state administration of national
pollution laws may indicate a trend back to cooperative effort
with local variations to meet local and regional needs. At the
same time, however, we are about to abolish this cooperation in
the mining laws because states have some control. I wonder what
is wrong with this type of federalism?
E.

Claim Size Is Limited

The 1872 law says lode claims shall not be more than 1,500
feet in length and between a minimum of 25 feet and maximum
of 300 feet wide on each side of the lode vein on the surface.'5 That
is twenty acres. Placer claims are locatable as well as lode
claims." The law does allow an association claim for any one
person or association to be as large as, but not more than, 160
acres." The courts have clearly established that while no one
person can have more than 20 acres in any claim prior to Discovery, 8 he may acquire and hold alone more than 20 (and up to 160)
'3 See, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); Blackburn v. Gold
Mining Co., 175 U.S. 571 (1900). See also 30 U.S.C. § 30 (1970).
, 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1970).
" Id.
§ 23.
'
Id. § 35.
17

"

Id. § 36.
"Discovery" with a capital "D", as used throughout this paper, indicates the
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acres of an association placer claim after Discovery.' 9
While laws at one time limited the number of claims one
person could hold, such limits no longer exist. Twenty acres, lode
or placer, were found a practical limit on the acreage one miner
could occupy and protect while seeking a Discovery or retain after
Discovery by annual assessment work.
F.

Proof of Good Faith Is Required by Actual Work

Congress required that not less than $100 worth of labor or
improvements shall be made for each claim each assessment
year. It further stated that a claim for which such work had not
been performed should be open to location as if no claim had been
located.'" The BLM Organic Act of 197621 makes failure to record
assessment work with the Bureau of Land Management [BLM]
conclusive evidence of abandonment. 22 This has been long sought
by government. Evidently the right of a new locator remains,
even if work has actually been done by his predecessor who failed
to file with the BLM.
Congress did not allow a locator to buy his way out to avoid
work on the claim. It provided that, even if a deferment of assessment work were granted, such work must be performed later to
prevent the claim being subject to relocation.2 Further, Congress
provided that no patent could issue for a claim unless a minimum
of $500 worth of work had been performed for such claim.24 In
discovery within each claim within rock in place of a valuable mineral so that "a person
of ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means
on the particular claim, with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a valuable
mine." Ranchers Expl. and Dev. Co. v. Anaconda Co., 248 F. Supp. 708, 714 (D. Utah
1965). This standard is applied to each claim under 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1970) before a Discovery vests a right in the locator, which is good against the United States, to purchase (i.e.,
patent) the claim.
A "discovery" with a small "d" denotes the discovery of a showing of minerals to
justify proceeding with the exploration and occupancy authorized under 30 U.S.C. § 22.
A proper location under state and federal laws constitutes a possessory interest good
against all except the United States.
" See, e.g., Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 650-52 (1881); Rooney v. Barnette,
200 F. 700, 708-09 (9th Cir. 1912).
30 U.S.C. § 28 (1970).
11 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, §§ 101-707, 43 U.S.C.A. §§
1701-1782 (Supp. 1977).
2 Id. § 314(c), 43 U.S.C.A. § 1744.
" See 30 U.S.C. § 28(d) (1970).
24 Id. § 29.
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addition to his development work, the purchaser of a claim had
to pay $5 per acre for a lode claim and $2.50 per acre for a placer
claim before patent would issue."
The combination of a maximum size for each claim and the
requirement that a Discovery be made on each claim limited the
number of claims which an individual miner, and even a company, could hold for exploration. Annual assessment work and
development work before patent could be done for a group of
claims after Discovery, but the size of the group was limited by
two practical tests: benefit for each claim and interrelation of
28
each claim to others of the group.
G.

Summary of the General Mining Law

1. A Law of Opportunity
The General Mining Law of 1872 is a poor man's law, a
pioneer law. It encourages exploration. Work, time, and energy
can be substituted for prohibitive "front-end money" requirements. It puts investment capital-money and work-into the
effort to develop new wealth for our nation. It does not unreasonably inflate the costs of the minerals found, mined, and marketed by imposing unproductive expenditures that dry-up the
risk capital.
I Id. §§ 29, 37. The cost was $2.50 per acre for a placer claim. At that time the United
States was selling nonmineral land for $1.25 an acre.
" The limits of claim size and good faith work operated together. One miner could
explore for minerals on one claim at a time, but in the early days he was protected in his
exclusive right of possession only to that part of the total claim on which he was actually
working. The doctrine of pedis possessio was later extended to protect the entire claim
from claim jumpers as long as a miner was in physical possession of some part of the claim
and was diligently working toward a Discovery. If the first locator relinquished possession,
he could not prevent other citizens from entry or attempts to make a valid Discovery. The
acreage limitation for each claim (and for the size of permits and leases under the Mineral
Leasing Act) still works to prevent miners from hoarding the public mineral lands by
holding more claims than they can explore and develop. On mining claims, a miner is
limited to the number of claims he can actually or constructively occupy while seeking a
Discovery on each separate claim. After Discovery, the number of claims which can be
held is limited only by the need to do $100 worth of annual assessment work for the benefit
of each claim. Assessment work may be performed outside the boundaries of a claim and
still be for its benefit, but there are two practical limits on excessive holdings: The work
must be for the benefit of the claim, and the benefit of each claim must be worth at least
$100. See 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1970).
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2. A Law That Protects Against Hoarders
The General Mining Law of 1872 broadens the opportunity
for small beginnings, the "seed" developments that are big tomorrow. It protects against the greedy, who hoard potential mineral wealth by trying to control more than they can explore or
develop within reasonable time limits. It punishes sloth and
awards diligence. It prevents monopoly. It provides a selfprotecting system whereby the legitimate miner can oust the illegitimate from mineral deposits on public lands. Likewise, it
works against the hoarder and nonproducer.
3. A Law That Provides Checks on the Validity of the Government's Decisions
The General Mining Law of 1872 allows a citizen to challenge
the validity of the government's decisions. It provides an opportunity to develop markets and supply materials which such officials cannot see, do not feel are needed, or do not want. The right
to self-initiate a mining claim minimizes arbitrary, discretionary
denial. It prevents public lands from being held for the preferred
few. It provides equitable opportunity for all citizens. It prevents
"Government" from withholding mineral deposits for the benefit
of competing products.
The above three statements summarize the law, not its administration. Any amendments to the law and any failure to affirm and protect its principles will allow further erosion of those
principles that still best serve the public interest of all Americans.

II.

PLLRC

RECOMMENDATIONS

The PLLRC made general and specific recommendations as
to "Mineral Resources."" The Commission adopted certain basic
principles to govern the development of these resources:
Public land mineral policy should encourage exploration, development, and production of minerals on the public lands.2
PLLRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 121-38. The specific recommendations in Chapter
7 must be read in concert with the basic chapter of the report, A Programfor the Future.
Id. at 1-7. The general premises of the Report are guidelines for minimizing potential
misuse of the specific recommendations. Without such premises, the general and specific
mining law recommendations might be misinterpreted or misused. One must at least be
wary of the truth behind the old adage, "If they can be, they will be."
11Id. at 121-22.
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Mineral exploration and development should have a preference
over some or all other uses on much of our public lands.9
The Federal Government generally should rely on the private
sector for mineral exploration, development, and production by
maintaininga continuing invitationto explore for and develop minerals on the public lands.3"

The PLLRC also made specific recommendations concerning
the Mining Law, with substantial overlapping into both the Mineral Leasing and Materials Act systems.' The numbered recommendations included the need for realistic determination of what
public lands shall be excluded from mineral exploration;" proposed modifications of the federal system to allow mineral activity on the public lands;3 3 removal of irrelevant obstructions to
public land mineral activity;3 ' and recommendations on oil shale

deposits .35
The Commission considered and rejected replacement of the
existing mining law system by a leasing system, saying, inter alia:
"The public interest requires that individuals be encouraged-not merely permitted-to look for minerals on the public
lands. The traditional right to self-initiation of a claim to a deposit of valuable minerals must be preserved. 136 The general and
detailed mineral recommendations of the PLLRC were structured
parts fitting into a total public land policy. Their interrelations
must be remembered. Many other recommendations on mineral
activity made by "government" and by "industry" may be selfserving of their special interests.
CONCLUSION

The history of the Mining Law of 1872 leads to a recognition
that a good law may not succeed if poorly or unsympathetically
Id. at 122.
Id.at 122-23.
3,Id. at 11-12. The recommendations number 46 through 55. Detailed discussion,
with nonnumbered but important recommendations italicized, is in pages 121-38 of the
report. Relevant recommendations on government organization, appeals procedures, and
payment of funds are found in other chapters of the report. E.g., id. at 281-89, 253-56,
243-49.
Id. Nos. 46 and 55 at 11-12.
Id. Nos. 47-50 and 54.
Id. No. 53 at 12.
Id. Nos. 51-52 at 11.
Id. at 125.
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administered. 7 However, a poor law may serve the public interest
if the administrators want it to work.3 Special, not public, interests will almost certainly dictate the operation and administration of present and future laws unless the decisions of government
officials can be meaningfully reviewed. This applies to decisions
on use and non-use and on environmental and resource needs of
Americans. Meaningful review of governmental decisions as to
the availability of mineral deposits on public lands has traditionally been provided by the self-initiation right of the miner. The
principle of "self-initiation" by right should be restored to the
permit, leasing, and other mineral laws of the United States. The
right to locate under the Mining Law must be retained in some
form that allows for self-initiation. The locator must be given a
reasonable way to challenge discretionary action of government
officials. Most important, the use by government of unreasonable
limitations on a mining claimant's right to proceed must be controlled. 9
The conclusion is obvious that the attacks on the Mining
Law of 1872 seek to eliminate the right of self-initiation that now
operates effectively only under the 1872 Act. The preservation of
the crucial right of self-initiation is necessary for protection of the
public interest in the wise use of our mineral resources. With an
assured right for citizens meaningfully to challenge governmental
denial of access to mineral resources, the proposed changes in the
mineral laws can work successfully.
The right of self-initiation under the Mining Law of 1872
must be protected. It should be restored to other resource laws
dealing with United States lands to give us incentive, to give us
" Examples are the coal leasing system of the U.S.; the prospecting permit provisions
of the Mineral Land Leasing Act; and the oil shale programs.
11One example is the uranium material program of the 1945-1955 period, when the
Mining Law of 1872 was used to find and develop reserves by overriding substantial legal
questions which could have been invoked, but were not. The history of that period should
be written. It is too great a tribute to the principles of the Federal Mining Law to be
ignored.
, An example of unreasonable limitations is the power of "government" to deny a
citizen the right to work his claim by unrestricted delays in the granting of permission to
proceed. Other examples are the front-end loading of the mining operation with cash
payment requirements and with nonproductive work requirements. Another is the developing practice of government "cost recovery," to cover processing by the government, with
no limitations on how much the government may elect to spend.
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opportunity, and to give Americans encouragement to explore
public lands and retrieve the wealth that belongs to them.

Is

SELF-INITIATION STILL POSSIBLE?

By H.A.

TRUE JR.*

Getting up here and following Professor Clark in a discussion
of the General Mining Law' reminds me of the experience of one
Ralph Thompson. As a young man, Ralph was caught in the
Jamestown flood. As he got older, he got to be quite a bore in
telling people about it. When he died, St. Peter met him at the
Pearly Gates and asked, "Mr. Thompson, is there something we
could do to make your arrival here more enjoyable?" Ralph said,
"I love to tell people about the Jamestown flood. Would you get
a crowd together so I can do that?" "I'd be glad to," St. Peter
answered, "but I should warn you that Noah will be in the audience."
Not wanting to debate flood survival with Noah, and since
Bob Clark gave me a break by referring to the entire chapter on
mineral resources' and not only to the Mining Act as such, I hope
to draw my discussion out a bit and not come face to face with
Bob because my knowledge of the Mining Law is not equal to his.
During the deliberations of the Public Land Law Review
Commission (PLLRC), many of us involved in exploration for oil
and gas on public lands were concerned that an extension of
competitive bidding would freeze the small operators out of the
leasing and exploration process. We were justified in feeling this
way because the competitive bidding situation under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act 3 has obviously kept the independents and small operators out. In its report, the Commission encouraged competitive bidding, but not complete competitive bidding as some have advocated.' The Commission also, of course,
recognized that the environmental impact of exploration and development must be appreciated and corrected. 5 The Report re* President, True Oil Company.
I 30 U.S.C.
§§ 21-54 (1970).
2 PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 121-38
(1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
1 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 345,
§§ 2-15, 67 Stat. 462).
1 PLLRC REPORT 132-34. The Commission felt that "[competitive sale of exploration permits or leases should be held whenever competitive interest can reasonably be
expected." Recommendation 49, id. at 132.
1 Id. at 127.
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commended that the country look to the private sector for exploration and production of minerals from the public lands.'
We heard earlier at this Conference that the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976,1 outside of recording and
other evidentiary matters, did not touch on either the General
Mining Law' or the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.1 But since my
expertise lies in the field of oil and gas, I would like to make a
few comments about that area and what has happened since the
PLLRC Report was issued. My friends in the mining business
assure me that more or less the same thing has happened to the
hard rock mining people.
I started in this business almost twenty-nine years ago, at a
time when self-initiation was the watchword for development of
the public domain. Shortly after I started, I had occasion to check
an area in the Buffalo BLM office and found some open acreage.
I filed on a little and made a deal with the owners of the rest. Five
years later, after a dry hole, we did drill a discovery, and, as I
recall, that well made fourteen barrels almost every day. Not very
commercial! We subsequently drilled a third well that made
about 100 barrels a day which was a commercial well. We experienced "self-initiation" participation in the development of the
public land and recovered resources that we felt were valuable to
our country.
At that time all my operation needed was a two-office suite
with a secretary, and, because even in those days we had Social
Security, unemployment taxes, Fair Labor standards, and withholding taxes, a CPA to prepare my books and records and keep
me within the law. When I look at our organization today, I see
120 people, and as near as I can figure, about 100 of them are
keeping records for and making reports to governments of various

levels. Since

ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LANDS

was issued, there

has been legislation that has affected the oil and gas business
along with every other business. Today we have the EnvironmenId. at 122.
Pub. L. No. 94-579, §§ 101-707, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976).
30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1970).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of February 25, 1920, ch. 85
§§ 2-38, 41 Stat. 437).
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tal Protection Act, 0 the Clean Air" and Water Acts, 2 OSHA,13
FEA,14 and the EPCA.15 These and many other congressional actions have burdened the oil and gas industry, but not through the
public lands. Looking back over these seven years since the Commission's Report, I see no statutory change that has altered the
position of the oil and gas explorer on the public domain.
The Department of the Interior, through its regulations, has
had a tremendous impact on the industry. But let's see what has
happened through the Department of the Interior and its rulemaking regulations. A couple of years ago Interior came out with
what was called "The List of 13," which was thirteen requirements for obtaining approval of a drilling location on the public
lands. It was quite detailed and onerous and took a lot of time.
We hadn't seen much of anything though, because in 1975 Interior came out with the NTL-66 which is a whole laundry list of
not only what you have to do before drilling, but what you have
to do during drilling and after drilling.
I'd like to relate a couple of horrible examples of what has
happened to us under these regulations. We staked a well location
in North Dakota where the Federal Government controlled the
surface and the mineral rights. We invited personnel from the
Forest Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the Bureau of
Land Management into the field and got the location approved.
We thought everything was fine. The first load of the drilling rig
arrived and as it turned off the county road, 660 feet from the
location, a "Keystone Cop" in the form of a district engineer for
the USGS came up and shut us down because nobody had approved the road to the drillsite. So we had to send for the engi* National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, 4331-4335, 43414347 (1970).
Clean Air Acts and Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1857x (1970).
" Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 88 101-211, 80 Stat. 1246
(1966) (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
13 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §§ 2-34, 84 Stat.
1590 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 24, 42, 49 U.S.C.).
, Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-786 (Supp. V 1975)).
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 101-552, 89 Stat. 871
(1975) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 50 U.S.C., generally in 42 U.S.C. §§
6201-6422 (Supp. V 1975)).
11Notice to Lessees ahd Operators of Federal and Indian Onshore Oil and Gas Leases
(NTL-6).
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neers to make a cut-and-fill profile and do all the other engineering. After all that we just drove over the prairie, but we did finally
get approval. We estimated that that little misunderstanding
cost us a cool $25,000.
Last year, in early November, we made an agreement with a
lessee to drill on his federal lease, which was due to expire on
January 31, 1977, some eleven or twelve weeks later. As you may
know, the USGS is very stuffy about extending leases for two
years. To get an extension you must have a rig on the site and be
drilling on the expiration date. For this reason we made an allout effort to get approval of the location. Our first visit to the
location, accompanied by USGS personnel, dirt contractors, engineers, and geologists, was on November 12, 1976. The USGS
approved the location but the BLM did not.
We then staked an alternate location 600 feet northwest. Let
me explain that up in this area you are sharpshooting at little
pimples. They are one-well oil fields and, if you get off the closure
and away from the porosity, you get a dry hole. It is a very scientific pinpoint process. We finally agreed to move 600 feet northwest in order to place the drillsite in a different environment on
the National Grasslands. We resurveyed it and on December 12,
1976, got everybody back together to reexamine the location.
Again the USGS approved but the BLM did not. One week later
we received a list of the reasons for refusal: (1) the access road
required too much cut; (2) the location required too much cut;
and (3) the area was identified as a critical area for raptor nesting
sites. Furthermore, the previous lessee had built a road to within
a quarter of a mile of our location which we had planned to use
but we had not requested permission to do so. As a result, the
whole deal was again turned down. The final objection was that
the access road-and this was in rough, rugged country-would
require more than a two-foot cut. You can hardly build an access
road on a prairie with less than a two-foot cut!
Finally, on January 4, 1977, a third wellsite inspection was
made at a new location, forty or fifty feet away. On January 18,
we received the necessary approvals. Because of a shortage of rigs
and because we had to have a rig on that location and drilling by
January 31 in order to extend the lease, we had been paying
standby time for a rig since December 1, 1976. We force-drafted
equipment into North Dakota and got the road and location pre-
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pared. The rig began drilling about six hours before the deadline,
and we got the extension of the lease. Unfortunately, this all
turned out to be a mistake because it was a dry hole. If we had
just known that, we would have happily lost the lease and saved
the money. We have documented the cost of that delay on the
location at $200,000. Now that's pretty expensive hawk-nesting
protection.
Additional regulations are now pending that will not change
the Mineral Leasing Act or General Mining Law per se but will
certainly affect us all. The USGS is currently conducting hearings on redefining the "MER," a term referred to in the EPCA
and to which Interior refers in leases and regulations. Ever since
I went to school, the MER has been the Maximum Efficient Rate
of production. However, since the Secretary's authority is tied to
the term, the USGS will probably find a new definition that is
more to its liking, so that it can legally regulate the rate of production on eighteen federal leases."
My question is this: In the absence of any specific legislation
affecting the small oil and gas operator on the public lands, is
self-initiation still possible?
I would have to answer in this way: Yes, it is possible but
only for the big companies that have sufficient staff and resources
to fight all the red tape and put up with the delays and expense.
Yes, it is possible for the individual, the small guy, if he's only
going to act as a broker. But, if he wants to be a producer, if he
wants to be an explorationist, I must admit that I see no way that
an individual can start out from scratch now and "self-initiate"
into petroleum production from the federal lands.
"1 The USGS already regulates the price of federal royalty oil, the price of federal
royalty gas, and the determination whether oil can be produced without marketing gas.

FEDERALISM
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN FEDERAL LAND AND
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
By D. MICHAEL HARVEY*
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE POWERS

Our nation was founded by thirteen independent states, each
of which, in the larger national interest, voluntarily submitted to
federal supremacy in certain defined and limited areas of policy.
The residual sovereignty rests in the states and they may perform
any acts of government which are not precluded by their own or
by the Federal Constitution.
The Federal Government, with limited and defined powers,
must seek a basis in the Constitution for any actions or programs
it undertakes. The bases for affirmative federal programs regarding natural resources, the environment, and energy are varied.
Early water resource and regulatory policies rested on the commerce clause; national defense, public health, and the public
welfare underlie many other federal policies. With respect to federal lands and resources, these underpinnings are firmly buttressed by the "property clause."'
In recent years, the complexity, breadth, and cost of social
welfare and environmental protection and resource development
programs have dictated both a public demand for, and an inevitable movement toward, federal action in policy areas formerly reserved to the states by practice and tradition. Through the use
of financial assistance, technical advice, and control over information, implicit notions of federal policy have been implemented
as a part of federal law without explicit discussions of their Constitutional basis, or their historical tradition.
As the division between state and federal authority and responsibility has blurred-both in fact and in the minds of the
public-coordination between the levels of government has become an increasingly difficult problem. Ambiguity and conflict
* Chief Counsel, United States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington; D.C.
' U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
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among policies and delay of important public actions have resulted.
There is a growing need to bring together the viewpoints of
the states with the technical and financial strengths and the national concerns of the Federal Government regarding vital public
policy issues related to energy, natural resources, and the environment. Both sets of viewpoints are critical to Americans in all
states; all citizens share in national problems and in efforts to
resolve them.

II.

THE NEED FOR ACCOMMODATION TO SERVE BOTH STATE AND
FEDERAL INTERESTS

The past decade has seen the emergence of a new set of
national issues involving federal lands and resources which are
imposing serious strains on the fabric of state-federal relationships.
Those with the highest current visibility involve the role of
state government in federal programs and proposals to increase
domestic energy self-sufficiency through the development of
federally-owned energy resources. For the longer term, all these
issues assume constitutional dimensions and involve fundamental questions concerning institutional arrangements for regional
and national planning, balancing environmental concerns with
developmental requirements, national, regional, and state allocation of costs and benefits, and the manner in which state concerns
and interests are to be reflected and accommodated in national
policies and decisions. They usually involve multi-state or national interests which go beyond the jurisdiction or the financial
and technical capabilities of single state governments. Examples
include:
(1) regional environmental problems such as damage resulting
from Outer Continental Shelf development, air pollution in the
southwestern region, pollution of the Great Lakes, dedication of
limited western water resources to industrial uses, and increasing
salinity in the Colorado River and its tributaries;
(2) development of regional energy resources such as western
coal reserves, Alaska oil and gas, oil shale, and the Outer Continental Shelf for national purposes; and
(3) the social, economic, and environmental impacts which affect particular states or regions disproportionately such as the impact of using one region's resources for the benefit of other regions
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and the siting of nuclear and fossil fuel power plants, refineries and
strip mines.

These problems pose severe challenges, but also present great
opportunities for our federal-state system of government.
At present, no comprehensive or satisfactory set of institutional arrangements has been developed to facilitate a coordinated federal and state governmental response to these issues.
Traditionally, when the national consequences of particular developmental programs are discovered, a national program or policy is prepared in response. To the extent that the impacted
states and regions are able to make their views known at the
federal level-whether through public opinion, congressional influence, or legal obstruction of particular federal proposals-accommodation of state interests is made on a case-by-case
or issue-by-issue basis.
When the traditional approach to accommodation of state
interests fails, proposals for federal preemption are advanced
often without a genuine effort to resolve or accommodate potentially divergent federal and state interests.
Neither of these approaches-federal preemption or case-bycase resolution-is satisfactory. Both create uncertainty, invite
conflict, and impede orderly and logical planning at the federal
and state levels. Neither directly addresses the difficult question
of how best to resolve energy, natural resource, and environmental controversies which place national requirements in conflict
with the economic, social, and environmental objectives of individual states.
Without greater cooperation between federal, state, and local
levels of government to accommodate truly divergent needs and
objectives, the likelihood of creative and enduring programs addressing the energy, natural resource, and environmental challenges of the years ahead is greatly diminished. Moreover, it is
increasingly apparent that the country has neither the luxury of
unlimited time, or unlimited resources, in which to develop these
programs. The responsibility for devising the kinds of procedures
and institutions necessary to accommodate the economic, social,
and environmental interests of both state and federal government
rests with all public officials, at both levels of government.
When these problems involve the use of federal lands and
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resources, the Congress has a special responsibility. The challenge is also a great opportunity for progress.
III.

A.

ISSUE AREAS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Federally-Owned Energy Resources-Overview

The confrontation between the federal and state governments is perhaps most intense in matters concerning federallyowned energy resources. Controversies over development of federal coal, oil shale, Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas, and location of pipelines and transmission lines which cross state and
private lands have become increasingly obvious. State and local
governments are now seeking an active role in decisions which
traditionally have been made exclusively by the Federal Government with little and, in some cases, no input from state and local
government. Conversely, other matters are now seen as overriding
national concerns in which state and local interests were previously paramount, even when federally-owned resources were
involved.
The Federal Government owns over fifty percent of the fossil
fuel energy resources in the United States. These resources are on
the public lands, the offshore area known as the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and in reserved mineral interests underlying
private lands.
No one knows precisely how much the public owns, but recent estimates of energy resources indicate that the Federal Government holds, of the total national endowment: sixty percent of
the crude oil and natural gas, fifty percent of the coal, eighty
percent of the oil shale, fifty percent of the recoverable geothermal energy, and fifty percent of the uranium. The management
of these public resources is perhaps the most important energy
policy responsibility of the Federal Government.
Federally-owned energy resources belong to all the people of
the United States. The Federal Government has the basic responsibility to assure that they are developed in a manner which
benefits all the people. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the need for the Federal Government to consider the
special impacts of federal energy resource development on the
people living in areas which will be directly impinged upon by
such development. We need a national policy which balances the
national interest in federal energy resource development and the
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real concerns of state and local government regarding the social,
economic, and environmental impacts of such development.
B.

Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas

During the next decade, development of conventional oil and
gas from the United States Outer Continental Shelf may well
provide the largest single source of increased domestic supply.
Despite the intense and justified concern of many Americans over
the potential social, environmental, and economic impacts of
OCS oil and gas development on the ocean, its resources, and
onshore, there is increasing evidence that, if done properly, OCS
development may be more acceptable environmentally than development of any other potential domestic energy resources.
The major policy issues raised by the states concerning OCS
oil and gas development are (1) the rate and location of development, (2) environmental safeguards, (3) impacts on coastal
states, (4) the resource allocation system (i.e., the method of
bidding, etc.), (5) information disclosure to potential competitors, government (federal and state), and the public, (6) the role
of Federal Government, as owner of the resources, in exploration
and development, (7) separation of exploratory and developmental rights in lease terms, and (8) the disposition of bonus and
royalty revenues.
The ninety-fourth Congress addressed these issues in two
major bills. One (S. 586) became law as the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976.2 This Act makes it clear that
OCS leasing activity and onshore development must be consistent with a state's approved coastal zone management program2
The new law also established a "coastal energy impact program."
Under this program, coastal states and local governments can
receive federal loans or grants for planning or public facilities
needed as a result of OCS leasing and certain other federal actions.'
The other major bill was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act Amendments of 1976 (S. 521).1 It narrowly missed being

'

16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1456 (West Supp. 1977).
IId. § 1456(c)(3)(B).
Id. § 1456a.
S. 521, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976).
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passed when the House of Representatives failed to adopt the
conference report in the last week of the ninety-fourth Congress.
Passage of very similar legislation (S. 9)1 is likely this year.
Among other things, S. 9 gives coastal states a formal advisory
role in the OCS leasing program.'
C.

Coal

The Federal Government owns about half of the estimated
recoverable coal reserves in the United States. In the past, production of these resources has been very limited. Now, however,
there is great interest in development of federal coal deposits,
which are located primarily in the Western States. But many of
these states have expressed great concern over the potential impact of large-scale strip mining on their environments and lifestyle; they fear a "boom and bust" cycle.
Congress has reacted to these concerns in several different
ways. The action of greatest significance to date was the enactment, over President Ford's veto, of the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act. 8 This Act established many new policy guidelines for leasing. These include a requirement that the Secretary
consider the impacts of mining on the surrounding area including
"impacts on the environment, on agricultural and other economic
activities, and on public services." 9
The 1976 leasing law also increased the share of mineral leasing revenues paid to the states from 37.5% to 50%. The additional
12.5% is to be used by the states with "priority to those subdivisions of the State socially or economically impacted by development of minerals leased under this Act for (1) planning, (2) construction and maintenance of public facilities, and (3) provision
"110
of public services ....
The long-sought surface coal mining legislation also addresses the question of federal-state relationships. In its twicevetoed form the bill asserted exclusive federal jurisdiction over
S. 9, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), 123 CONG. REc. 163 (1977).

Id.

30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-352 (West Supp. 1977).
Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 3(3)(c), 90 Stat. 1083 (amending 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970)).
30 U.S.C.A. § 201(a)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1977).
" Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 9(a), 90 Stat. 1083 (amending 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1970)).
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regulation of strip mining of federal coal." There were, however,
express provisions for cooperative agreements between the Secretary of the Interior and the states which could lead to single
agency (federal or state) regulation of mining of federal, state, or
private coal.' 2
In 1976 and early 1977, former Interior Secretary Kleppe entered into agreements with several states which allow them to
regulate, under state law, mining of federal coal. Under these
agreements, the Department, in effect, adopts state reclamation
laws as a federal regulation. The states, as one might expect, take
the position that state reclamation laws apply to federal lands in
any event. The Department has always rejected that position. To
the best of my knowledge, the issue has not been resolved by the
courts.
The latest Senate version of the surface mining bill (S. 7)13
expressly provides that states with approved reclamation programs may elect to regulate all surface coal mining within their
borders, including mining of federal coal. This provision has been
hailed by western governors.
D.

Oil Shale

The Federal Government owns eighty percent of the nation's
estimated oil shale reserves. Most of this is located in the Piceance Basin in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. The Department of
the Interior started a prototype leasing program in 1974.
The potential social and environmental problems associated
with oil shale development are so severe and the economics so
uncertain that, even at present cartel prices of oil, the oil industry
is reconsidering its planned investments. A major research and
development program is needed to find new, environmentally
acceptable ways of extracting oil from the shale. The most recent
federal legislation (S. 419)4 designed to determine the commerPub. L. No. 94-377, § 2, 90 Stat. 1083 (amending 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970)).
Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 3, 90 Stat. 1083 (amending 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1970)) (submission of lease proposals to state's governor before approval); 90 Stat. 1084 (state public
hearing when non-federal interests are involved); 90 Stat. 1085 (exploration license subject
to federal, state, and local laws); Pub. L. No. 94-377, § 9, 90 Stat. 1083 (amending 30
U.S.C. § 191 (1970)) (increasing the percentage of rentals going to states for benefit of
impacted areas).
S. 7, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. Rc. 161 (1977).
S3
S. 419, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. Rxc. 1185 (1977).
"
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cial viability of oil shale technology and measure the social and
environmental impact of oil shale development contains express
provisions for financial aid to communities impacted by the projects. These include federal guarantees of state and municipal
bonds and of payment of state or local taxes by the demonstration
facilities.
E.

Geothermal Energy

The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-581)" and the
Geothermal Energy Research, Development and Demonstration
Act of 19741 established the framework for harnessing the significant energy potential of the nation's geothermal resources for the
generation of electric power, process heat, and other purposes.
The resource is most immediately available in the west and is of
special interest to the western states. Geopressured areas have
also been identified offshore in the Gulf of Mexico and are generating considerable interest among coastal states. Since these resources are located on federal lands in the west, offshore, and on
state and private lands subject to state leasing and control, they
are of vital joint interest to federal, state, and local governments.
Effective federal-state cooperation will be required. To date, the
geothermal leasing program authorized by the 1970 Act has
lagged seriously, as have authorized geothermal research and
development activities. A review of that Act is in order and will
be undertaken during the present Congress. The issues will include proposals designed to accelerate the leasing program, enlargement of the Act to include offshore geopressured resources,
incentives to private industry, and the coordination of federal and
state leasing programs and regulations. Federal research and development programs under the 1974 Act must be coordinated
with state and local governments to assure the definition of project priorities of maximum benefit to state and local programs.
F.

Energy Facility Siting

Over the last years, Congress has been increasingly concerned with the issue of energy facility siting which frequently
involves federal lands. The most recent manifestation of this con30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1970).
Id. §§ 1101-1164 (Supp. IV 1974).
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cern is the 1974 Deepwater Ports legislation.' 7 Two of the more
critical issues in federal-state energy relations are the questions
of who should determine the location of these facilities and what
considerations should be involved in the siting decisions. Federal
preemption without state participation is unacceptable, because
the states must be assisted to do their own planning without the
threat of federal preemption, and, secondly, comprehensive planning is far superior to single purpose, utilitarian planning. A permanent preemptive, functional bias in planning-be it for energy,
transportation, or land preservation-renders impossible the
ability of government and citizens to plan for and balance all
competing social, economic, and environmental concerns. Congress will again be considering a Land Resource Planning Assistance Act'" which assists the states to undertake comprehensive
planning for critical areas and uses-of which energy facility siting is only one component-in order to avoid federal secondguessing of state decisionmaking. The states can and must be
given a meaningful opportunity to develop their own land use
programs before federal siting is mandated.
IV. FEDERAL RESOURCES-OVERVIEW
The United States in recent years has experienced continuing exponential growth of nearly all sectors of the economy. Simultaneously, new public values have evolved which may be
summarized as an environmental ethic, encompassing a very
broad rejection of strictly economic measures of progress. The
combination of growing pressures upon finite natural resources
coupled with new policy constraints upon development have
brought about confrontations and impending shortages throughout the range of renewable natural resources, as well as finite
energy resources.
Federal resources are often located within one or a few states,
although their development and use may be of vital national
consequence. In the foreseeable future, national needs and concerns will force the Federal Government to adopt resource policies
in the national interest which may be inconsistent with the preferences or even the best interests of the localities where natural
1 33

U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (Supp. IV 1974).
Is H.R. 2226, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 482 (1977).
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resources are found, or where they are used. It will be essential,
however, to adequately reflect diverse state requirements in federal decisionmaking, to recognize and provide for mitigation of
the disproportionate impacts of some policies on some states, and
to assist all of the states in coping with the impacts of federal
policies.
In 1976, three major new laws were enacted which, among
other things, deal with these issues. The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 197611 is the most significant of these. Although frequently referred to as the "BLM Organic Act," this law
applies, in some degree, to the national forests and other large
areas of federal lands as well as to all lands administered by the
Bureau of Land Management.2 1 It contains numerous requirements for coordination of federal resource management plans and
programs with state and local land use plans.2 ' It provides new
opportunities for state and local governments to acquire federal
22
lands needed for public purposes, frequently at little or no cost.
The new Act directs the federal agency to cooperate with
local law enforcement personnel and to pay for their services. 23 It
adds a provision to the revenue sharing provisions of the Federal
Coal Leasing Amendments Act 2 for federal loans to state and
local governments to meet mineral development impacts in advance of obtaining fifty percent of the receipts. 2 The law also
calls for establishment of right-of-way corridors on federal lands
26
which must consider state land use policies.
Although the National Forest Management Act of 19762 was
originally designed primarily to establish guidelines for timber
harvesting on national forests, it also contains several provisions
dealing with federal-state relations. State and local governments
must review forest management plans. 2 The state and local gov43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1977).
Id. §§ 1701, 1712.
21 Id. §§ 1712(c)(9), 1712(f), 1720, 1721(c)(1).
- Id. §§ 1713, 1721.
Id. § 1733(c)(1).
U 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-352 (West Supp. 1977).
21 43 U.S.C.A. § 1747 (West Supp. 1977).
- Id. § 1763.
7 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (West Supp. 1977).
"

2,

Id. § 1604(a).
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ernment share of timber sale receipts was set at twenty-five percent of gross receipts, rather than net as had been the previous
rule. 29 This will increase such payments by an estimated sixty
million dollars in the first year.
Finally, county governments achieved a longstanding goal
when Congress enacted a payments-in-lieu-of-taxes act (P.L. 94565) . ° The Act supplements the various existing revenue-sharing
laws and assures that each county will receive a minimum payment from the federal treasury each year simply because the
Federal Government owns land within the county. 3 It also provides for additional "transition" payments for five years after
lands on the property tax rolls are acquired for the National Park
or National Forest Wilderness Systems.2
A.

Water

There appears to be no immediate prospect of new major
federal policy initiatives in the area of water resources. Federalstate coordination in water resources planning, although not
ideal, is probably closer and more consistent than in other policy
areas.
There are two major areas of potential concern regarding
water resources. First, there is a widespread belief that water
resource limitations may impose constraints upon the development of domestic coal and oil shale. Although the facts do not
appear to support such a contention, there is no doubt that uncontrolled preemption of the most readily available water supplies by energy industries could impose serious local dislocations
upon other water users, particularly agriculture. In view of this
potential conflict, national water policy initiatives ostensibly justified by the energy crisis must be limited to constructive and
realistic proposals.
Second, the general lack of support for water resource programs by the executive branch during the last eight years threatens to erode the existing competence in the field. Specifically,
planning grants to the states, research and training programs,
Id. § 500.
' 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1607 (West Supp. 1977).
" Id. § 1602.
Id. § 1603.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 54

and federal support for data collection and comprehensive planning must be continued at effective levels. Otherwise, the nation's ability to respond to future water resource problems will be
lost.
B.

Minerals

The oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices imposed
by OPEC have served to call attention to the fact that the United
States is heavily dependent on imported minerals.
State and local governments need to become more aware of
the impact of local and state land use decisions on potential sites
for extraction of essential minerals and construction materials.
Failure to preserve good sites close to urban areas consistent with
environmental and land use requirements will push up the cost
of such materials.
Federal decisions to allow development of federal minerals
can have drastic impacts on the states. Federal policy in this
area, particularly "hardrock" mineral development under the
Mining Law of 1872,11 lags far behind state and local policy.
There is a critical need for comprehensive land use planning
regarding mineral development. Most people are willing to compromise and allow "undesirable" uses such as mining. However,
it is difficult to see tradeoffs in the case-by-case decisionmaking
process. Comprehensive planning, however, clearly indicates existing alternatives and competing values, thereby allowing intelligent analysis and decisionmaking.
Environmental protection must be provided for in all mineral extraction plans and activities in order to prevent or minimize the degradation of the nation's landscape. Sacrifice of some
resources to realize others is not limited to mining; it is characteristic of any intensive use. However, the Mining Law of 1872 fails
to have internal controls for weighing the value of these sacrifices.
It contains no general requirement for consideration of the other
resource values of the lands involved. This is the critical weakness
of the 1872 Mining Law. It puts the land use decision entirely in
the hands of the miner. He decides that mineral development is
- 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-54 (1971). "Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91, is the
foundation of the existing system for acquiring rights in public mineral lands .
Id.
§ 22, n.1.
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the best use of public lands regardless of other values, with no
rehabilitation and no evaluation of alternatives. Revision of the
1872 Mining Law is going to be a high priority of the ninety-fifth
Congress. Absent such reform, much mineral development could
take place on federal lands without regard to state or local plans.
C.

Parks and Wilderness Areas

Parks and wilderness issues are largely but not exclusively
dependent upon national goals for outdoor recreation. Inadequate
implementation of existing programs such as the HUD 701 Open
Spaces program and the Land and Water Conservation Fund34
have resulted in (1) the inability of federal programs to accomplish or approximate their avowed goals; (2) enormous losses in
open space land in urban areas, estuarine and flood plain lands
in open space land in urban areas, and of historic urban properties, since state and local governments receive little material federal support to withstand development pressure for suburban
expansion or urban renewal; and, for this reason, (3) increasing
pressure on the Federal Government to acquire, develop, and
maintain areas and properties of admittedly significant local concern but of minimal national significance.
The critical recreation needs, however, are at the regional,
state, and local levels. Historic properties are being lost to development for want of either, or both, (1) funds to acquire and renovate the structures in question and (2) alternative uses for them
(museums, low cost housing, stores, etc.) which could stave off
the incursion of "modern" development. Open space lands in and
out of urban areas also are being given over to intensive commercial development in order to increase the tax base, or because no
authority exists to prevent such development.
The creation of Wilderness Areas and new units of the National Park System can provide significant recreational opportunities, but often at the cost of the withdrawal of commercial timber
or mineral production, grazing on public lands, or commercial
and residential development from private lands. Increased tourist
income and psychic and aesthetic satisfaction must be balanced
u, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601-6a, 4601-8 (as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 4801-8 (West Supp.
1976)), 4601-10(a) (West 1974).
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against necessary job displacement and revenue loss. Important
legislative priorities at both the federal and state levels include:
(1) the inventory of significant cultural and historic properties to
be preserved; (2) analysis of population trends and demand for
outdoor recreation facilities; and (3) sufficient integration of federal, state, and local policies and actions for addressing these two
activities.
D.

Impact of the National Environmental Policy Act

The National Environmental Policy Act 5 (NEPA) has
proved to be a highly significant instrument in protecting both
environmental interests and the interests of state and local government, although several federal programs have been exempted
from its requirements. NEPA possesses another attribute which
makes it of critical importance to the states; it contains perhaps
this nation's best freedom of information law.3" NEPA requires an
agency taking any action with a substantial effect upon the environment to make explicit the rationale for its decision. 7 In doing
so, it tends to expose all the facts behind a governmental decision.
As a result, NEPA often serves as a brake against precipitous
federal action in contravention of state policies and programs.
V.

ALASKA'S FEDERAL LANDS:

A.

Background of Statehood and Native Claims

A

SPECIAL PROBLEM OF NATIONAL

CONCERN

Alaska and its resources have for decades been a focal point
for fiercely competing resource protection and development demands. These contests are of growing national importance as
citizens of all states become increasingly dependent on the development of Alaska's energy resources-first, oil, then natural gas,
and finally, perhaps, its coal. Simultaneously, as Americans become increasingly aware of Alaska's superb scenic and recreational resources, they have also demanded the protection of these
resources. Clearly, the Federal Government will be heavily involved in this decisionmaking. An opportunity exists for pioneering a creative new partnership between federal and state government. In its absence, the mixture of development and preserva42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1973).
42 U.S.C. § 4332, as amended by Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83.
Id. § 4332(c).
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tion that emerges is sure to be profoundly unsatisfactory both to
local and to national interests.
Under the Statehood Act 3 and the Native Claims Settlement
3
Act, 9 the Federal Government must participate in decisions to
deed 103 million acres of federal land to the state" and 40 million
acres to Alaskan native groups,4' and to set aside 80 million acres
as national parks, forests, and refuges.4" It must make decisions
concerning the Outer Continental Shelf adjacent to Alaska which
constitutes sixty percent of the United States' shelf areas and
which holds one of the world's most productive fisheries. The
Federal Government must also make decisions regarding the
transportation system to bring natural gas from the North Slope
to the continental United States and the possible development of
coal resources and of Alaskan deepwater ports. These decisions
must be made with both a recognition of the national interest and
a sensitivity to the impacts upon and the concerns of a state
whose citizens have long felt themselves beleaguered by
"outside" interests, federal and private.
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 3 and corresponding state legislation4 4 created a pioneering concept for coordinating federal and state planning, the Joint Federal-State Land Use
Planning Commission." While the Commission's effectiveness
has not necessarily fulfilled the most optimistic expectations projected for it at its inception, its experience may provide a foundation for further innovation in joint planning and decisionmaking
machinery between the two levels of government.
B.

Natural Gas Pipeline

Huge reserves of natural gas on Alaska's North Slope have
stimulated three competing proposals for the construction of a
transportation system connecting them with markets in the lower
forty-eight states. One proposal (Arctic Gas), by a consortium of
'
3

"
4

48
43
48
43
48

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§ 21 (1970).
§§ 1601-1627 (1973 Supp.).
§ 21(6)(a) (1970).
§§ 1610-1615 (1973 Supp.).
§ 21(6)(e) (1970).

43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1627 (1973 Supp.).
§ 10.05.005 (Supp. 1976); §§ 44.25.030-.038 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 1616 (1973 Supp.).

u ALASKA STAT.
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Canadian and United States companies, calls for the construction
of a pipeline through Canada with a capacity of over three billion
cubic feet per day, to connect with existing natural gas transmission facilities (which would be expanded) serving the Pacific
Northwest, the Midwest, and the Northeast. The second proposal
(El Paso) would carry a somewhat smaller quantity of gas via a
pipeline roughly paralleling the trans-Alaska oil line. At the pipeline terminals the gas would be liquified and shipped via specially
constructed tankers to West Coast ports. Gas supplies to midwestern and eastern markets might be increased to the extent
that Alaskan gas could displace and make available to those markets part or all of the gas now flowing to California and the Pacific
Northwest from fields in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. The
third proposal (Alcan) would follow the oil pipeline and the Alcan
Highway bringing the gas across Canada and then tie into existing lines. The State of Alaska sees its interest best served by the
"all-American" route. This system would provide more jobs
in
Alaska and an assured gas supply. It also could increase the
state's revenues as an owner of some of the gas. The Federal
Government undoubtedly owns large Alaskan gas reserves. Furthermore, the Federal Government must assure that gas from
Alaska is available to meet national needs. Thus, the national
interest may well be very different from the state's. This is a
classic federal-state confrontation and is one of the reasons that
the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976 mandates
that both the President and the Congress decide on the appropriate route.
C.

Relations with Canada

At the present time Canada is one of the United States' most
important foreign sources of energy. The Canadians, however,
have clearly enunciated a policy that will, absent unanticipated
new discoveries, result in a phased reduction of both oil and natural gas exports to this country. In the meantime, the Canadian
government has taken certain steps, including the imposition of
a substantial export tax on oil, to insulate Canadian consumers
from some of the dislocations resulting from the rapid escalation
of world oil prices. These actions have been the source of some
friction and misunderstanding with the United States. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the real issues between the two nations
are not with respect to the direction of Canadian policies, but
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rather with regard to the mechanics and schedule of their implementation.
The fact that two of the three routes by which it is proposed
to bring Alaskan gas to the lower forty-eight states (and a possible
second oil pipeline from Northern Alaska) involve transit of Canada raises a much more fundamental issue. The Canadians are
very sensitive to the inflationary impact that the construction of
such pipelines might have on their economy and uncertain with
respect to the benefits they might receive from such facilities.
The Federal Government owns large oil and gas resources in
Alaska (onshore and on OCS) and lands over which any oil or gas
transportation system must cross. Some states fear that this
could influence the Federal Government's actions with respect to
any agreements with Canada. They see a possible "conflict of
interest" between the United States as land and resource owner
and the United States as the sovereign negotiating with another
sovereign.

VI.
A.

TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP

Brief Review of PLLRC Recommendations

The Public Land Law Review Commission's (PLLRC) report, "One Third of the Nation's Land,"46 pointed out that there
are several "publics" which, in the aggregate, make up the general public with respect to policies for the federal lands. 7 It identified state and local government as one of these "publics." The
Commission stated its view that in making public land decisions,
the Federal Government should consider the interests of state and
local governments within which the lands are located. 8
The Commission's overriding recommendations on planning
future public land use fleshed out this view. The Commission
stated its conviction that "effective land use planning is essential
to rational programs for the use and development of the public
lands and their resources." Recommendations thirteen, fourteen,
and fifteen specifically stated that (1) state and local governments should have an effective role in federal land planning; (2)
46

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION,

[hereinafter cited as PLLRC
,' Id. at 6.
I at 7.
Id.

REPORT].

ONE THIRD OF THE NATION's LAND

(1970)
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the states should get federal funds to help them do better planplanning commisning; and (3) federal-state regional land use
49
possible.
where
established
sions should be
The report also recommended that state standards for environmental quality should be used on federal lands, if they have
been adopted under federal law. 50 Other portions of the PLLRC
Report indicated specific federal-state coordination requirements
for wildlife habitat management (Recommendation 60). 11
Current Approaches to FederalDecisionmaking

B.

As has been seen, there are several current approaches to the
state role in federal land and resource planning and decisionmaking. These include (1) federal-state consultation and coordination, (2) state veto over federal decisions, (3) federal preemption,
and (4) joint planning.
C. Current Approaches to Federal Land and Resource
Management
The traditional approaches to federal land and resource
management have been (1) concurrent federal and state control
on lands over which the United States has proprietary jurisdiction with state laws regulating conduct of private users of federal
lands and (2) exclusive federal control on lands over which the
United States has exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Recent legislation has, in some instances, attempted to modify or blur these
traditional control distributions. The "federal consistency" requirements of the Coastal Zone Management Act,5" for example,
tend toward state control over federal agency actions on federal
lands. On the other hand, the twice-vetoed surface coal mining
bills provided for exclusive federal regulation on federal lands,
even over federally-owned coal underlying privately owned surface. It seems clear that Congress is willing to encourage close
coordination of planning but very hesitant to surrender federal
control over federal lands.
, Id. at 9-10.
10Id. at 10.
"

Id. at 12.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. H 1970).
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A Proposed Approach for the Future

In the future, several policy options could be considered to
improve federal-state cooperation in federal land and resource
planning and management.
The traditional approach draws on a variety of approaches
upon an issue-by-issue basis. This is the way in which current
federal policymaking is proceeding, and probably will continue,
unless serious efforts are made to bring about a comprehensive
approach.
Alternatively, some entirely new federal-state relationship
could be established by a comprehensive policy statement. In the
past, major restatements of the relationship have been effectuated by legislation and by financial policies such as block
grants or revenue sharing. Modern energy and economic issues
might justify a broad reexamination of federal-state roles in federal land policymaking. However, this kind of revolutionary
change seems unlikely.
There is a more modest alternative available that is based on
the recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission. This alternative recognizes that our national land and resource base is finite and that land use decisions on federal, state,
and private lands affect us all.
Past failures to anticipate and accommodate competing
demands for our finite land base have precipitated many of the
most crucial problems and conflicts facing all levels of government including those related to the protection of environmental
amenities; siting of energy facilities and industrial plants; design
of transportation systems; provision of recreational opportunities,
water and sewage facilities, police and fire protection, and other
public services; and development and conservation of natural
resources. We must not perpetuate these failures by continuing
to indulge in the ad hoc, short term, case-by-case, crisis-to-crisis
land resource decisionmaking so prevalent in the past.
There is a growing consensus favoring the idea that none of
us has a right to abuse the land and that, on the contrary, society
as a whole has a legitimate interest in proper land use. Basically,
we are drawing away from the idea that land's only function is
to enable its owner to make money. This principle has been applied to all ownerships. Remember that federal lands were used
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to raise cash for government operations or to reward soldiers and
subsidize internal growth by railroad or canal construction. The
new concept recognizes land as both a resource and a commodity.
We now recognize that public land policy must extend beyond the production of traditional commodities-wood, food,
fiber, and minerals. We are moving toward Aldo Leopold's view
that "[w]e abuse land because we regard it as a commodity
belonging to us. When we see land as a community to which we
belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. There is no
5' 3
other way for land to survive the impact of mechanical man.
Federal land and resource planning and management must
be consolidated (at least in part) under some form of general land
use planning. Presumably, a major federal-state effort to rationalize and coordinate land use decisionmaking would have to address a broad range of federal and state policies regarding both
environmental management, energy facilities siting, and mineral
and fuels development. As state land use planning proceeded
with federal assistance and participation, a great many policy
issues could be addressed within the forums and institutions established for land use planning. Essentially this approach envisions the joint federal-state consideration of an issue and the joint
development of a policy response to reflect both state and federal
concerns in a manner which assures support from both state and
federal government when it is implemented.
There are serious obstacles to the fullest participation of
states in federal decisionmaking. The legal and political structures of federal government tend to compartmentalize governmental responsibility and sovereignty regarding critical decisions, making both state and federal parties reluctant to accept
compromises for which they must be accountable within their
respective political systems. Furthermore, although full state
participation in planning may be invited, the relative lack of
manpower, technical expertise, and funding at the state level
often serves to reduce the actual state participation possible. The
states are, in effect, implicated in decisions when they have in
reality been only observers in the decisionmaking process.
The Water Resources Planning Act of 196514 set in motion an
53

A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC (1966).

42 U.S.C. §§ 1962 to 1962d-14 (1970).
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important experiment in federal-state cooperative planning. The
River Basin Commissions which have been established in some
regions are an example of intimate cooperation between federal
and state agencies in developing an approach to water resource
management.55 Several similar interstate commission arrangements, with federal participation, have been established. In general, both state and federal parties have approached such arrangements gingerly and there has been a long learning period.
The best of these experiments, however, show promise of integrating state viewpoints into federal policymaking.
As the PLLRC recommended, we need a federal program to
encourage improvement in state and local land resource decisionmaking-decisionmaking which considers, balances, and where
possible, accommodates all competing demands for the
land-economic and noneconomic-in an open manner with the
full participation of landowners and the public.5
This program would provide federal grants to the states to
assist them to inventory their land resources, retain competent
professional staff, develop planning and institutional procedures
both to avoid, where possible, and resolve unavoidable land resource conflicts, and to develop and implement land resource
programs for critical areas and uses of more than local concern.
It would provide the states with a better handle on federal activities within their borders by requiring that federal activities which
significantly affect land use in states receiving grants under the
proposal be consistent with the state land resource programs except in cases of overriding national interest as determined by the
President.
The legislation should authorize experimentation with
federal-state regional land use planning commissions. These
Commissions would serve as the focal point for all federal-state
land and resource planning. These could build on the experience
of the Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission for
Alaska established by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
of 197151 and of the River Basin Commissions under the Water

5'

Id. § 1962b-6.
PLLRC REPoRT 61.
See note 39 supra.
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Resources Planning Act of 1965.," Only by such a mechanism can
we achieve a truly coordinated national land use policy, and meet
the objective stated by the Commission: "[Fleeling the pressures of an enlarging population, burgeoning growth, and expanding demand for land and natural resources, the American people
today have an almost desperate need to determine the best purposes to which their public lands and the5 9wealth and opportunities of those lands should be dedicated.
"

See note 54 supra.
PLLRC REPORT 1.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT
By

JAMES

T.

RAMEY*

It has been and is a pleasure for me to participate in the
"revisitation" of the Public Land Law Review Commission. As
Chairman Aspinall mentioned, we have known and respected
each other for many years, first when I worked for him as Staff
Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and then
when I was a Commissioner of the old Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
I thought I would repeat the normal practice I followed with
the old Federal Land Review Commission and bring you up to
date generally on the uranium resource picture and nuclear power
situation. Although my present responsibilities as Senior Energy
Advisor to Stone & Webster involve all forms of energy, I still
seem to be something of a spokesman for the downtrodden nuclear community.
Back in the 1960's and early 1970 at the time of the Public
Land Law Review Commission Report, the uranium market was
soft, with U308 selling for $5 to $7 per pound. With the Arab oil
embargo causing the increase in oil and coal prices and inflation
generally, the price of uranium jumped up to $30 and $40 per
pound. Westinghouse, which got overextended, has claimed that
there was an international cartel on uranium which pushed up
the price.
In 1970, only a few nuclear electric power plants were in
operation, but a great many were ordered; there was great optimism as to the future of nuclear electric power. Today there are
over sixty nuclear plants in operation, and over one hundred on
order or under construction. In 1976, these sixty plants produced
around ten percent of total U.S. electric power. In certain areas
such as the Chicago metropolitan area, nuclear power accounted
for thirty to forty percent of their electric needs, and in New
England around twenty-five to thirty percent. In the recent January cold spell, had it not been for nuclear power, there would have
* Vice President, Stone & Webster, Bethesda, Maryland.
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been cascading blackouts along the east coast from Virginia on
down and in the TVA and South Carolina territory.
In the political arena, nuclear power fared well in the states
last year. Anti-nuclear initiatives were defeated by a two-to-one
majority in six states, including California, Colorado, Oregon,
and Washington.
That's the good news. Now for the bad news.
The construction of nuclear power plants has been seriously
delayed since 1970, primarily because of the inexperience of manufacturers and constructors, but also because of intervention by
environmentalists and others, and restrictions imposed by the
courts under NEPA.' And in 1974 the impact of inflation and the
recession caused financing problems for utilities involving all
types of power plants, resulting in substantial deferrals and cancellations of nuclear and fossil plants.
Now in April, 1977, it appears the Carter Administration
may indefinitely defer the breeder reactor and reprocessing of
nuclear fuel, which could further increase the instability of the
nuclear industry.
At this point, and in line with the above discussion, I would
like to comment on the BLM Organic Act.2 I would like to reinforce Carl Landstrom's statement concerning possible procedural
delays due to interpretations by activist judges when construing
the general policy language of the Act. I can recall that similar
general language in NEPA was interpreted to establish procedural requirements which had important substantive effects, especially in regard to delays. For example, the effect of the Calvert
Cliffs' case3 in 1971 was to delay the licensing process of AEC by
as much as thirteen months. Incidentally, we had developed a
legislative history which pretty well established that Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) were not to be included in the
hearing process. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit chose
to ignore this history.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 43 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743
(to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 10, 16, 22, 25, 30, 40, 43, 48, 49 U.S.C.).
I Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (1971).
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Now to some comments on Mike Harvey's paper.' I believe
he presented a very comprehensive statement on federal-state
relations and there isn't much more I can add.
In regard to energy facility siting, there is, of course, a great
deal of experience in the nuclear field. I served as Staff Coordinator for the old Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1974, after
I left AEC, and developed what is known as the "Price" Bill5 on
nuclear facility licensing. There is a section in that bill authorizing federal-state cooperation in licensing. The old AEC, and now
NRC, are already working with certain states (such as New York)
in conducting joint hearings, or at least concurrent hearings, so
as to utilize the same record on environmental matters. The matter of duplication and excess paperwork between the Federal Government and state governments is certainly something which
needs more attention.
In conclusion, I fear I must raise one big question as to the
thesis of federal-state cooperation in siting: Do we have the time
and funds for the states to get up to speed, or, because of the
emerging energy crisis, should we be thinking of more straightforward procedures to bypass the current "red-tape" which is increasingly causing so many delays involving all types of energy
facilities?
Joe Swidler, former Chairman of the FPC, and I recently
wrote a letter dated March 25 to James Schlesinger giving him
the results of a study we have co-chaired on delays affecting electric power plants of all types: fossil, hydro, and nuclear. Our task
force, under the sponsorship of Americans for Energy Independence (AEI), concluded that certain regions of the United States
may suffer electric power shortages in the next several years
(rather than sometime in the 1980's) unless drastic steps are
taken soon. This is because the delay trend is increasing rather
than diminishing, and electric power demand is getting back to
its normal six to seven percent annual rate. Thus, we may be in
for an electric power crisis sooner than we think. And efforts to
get power plants on the line may require some sort of congressional exception from NEPA and other procedural restrictions,
comparable to the exception for the Alaska pipeline.
Michael Harvey, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN FEDERAL LAND AND RESOURCE
(this issue).
' S. 1717, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

By JERRY L. HAGGARD*

The topic "Federalism and Environmental Law" assigned to
me is not limited to the public lands defined in section 10 of the
Public Land Law Review Commission's Organic Act (P.L. 88606).' I am glad not to be so limited because the problems created
by this topic apply to all lands and all people in the United
States.
The terms "federal," and "federalism," and "federal government" seem to have taken on an increasingly negative connotation in recent years. The pervasion of federal influence into the
daily lives of so many people must be a large part of the reason
for this. By requirements like seat belts and school busing,
through radio and TV commercials for federal agencies, and by
innumerable other activities, every person, in business or private
life, is affected intimately each day by federal programs.
The burden imposed by government regulations is of very
great concern to business. In a survey taken last year, 60% of the
2,274 responding small businesses ranked government regulations
as one of their three most urgent problems. All industries surveyed, except transportation and communications, ranked government regulations as the most urgent small business problem.
Direct federal expenditures for regulating business are expected
to increase from $2.9 billion in fiscal year 1976 to $3.5 billion in
fiscal year 1977 and to $3.8 billion by the end of fiscal year 1978.2
Much of this increased federal regulation has, of course, been
brought about by environmental controls. Between 1970 and
1976, annual federal outlays for pollution control, grants, and
studies increased from $2.8 billion to $6.9 billion per year.' Most
of this increase, of course, has been in expenditures by the Environmental Protection Agency. Annual expenditures by industry
for federally required pollution abatement will increase from
*

Phoenix, Arizona; Partner, Evans, Kitchel & Jenckes, P.C.
Public Land Law Review Commission Act, § 10, 43 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970).

2 INDUSTRY WEEK, Feb. 14, 1977, at 17.
3 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrY, THE SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrry 480-84 (1975).
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$11.3 billion in 19711 to an estimated $34.5 billion in 1983.1 The
Environmental Protection Agency has increased the number of
its employees to more than 10,000 today since its creation seven
years ago and has requested a 2,500-employee increase for fiscal
year 1978.6
That federal environmental controls are a dominant influence on our business and private lives is clear. The more interesting questions are: How did we get into this position and what are
the effects of federal controls? In considering the question of how
federal control has become so dominant, a scholarly presentation
would include a fascinating discussion on the sources of federal
authority. It would discuss federal authority over navigable waters which extend upstream into dry washes. It would discuss the
limits (if any) of the commerce power and whether the federal
government has a police power. (This is academic, of course,
because with the commerce power expanded by the courts, who
needs the police power?) One would also expect a discussion of
the restrictions on these powers, including improper delegation,
equal protection, the taking issue, and due process. None of those
subjects will be discussed in this presentation.
As much writing, discussion, and litigation as there has been
on these subjects, it is somewhat surprising that these questions
are seldom raised as each new federal environmental program is
introduced into a state or local community. These questions may
be raised by industry or property owners after a program has been
geared up through the state machinery and put into effect, but
they are seldom raised when Congress, EPA, or another federal
agency approaches a state, dangling the green carrot to assist the
state in "cooperating" with the new federal program.
The devices used to induce states to adopt federal programs
would be worth a study in itself. The federal government has
utilized nearly every weakness present in state and local governments to induce the adoption of federal environmental programs.
These weaknesses include the need for money, a desire for local
' COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY, THE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrr 93 (1973).
' COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY,

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 534 (1975).
1 7 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1395, 1406

FOURTH

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL

THE SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON

(1977).
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governmental autonomy, state bureaucracies desiring to expand
their staffs and authorities, and the motherhood-apple pie political appeal of environmental protection pervading all other reasons.
Although, from the nature of the governmental activity involved in environmental protection, one would expect that the
direct forces of the federal commerce power or the police power
(if there is any) would be applied to induce state cooperation, it
is curious to observe that another governmental power is utilized
indirectly, much more widely, and much more effectively. That
is the power to tax and to create money. Federal environmental
grants returning tax money to the states with strings (or shackles)
attached are a most powerful force in inducing state adoption of
these programs. The grants usually are made available in two
forms. First, as provided for in the Solid Waste Disposal Act 7 and
under section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 8
funds are granted to conduct studies, to set up planning and
control systems, to hire personnel, and to obtain the necessary
state legislation. Many of these funds are made available to the
staffs of regional government organizations within the states,
many of which have acquired characteristics of federal agency
subagencies.
When the personnel are hired, the studies are completed, and
the program is established, the system exists, lacking only the
legislative authority to implement it. This situation, of course,
removes a state legislature from the more tenable position of
refusing to create a new office or a new program, and places it in
the more difficult position of having to abolish an existing office
and program.
Adding to the irresistibility of the federal environmental programs are the grant-sharing funds made available to states if they
implement the program. This makes the financial bullet somewhat less difficult to bite for the initial passage of the state legislation. The issue can be made into one of losing federal funds if
the legislation is not passed. But then, typically, the federal funds
are phased out after several years and the state is left on its own
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6941-6949 (1977).
33 U.S.C. § 1288 (Supp. IV 1974).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

V~OL. 54

to either finance or repeal the program. It is, of course, a maxim
of government that it is incomparably more difficult to repeal
legislation than it is to enact it, particularly environmental legislation. There is the further difficulty that an additional bureaucracy has been established, personnel have been hired, and a system is operating. It is an extremely unusual case in which a
legislative body would repeal legislation under these circumstances.
The compounding of those federal programs which do provide for continuing funding has a secondary result which is quite
effective. As states come to depend upon continuing funding, the
threat of decreasing or eliminating those existing programs becomes a very effective method to induce the adoption of and
compliance with new programs.
Another positive inducement for states to accept federal environmental programs is the strong desire to manage their own
affairs. It is found frequently in air and water quality and waste
disposal statutes that the state may conduct the program if approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. If the state program is not approved, EPA will carry out the program in the
state. This presents state legislatures with another dilemna. It
is not politically healthy to open oneself to the charge of abrogating state authority and responsibility to a federal agency. There
is also the concern that EPA restrictions will be greater than
those which EPA would approve if the state prepared and carried
out its own program.
Finally, there is the method of encouraging state compliance
by threatening to withhold permits under other environmental
programs. This method is used in section 208 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act' to induce states to develop a statewide water management program. The failure to do so can result
in the denial of state authority to administer local pollutantdischarge programs. 0
With EPA's arsenal of gentle persuasion available to apply
federal environmental programs to state and local matters, it
becomes unnecessary to utilize the more brutal federal constitutional powers to accomplish the same goals.
9Id.
30

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (c)(3) (Supp. IV 1974).
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There may be a trend commencing for states to swallow their
pride of autonomy and to tell EPA that, if the program is to be
enforced, EPA will have to do it. This has occurred in Arizona,
at least in this session of its legislature, with respect to implementing the Safe Drinking Water Act, I and the automobile emission testing program was threatened with the same fate. I understand that a similar disposition was made of legislation in New
Mexico this year. This, of course, is not welcomed by EPA' because, even with 10,000 employees, there is a limit to the number
of EPA personnel available to administer specific state programs.
Also, EPA prefers to have any public dissatisfaction with the
enforcement of programs directed toward the state rather than
toward EPA.
Although federal regulation has been the source of considerable complaint and concern, there has not been any quantitative
determination of what the effects of individual regulations, or the
cumulative effects of the entire federal regulatory system, are on
business and industry. However, studies to provide some indication of those effects are presently underway. The National Science Foundation last year commenced studies of the benefits and
detriments of governmental regulations on the copper wire,
ground beef, and consumer financing services industries. But, if
these studies are ever completed, it will likely be years from now.
Another study on the effect of federal regulation of the iron
and steel industry is being conducted by the Council on Wage and
Price Stability. The first phase of that study, completed last
December, consisted of a catalog identifying federal regulations
which apply to this industry.1 2 The effect of those identified programs will be the subject of a later study. The initial study,
however, provided some interesting insights. First, the study was
limited to the direct manufacturing process and did not include
mining or the manufacture of steel products. The study found
that this portion of the iron and steel industry is regulated by at
least twenty-seven different federal agencies.
1 H.R. 2152, 33d Ariz. Leg., 1st Sess. (1977), was not reported out of the House
Health Committee; this bill would have implemented the EPA Safe Drinking Water Act
in Arizona.
12 COUNCIL

ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, CATALOG OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AFFECTING

THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY (1976).
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The Council also found that in 1975 there were 7,305 final
rules and regulations and 3,042 proposals for new rules or amendments published in the Federal Register. Although it was not
determined which of these would affect the steel industry, the
study identified a total of more than 10,000 changes or potential
changes, within one year, in the rules of which businessmen had
to keep themselves informed. The Council expressed its concern
as follows:
The result of his understandable confusion and frustration with
them is a high level of uncertainty. He [the businessman] barely
grasps what he must do today; he can only imagine what he will be
asked to do tomorrow.
We are currently entering a period of several years when industry
will face near simultaneous compliance with a host of new health,
safety and environmental standards promulgated separately in past
years. The consequences of this timing coincidence are not known,
because it is a question that has never been addressed. It has never
been addressed because government has never felt inclined to examine the totality
of its actions from the perspective of those directly
3
affected.'

Compounding the problem of the multiplicity of regulations
is the nature and philosophy of many federal agencies in drawing
up and enforcing the regulations. A prime example of this problem is found in the Environmental Protection Agency. Instead of
being an objective administrator of the law, it is not incorrect to
say that the Environmental Protection Agency is a zealous and
dedicated advocate of environmental protection. This is acknowledged in one of EPA's own publications, THE CHALLENGE OF THE
ENVIRONMENT: A PRIMER ON EPA's STATUTORY AUTHORITY: "It
[EPA] is an independent regulatory agency that has no obligation to promote agriculture, commerce or industry. It has only one
mission-to protect and enhance the environment."' 4 An example
of EPA's advocacy is indicated by a Chicago law firm's recent
charge that the Environmental Protection Agency lobbied in at
least four state legislatures for the passage of legislation to restrict
the use of nonreturnable drink containers.'" In this instance, EPA
Id. at VI.
11U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
13

PROTECTION AG

CY, THE CHALLENGE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

PRIMER ON EPA's STATUTORY AUTHORITY 1 (1972).
,17 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1604-05 (1977).

A

1977

FEDERALISM

was faced with a statutory prohibition against lobbying in this
area. However, lobbying by EPA in state legislatures is inappropriate at any time.
One of the programs which appears to be particularly effective in extending federal controls to states is the one by which
EPA employees are assigned to work on a temporary basis in state
agencies. Recently I met with an EPA employee temporarily assigned as the director of a state agency who had drafted state
environmental legislation which would be ultimately administered by EPA. This employee was actively lobbying, while on
EPA's payroll, for the passage of this bill in the state legislature.
Participation by a federal employee in a state legislative process
seems to be inherently wrong.
Former President Ford made a pledge when he took office to
reduce the federal bureaucracy and regulations. Although there
is no reason to believe that best efforts were not made to carry
out this pledge, federal regulatory actions increased during his
term. On February 2, 1977, President Carter made a similar
pledge during his fireside chat. General statements of goals of this
nature are always easy to make and easy to break when specific
programs are addressed. The March 29, 1977, edition of the Wall
Street Journal reported that the President's environmental proposals expected to be released next week will include the following proposals for increased regulations:
1. Additional restrictions on off-road vehicles.
2. Limiting use of inland and coastal wetlands.
3. Ending coal strip mining on private agricultural lands.
4. Restricting coal mining in other areas.
5. Expanding the Endangered Species program.
6. Increasing the size of the Redwood National Park to prevent timber harvesting.
7. Strengthen auto pollution rules.
8. Create new wilderness areas.
9. Increase environmental standards for water development
projects.

618
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10. Increase environmental requirements for off-shore oil
and gas development."
Not much encouragement is provided by such a list proposing increasing federal regulations. Until such listings are reversed
to identify programs proposing deregulation and until those programs are carried out, prospects for a rationally balanced federal
system of environmental law are not bright.
" Wall St. Journal, Mar. 29, 1977 at 3, col. 2.

COMMISSIONS
COMMISSIONS AND PUBLIC LAND POLICIES: SETTING
THE STAGE FOR CHANGE
By PERRY R. HAGENSTEIN*
If you're pestered by critics and hounded by faction
To take some precipitate, positive action
The proper procedure, to take my advice, is
Appoint a commission and stave off the crisis.
A royal commission is strictly impartial,
The pros and the cons it will expertly marshal
And one of its principal characteristics
Is getting bogged down in a sea of statistics.'
[If only,] as in England, or governments . . . appointed periodically commissions of inquiry . . . armed with the same plenary
powers to get at the truth . . . [and with] men as competent, as
free from partisanship and respectful of persons as are the English
[commission members] ....
I
I.

THE COMMISSION IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT

There are two views of advisory commissions. One, most
common in the press and journals of commentary, is that advisory commissions are ineffectual and used to avoid, rather than
solve, difficult problems. Some political scientists and students
of government, on the other hand, find advisory commissions a
useful device, one of many, for solving problems of government.
Whatever the extremity of the problem that brings about the
creation of an advisory commission, commission reports are
usually cast in terms of crises. 3 Despite criticism, commissions
continue to be created, to write their reports, to have their day
on the front pages of the newspapers, and to influence, subtly, the
course of public affairs.
This paper is concerned with national advisory commissions
*

Executive Director, New England Natural Resources Center, Boston, Massachu-

setts.
Parsons, Royal Commission, PUNCH 25, Aug. 1955: This is a favorite poem of commission watchers. It is quoted in H. SEInMAN, PoLrCS, POSmON, AND POWER: THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL ORGANIZATON 23 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as SEIDMANI.
K. MARx, CAPITAL, xviii (1939).
M. Derthick, On Commissionship-PresidentialVariety, 19 PUBLIC PoucY 623, 628
(1971) [hereinafter referred to as Derthick].
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in general4 and with the Public Land Law Review Commission
[PLLRC], which existed from 1965 through 1970, in particular.5
The most common advisory commission is the presidential
commission, which is created by a public action; is advisory to
the President; is appointed solely by the President; has at least
one public member; is ad hoc; and whose report is public.' The
PLLRC, in contrast, had a majority of its members appointed by
the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House.' Its report
and recommendations were presented equally to the President
and to the Congress. In most ways, it functioned much the same
as a presidential advisory commission, but there are some important differences.'
A. The Use of Commissions
Categorizing and characterizing government commissions is
difficult because of the great variety of their purposes and operations. One distinction lies between "informative" and
"administrative" commissions.8 The latter are concerned with
the execution, as well as the establishment, of policies and include, in addition to the regulatory commissions, a range of coordinating boards, councils, and committees. The focus here, however, is on the informative, or fact-finding and opinion-guiding,
commissions.
Study commissions are suspect because their reports commonly fall victim to "the national sport of shelving expert stud'Information on commissions in general is drawn largely from the available literature
and to a much lesser extent from conversations with people who were involved with one
or more commissions.
The Public Land Law Review Commission was created by Public Law 88-606, 78
Stat. 982 (1964) (later codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970)), and held its organization
meeting on July 14, 1965. It went out of existence in late December 1970. Portions of the
paper concerning the Public Land Law Review Commission are drawn in large part from
my experiences as a member of the Commission's senior staff.
I T. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSONS: TRUMAN TO NIXON 7 (1975)
[hereinafter referred to as WOLANIN]. Marcy, in a shorter monograph, covered presidential commissions from the beginning of Theodore Roosevelt's terms as President through
1940. C. MARcY, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS (1945) [hereinafter referred to as MARcY]. See
generally F. POPPER, THE PRESIDENT'S COMbUSSIONS 63-64 (1970) for a discussion of
legislative-executive commissions as an alternative to presidential commissions
[hereinafter referred to as POPPER].
P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964); see text accompanying note 55 infra.
See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text infra.
MARCY, supra note 6, at 23.
7
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ies."' 0 Yet they have been frequently used in the United States
since 1900 and were even used to some extent prior to that. The
commission sometimes cited as the first in the United States was
not an advisory commission. George Washington appointed a
presidential commission to help in settling the Whiskey Rebellion
of 1794." Although called a commission, it was more in the nature
of a three-man task force which had an action, rather than advisory, mandate. From the start of Theodore Roosevelt's incumbency through the end of Calvin Coolidge's tenure, there were "no
less than 471 federal commissions, committees, boards and similar bodies created."'" Not to be outdone, Herbert Hoover appointed sixty-two commissions during his four years, and Franklin Roosevelt appointed more than one hundred such bodies from
1933 through 1940.' 3 Between the start of President Truman's
incumbency in 1945 and the end of President Nixon's first term
in 1973, there were ninety-nine presidential advisory commissions, not including joint legislative-executive commissions."
B.

The Impact of Commissions

Part of the discredited image of commissions results from a
failure to comprehend the reasons for appointing a commission.
Harold Seidman suggests that presidents
employ committees and commissions to capture and contain the
opposition. . . .[that committees and commissions] can also offer
an immediate, visible response in times of national catastrophe
... .[that they] are employed as a kind of tranquilizer to quiet
public and congressional agitation . . . .Prestigious commissions
can also build public support for controversial courses of action.
What is wanted is endorsement, not advice .... 11

Elizabeth Drew identifies eight reasons for appointing commissions:
1) to obtain the blessing of distinguished men for something you
want to do anyway;
Chase, The Longest Way from Thought to Action, THE REPORTER, June 22, 1961,
at 28. The quoted phrase in the text was originated by Henry Heald, formerly head of the
Ford Foundation.
POPPER, supra note 6, at 7.
"

MAuc-, supra note 6, at 3-4.

13Id.

SWoLANiN, supra note 6, at 205-15.
SSEIDMAN,

supra note 1, at 23-24.
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2) to postpone action, yet be justified in insisting that you are at
work on the problem;
3) to act as a lightning rod, drawing political heat away from the
White House;
4) to conduct an extensive study of something you do need to know
more about before you act, in case you do;
5) to investigate, lay to rest rumors, and convince the public of one
particular set of facts;
6) to educate the commissioners, or get them aboard on something
you want to do;
7) because you cannot think of anything else to do; and
8) to change the hearts and minds of men."

It should be obvious that presidential commissions are often
used for political purposes. In fact, it has been charged that many
of the commissions appointed by President Hoover "were political in character, meaning that they were devices for avoiding
taking a stand on controversial issues."' 7
Nevertheless, the primary purpose for most commissions is
"to formulate innovative domestic policies and to facilitate their
adoption," although "ducking issues" may also have been of
some importance as a reason for creating commissions, especially
those dealing with policy analysis. 8
It is still difficult to assign particular results to advisory commissions. They are reflective, rather than active, organizations
and, in this, they are criticized along with planning agencies,
interagency boards and councils, interstate compact commissions, and, not to spare the Congress, nonlegislative committees.
Advisory commissions make their recommendations and then
disappear. If action eventually occurs, there are other active people and organizations ready to claim parenthood. Nevertheless,
the record of commissions, though fuzzy, is not as bad as it may
appear, especially if those commissions whose purpose was to
avoid action are not considered.
By contrast, the English royal commissions have had a remarkable record of achievement. They have been perhaps the
most important source of ideas for social reform in England,"
1 Drew, On Giving Oneself a Hotfoot: Government by Commission, ATLANTIc
May 1968, at 45-46 [hereinafter referred to as Drew].
" MARcY, supra note 6, at 43-44.

MONTHLY,

"

WOLANIN,

supra note 6, at 11, 22.

The Royal Commission on the Poor Law and Relief of Distress of 1905 to 1909 was
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though they are used less frequently than advisory commissions
in the United States." Appointment by the sovereign gives a
degree of separation and disinterest from the head of government
and makes the public, rather than the government, the client of
the royal commission.
One does not have to turn to royal commissions to find examples of commissions that have been successful in pointing the way
to new policies.2' One of these helped to establish what became
one of the categories of public lands later considered by the Public Land Law Review Commission. Recognizing the severe problems in the Great Plains States caused by the Great Depression
and drought, Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 created a Special Committee on Farm Tenancy which was made up of government officials and representatives of the lay public. It was given two and
one-half months to report. The President suggested that the committee, which functionally was a commission, consult with two
members of Congress who had been working on the problem,
Senator John H. Bankhead and Representative Marvin Jones.
One observer remarked, "[T]here is no doubt but that the
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937 owes its existence in
part, at least, to the work of the President's Committee. ' 22 On the
other hand, there was the famous Wickersham Commission, the
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, creformed to deal with the laws relating to relief of poor persons that had been in effect for
three-quarters of a century since the time of the previous royal commission on poor laws.
The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 embodied the principles of the Royal Commission
on the Poor Law of 1832, which included a provision that still frames debate over welfare
policy: "That the public relief of destitution out of funds raised by taxation-as distinguished from the alms of the charitable-devitalized the recipients, degraded their character and induced in them general bad behavior." B. WEBB, OUa PARTNERSHIP 317-18
(1948).
Although the Royal Commission of 1832 may have been wrong when judged against
modern concepts of welfare, it nevertheless had an enormous impact.
POPPER, supra note 6,at 50.
2W
Wolanin found that presidential support for commission recommendations and the
impact of these recommendations were surprisingly high. His analysis showed that 68%
of the commissions that were examined had received positive presidential support in the
form of a message, introduction of legislation, or administrative action on significant or
major recommendations of the commissions. Further analysis showed that 58% of the
commission reports ended up with significant or major recommendations that were, in
fact, implemented by legislative or administrative action. WoLANN, supra note 6, at 13339.
n MARcY, supra note 6, at 30.
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ated by President Hoover following a campaign pledge to deal
with the problems of prohibition, a pledge designed "to corral
both the wet and dry vote." That Commission's report was "an
unmitigated failure."
A former staff member of an advisory commission that has
been given high marks for effectiveness, the Outdoor Recreation
Resources Review Commission of 1959-1962 [ORRRC], gave four
reasons for its success: timing; nonpartisan membership; insistence by the chairman, Laurance S. Rockefeller, that there be no
minority report; and the ability, with help from the Rockefeller
philanthropies, to find key people for report writing and funding
a strong follow-up effort. 2' Two of these points, timing and the
consensus report, deserve some further comment.
An advisory commission has little control over either the
specific time at which its report is released or over the general
political circumstances into which its recommendations are
dropped. All commissions hope for front-page headlines on the
day of release, but most settle for less. Yet a report's public reception is determined to a great extent immediately following its
release. A more important consideration is whether the President,
the Congress, and the country are ready for the commission's
recommendations. Often, the failure of a commission may be due
to reasons lying beyond its control, such as the release of its
report.
ORRRC's report came at a time when outdoor recreation in
the country was booming, the states and federal land management agencies were not able to cope with the surge of people to
the outdoors, and Congress was looking for answers. There was a
problem, and the Commission had new and relevant solutions.
Most commissions, not just ORRRC, seek to have unanimous
or consensus reports. 2 The price of gaining that consensus frequently is fuzzy recommendations supported by generalities in a
report that lacks passion, none of which bodes well for convincing
the public, the Congress, or the President. The problem becomes
one of gaining too little attention for recommendations that may
Id. at 39, 40.
11Conversation with Professor Hugh C. Davis, University of Massachusetts, former
staff member of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission.
Derthick, supra note 3, at 635.
2
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have the support of an entire commission, but are difficult to
translate into meaningful legislation or administrative action.
C.

Why Commissions Are Appointed"

Five purposes served by advisory commissions may be identified and ranked according to their frequency of use:
1) Policy analysis: when the commission is expected to decide
what to do within the broad boundaries of nonradicalfederal action;
2) window dressing: when an "elite consensus" to support
presidential proposals is needed;
3) long range education: when calling public attention to
problems and creating "a frame of reference" for debating them is
desired;
4) crisis response: when something has to be done to show
recognition of a problem; and
5) issue management and avoidance: when the President
needs "to feel his way into a controversial, complex, or new area. ' '

Advisory commissions are not, of course, the only devices
available to presidents and the Congress for accomplishing these
purposes. White House Conferences, public hearings, presidential
trips, and various other means of capturing public attention can
further the purposes of window dressing, crisis response, and issue
management and avoidance. Government task forces, universities, and foundations or institutions, such as the National Academy of Sciences or the Brookings Institution can aid in policy
analysis or long range education. No single approach has a unique
ability to fulfill the assigned purposes. Advisory commissions do,
however, have some characteristics that are particularly well
suited for policy analysis and long range public education where
problems of government and public policies are involved.
First, they are outside the usual channels of government,
and, therefore, are blessed with a detached point of view. Second,
they are generally able to attract highly qualified members and
a staff of bright and diverse people who would not be available
in individual government agencies or could not be assembled to
serve on interagency task forces. Third, because commissions
often have the ear of the President or key members of Congress
See also text accompanying notes 15 and 16 supra.
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 23.
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and remain independent, they are able to get information and
access to assistance that would not otherwise be available."
While advisory commissions may not be the best device for dealing with some problems, they are well suited to work on matters
of public policy and administration, which are surely the kind of
issues that have faced public land commissions.29
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND COMMISSIONS
Prior to the Public Land Law Review Commission, there
were three commissions that dealt with public land issues: those
of 1879, 1903, and 1929. Each was important in focusing attention
on public land issues and abuses.
A.

1879

The first public lands commission in 1879 was established
because "Congress had gone on piling land law upon land law
. . . without considering how later legislation might affect or be
quite out of harmony with earlier laws which were not repealed."3
A movement to reform the land laws led Congress to authorize a
Commission made up of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, the head of the Geological Survey, and three nongovernment persons appointed by the President. 3 One member of the
Commission, Commissioner Williamson of the General Land Office, importuned the Public Lands Committees of both houses of
the Congress to appoint three members each to participate in the
32
Commission, but neither house responded to this suggestion.
Among the recommendations of the report of the Public
Land Commission of 1879 was a "proposal to classify the lands
. . . into arable, mineral, arid but irrigable, pasturage (for grazing), and timberland . . . [but the report made] little effort to
establish criteria for classification or to determine how it was to
be achieved. '33 The 1879 Commission's conclusion and recomz, Id. at 38-53.
Derthick, supra note 3, at 635.
3 P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 422 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as GATES]. Similar reasons are given for establishing the PLLRC.
31 Id. at 423.
: Id. at 424.
3
Id. at 428. The PLLRC in its 1970 report also found that land classification was a
relevant issue and that it was easier to recommend that criteria for classification be
established than to specify the criteria. Hagenstein, One Third of the Nation's
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mendations were contained in a short forty-seven page report
signed by all members of the Commission, although one member,
Powell, added a two page statement with proposed modifications
on water and mineral rights. The report was accompanied by
proposed statutes that would implement the recommendations
and were more concrete than the recommendations, and four additional volumes of background information."
B.

1903

The second Public Land Commission was appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt35 in 1903, after Congress had refused to
provide for a commission at Roosevelt's request, to consider
abuses of the Desert Land Act and other matters of concern. 6 The
three appointees were all government employees: Commissioner
of the General Land Office, Chief Engineer of the Reclamation
Service, and Gifford Pinchot, who at that time headed the Bureau of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture. This Commission, which was highly critical of the Desert Land Act as making
possible the creation of large landed estates, again decided that
there was a need for land classification, which in this case would
assign some land for disposal and some for leasing of grazing
Land-Evolution of a Policy Recommendation, 12 NAT. RESOURCES J. 56-75 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Hagenstein I. This article details the PLLRC's approach to
land classification, which was the subject of considerable criticism by various detractors
from the Commission's report.
GATES, supra note 30, at 429.
Advisory commissions had been used as a governmental device only sparingly in
the nineteenth century, and "Theodore Roosevelt probably deserves the title of Father of
the Presidential Advisory Commission." WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 5. Although enthusiastic about his creation, Roosevelt found, much to his disgust, that the Congress had some
doubts about his authority to establish commissions. The National Conservation Commission and the Country Life Commission were appointed in 1908, and both served without
appropriated funds. When the report of the National Conservation Commission was transmitted to Congress in 1909 with a request for $50,000: "[The President] was accommodated not by an appropriation, but by an amendment to the Sundry Civil Act which
denied him any funds and also sought to prevent the appointment in the future of such
'unauthorized' commissions." MARCY, supra note 6, at 37-38. Similarly, Roosevelt asked
for $24,000 for the Country Life Commission "to digest the material it has collected" and
this request was refused, in part on the grounds that the President had no power to create
the Commission in the first place." Id. Congressional displeasure with Theodore Roosevelt's Commissions is also illustrated by the fate of the report of the President's Home
Commission. It was attacked in Congress as being absurd, and a resolution was introduced
to exclude the report from the mails "as obscene literature unfit for circulation." Id. at
118.
3, GATES, supra note 30, at 488.
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rights. 7 The Commission's recommendations, with one limited
exception, were disregarded by the Congress, which resisted
Roosevelt's lecturing it on matters involving conservation. 8 In
contrast to other presidential commissions, the Public Land
Commission of 1903, which did not have nongovernment members, might instead be viewed as an interagency task force having
somewhat less standing than the usual blue-ribbon advisory commission with public members.
The first Roosevelt's relations with the Congress in general
may have helped to determine the congressional reaction to his
commissions. Although for a time they may have been less inclined to create commissions without approval of the Congress,
those who followed Roosevelt as President were not greatly deterred in the use of presidential commissions to achieve their
ends.
C.

1929

In 1929 President Hoover had concluded that, "For the best
interest of the people as a whole, and people of the western states
and the small farmers and stockmen by whom they are primarily
used, [the public lands] should be managed and the policies for
their use determined by state governments."3 9 He asked Congress
for authority to appoint a commission to study what to do with
the public domain and was duly authorized to appoint a Committee on the Conservation and Administration of the Public Domain. He appointed as chairman James R. Garfield, who had
been Secretary of the Interior under Theodore Roosevelt, and
eighteen other public members, in addition to the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior who were ex officio members of the
Committee. Reflecting Hoover's views, the Committee recommended that those public lands important for national interest
purposes should be retained, that the states should be offered the
remainder of the public lands and given them when prepared to
provide administrative control, and that those lands not accepted
by the states should be placed under organized federal management.4 0
11B.

HIBBARD,

A

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND PouclEs

30, at 489-91.
GATES, supra note 30, at 491-92.
"' Id. at 524.
3' Id. at 525-26.

432 (1924);

GATES, supra note
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Congress was sufficiently interested in the expected results
of this presidential commission that it asked that the report be
transmitted to the Congress." The old Roosevelt conservationists,
in Senate hearings, voiced opposition to the transfer of federal
lands to the states and unwillingness on the part of at least some
of the western states to accept federal lands without mineral
rights. 2 The result was that the Committee's recommendations
were not enacted, although its report helped set the stage for
passage in 1934 of the Taylor Grazing Act.

III.
A.

THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION

Formation

The Public Land Law Review Commission was the fourth
advisory commission in 100 years to make recommendations on
public land policies. Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall, then
Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the
House of Representatives, wrote President John F. Kennedy in
October 1962, saying,
I think that any student of the public lands situation will recognize
that we have reached a point where it is essential to establish clearcut legislative guidelines concerning the management, use, and disposition of our public lands. This has come about because of past
inaction of Congress, coupled with the growing scarcity of land in
the United States and the parallel need to preserve some of our
3
undisturbed areas in their natural setting.1

In his reply, President Kennedy noted that
the public land laws constitute a voluminous, even forbidding, body
of policy determinations within which the land management agenMARcy, supra note 6, at 27.
GATES, supra note 30, at 527-28.
3 Letter from Wayne N. Aspinall to John F. Kennedy (Oct. 15, 1962), reprinted in
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2d Srss., THE PUBLIc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 121 (Comm. Print 1964).
About the time of his letter to the President, Congressman Aspinall was noting that
the Public Lands Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
would have only "between 90 and 100 hours [during the 88th Congress] in which to
consider all of the matters within its jurisdiction." Address by Wayne N. Aspinall, Western Regional District of the National Association of Counties (Dec. 12, 1962), reprinted
in COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2d SEss., THE PuBLIc LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 28 (Comm. Print 1964). Given the scope of public land issues described by Aspinall as needing attention, Congress would clearly be hard put to deal with
them in its committees in the thorough manner that they deserved.
"
2
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cies must operate. Dating back as much as a century and a half, this
complex of statutory guidelines varies from the most detailed prescription of ministerial acts to mere definition of an objective coupled with broad grants of discretion to administrators. Viewed in
this perspective, the deficiencies of the present structure become
apparent."

In these "two strong and patriotic statements,"" the foundation was laid for the creation of the Public Land Law Review
Commission. The result was "the most searching assessment, the
most fundamental public exposure and discussion ever concentrated on a broad natural resource issue." 4
Responding to a growing national interest in recreation and
preservation of natural values on the public lands, the adm'nistrative agencies, under the broad grants of authority referred to
by President Kennedy, were increasingly restricting economic
uses of these lands. These uses-mining, grazing, and logging-had strong local constituencies from which western members of Congress derived much of their support and which provided grist for the legislative mills of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Committees. At least some members of the Interior Committees realized that they were unable to slow the administrative
agencies against which they were arrayed and which had the
discretionary authority ultimately to bring economic uses of the
public lands to a halt. As Chairman of the House Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee, Aspinall was looking for a way to
place some of the control over public land decisions back in the
Congress and especially in his Committee.
Given the various resources available to the Congress for
developing information on legislative matters, as well as the low
esteem with which commissions are sometimes held, the choice
of a commission as the mechanism for reviewing public land issues is perhaps surprising.4 7 It is obvious, however, that assigning
,1 Letter from John F. Kennedy to Wayne N. Aspinall (Jan. 17, 1963), reprinted in
88rH CONG., 2d SESS., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW
REVIEW COMMISSION 121 (Comm. Print 1964).
11John A. Carver, Jr. (unpublished paper), Public Land Law Review Regional Conference, Syracuse, New York (Dec. 14, 1970).
COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS,

'*Id.

By August 1963, Aspinall had settled on a congressional-executive commission as
the mechanism necessary for "a complete review of all laws and regulations affecting
Federal public land ownership and the natural resources thereof," which would have three
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the necessary studies and review to the executive branch would
not do; after all, the executive branch was in part the subject of
the review. Aspinall explored other possible institutional havens
for the task, including what was then the Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress, but the resources necessary for
a major effort of this sort could not be made available in ongoing
institutions.4 8 A temporary commission was required."
Although there are remarkable similarities in some of the
words used to describe the problems facing this and its predecessor commissions, as well as in the kinds of recommendations that
were made, there are also important differences. First of all, the
initiative for creation of the PLLRC came from the Congress
rather than from the Executive. It was Congressman Aspinall
who, as a representative from a public land district in Colorado,
most acutely felt the contrasting development and preservation
pressures on the public lands. In one sense it was western congressmen who had most to gain through a revision of the public
land laws that would provide a more rational system of allocating
public lands to conflicting uses and one that would satisfy, even
if only for a time, the various interests clamoring for their votes.
Second, this was not a presidential commission. It was made
up of members of Congress, appointed by the Speaker of the
House and President of the Senate, as well as appointees of the
and one-half years to make the necessary study and prepare a report. Remarks before the
Section of Mineral and Natural Resources Law, at the American Bar Association Annual
Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (Aug. 14, 1963).
11Interview with Theodore M. Schad, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, in 1964-65. Schad recalled Congressman Aspinall's inquiry.
Advisory commissions, nevertheless, "face a formidable set of tasks." They must:
- translate their mandates into operational terms;
- recruit a competent staff;
- establish their own credibility through background studies, public hearings, and visits to relevant locations;
- reach a consensus on recommendations; and
- put forth these recommendations in a report that will capture public
attention and at the same time show such understanding of the problems
faced that the proposed solutions are convincing.
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 96.
Wolanin found many similarities in the presidential advisory commissions that he
examined, which covered the period from 1945 to 1973, and found that little change in
commission work had taken place during this time. Id. at 123. With the only major
exception of the important joint legislative-executive character of the PLLRC, its operations fall into the patterns recognized by Wolanin for presidential advisory commissions.
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President. It was to consider problems that faced both branches
of the Federal Government and that involved fundamental issues
of the separation of legislative and executive powers. All three of
the previous public land commissions, as well as most other advisory commissions that have been appointed since 1900, were presidential in terms of appointees and character." The PLLRC had
members not appointed by the President, and it reported to the
Congress as well as to the President.
The reasons for the joint legislative-executive form of the
Public Land Law Review Commission were several. Participation
by the Executive Branch in this predominantly congressional effort was necessary to give the Commission credibility with recreation and preservation interests and to illustrate commitment of
the Executive Branch to its recommendations.
In addition, choice of this form was based in part on the
performance of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, whose report had only recently been released. The structure of ORRRC was similar to that of the PLLRC and it was
viewed as a remarkably successful commission." Congressman
Aspinall had been a member of ORRRC, along with three other
members of the House of Representatives, four members of the
Senate, and seven Presidential appointees.
Third, the scope of the PLLRC study was broader than that
of its predecessors, encompassing all federal lands, rather than
just the remaining unreserved and unappropriated public domain
lands. The intent also was clearly not limited to a codification of
the public land laws, but rather concentrated upon a full-scale
review of the law, policies, and practices governing the disposal,
retention, and management of these lands.2 If a more limited
purpose for the Commission was understood by some, it was not
evident in the law that established it.
50 Wolanin's definition of a presidential advisory commission is one that is inter alia
"advisory to the President . . . all members of which are appointed directly by the
President, . . . [and] at least one member of which is public ....
" Id. at 7.
1, Its report led directly to the creation of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation and the
Land and Water Conservation Fund, and its study reports were important as sources of
new and well-organized information. See generally Wolfe, Perspective on Outdoor Recreation: A BibliographicalSurvey, 54 GEOGRAPHICAL Rav. 203 (1964).
12 P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1970)).
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Finally, the time and effort devoted to this review far exceeded that of previous public land commissions." The initial
authorization of $4 million in funds and slightly over four years
in which to report was later extended to a total funding authorization of $7,390,000 and a total time of almost six years. 4
B.

The Commission Itself

A commission sets the tone of its work through selection of a
chairman and a staff director, the attention it gives to its work
and report, and its willingness to agree on consensus recommendations. The PLLRC had nineteen members: six Senators and six
Representatives, all ranking members for the respective Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and with equal majority and
minority party representation, six presidential appointees, and a
chairman chosen by the other eighteen."
The Chairman was Congressman Wayne N. Aspinall of Colorado, Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, and there was no question that he was the dominant
figure on the Commission. It was his idea originally, he was given
broad operational latitude by the other members, and the Staff
Director reported directly to him. Yet, the recommendations of
the PLLRC, as is common with commissions generally, represented a broadly agreeable consensus. Members of the Commission accepted the idea that only a consensus report would be
likely to have a significant impact, but perhaps more important
was the fact that involvement in the Commission's work tended
to develop a similar set of experiences with respect to public land
policies that affected the Chairman's views as well as those of the
other members.
Although the public members of the Commission initially
had less extensive knowledge of the policy issues facing them than
did at least some of the congressional members, as time went on
'1 Even after allowing for a year of delay before the Commission held its first meeting
in July 1965, the time and funds allowed for the Commission's work were handsome
compared to those allowed for earlier commissions. On the other hand, they were not
overly generous when compared with those allotted to other advisory commissions of its
time. The National Water Commission, established in 1968, had a more limited mandate,
but was given five years and $5 million with which to do its work. P.L. No. 90-515, 82
Stat. 868 (1968).
P.L. No. 90-213, 81 Stat. 660 (1967).
" P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
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they began to exert greater influence on the Commission's findings and recommendations. Not only were the public members
able to spend more time at the Commission meetings than were
many of the congressional members, but each of them was also a
swing vote in the sense that each had little previous public commitment to positions on specific issues before the Commission.
Some congressional members found it difficult to separate
their public posture in committee hearings and with constituents
from the private deliberations at the Commission meetings. Others, however, found the Commission meetings to be a congenial
forum for developing statesmanship. One congressional member
made the point clearly when he said during a private session:
As a representative of the fine people of the sovereign state of
,
I must oppose in no uncertain terms this hare-brained proposal,
which would lead to disaster and confusion throughout my state.
But, as a member of the Public Land Law Review Commission, I
applaud the highmindedness of this statesmanlike approach and
urge my fellow members to join me in voting for it."

The consensus nature of the Commission's recommendations
made it possible for congressional members to rise above the need
to satisfy voters in the district on each issue.
C.

The Advisory Council

The Act that created the PLLRC also established an Advisory Council of twenty-five members appointed by the Commission who were to be "representative of the various major citizens'
groups interested in problems . . . of the public lands"57 and
departmental liason officers from major agencies with public land
responsibilities. It also directed the Commission to invite each
Governor to appoint a representative to the Commission.58 The
Act further specified some sixteen categories of interests to be
represented, at a minimum, on the Advisory Council.5 9
Paraphrased from the author's notes from an executive session of the Commission.
P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
NId.
' Id. The Act identified the following major citizen groups to be included among
those represented on the Advisory Council: organizations representative of state and local
government, private organizations working in the field of public land management and
outdoor recreation resources and opportunities, landowners, forestry interests, livestock
interests, mining interests, oil and gas interests, commercial outdoor recreation interests,
industry, education, labor, and public utilities.
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Advisory Council members and Governors' Representatives
met with the Commission at two planning meetings during the
early stages of its work, in a series of eleven public meetings
throughout the country between June 1966, and April 1968, and
at a series of meetings to consider study reports and policy alternatives beginning in November 1968. In addition, written views
of the "official family" were solicited throughout the Commission's life.
The PLLRC Act specified that the Advisory Council was to
"advise and counsel the Commission concerning matters within
[its] jurisdiction"' " and indeed this is what the Advisory Council
did during the Commission's active life.' Advisory Council members, acting as individuals or representing their constituencies,
were generally helpful in providing information and suggesting
directions that might be taken by the Commission.
Beyond this, it was the stated hope of Chairman Aspinall
that, on release of the Commission's report, each member of the
Advisory Council would advise the groups that he represented
that the Commission's recommendations necessarily reflected a
balancing of the various interests and that his constituents had
fared as well as could be expected. It was also hoped that each
member of the Advisory Council would be able to muster the
support of the groups he represented for legislative proposals
growing out of the Commission's recommendations.6 2
It is not at all clear that the members saw themselves as representing the categories
of interests specified in the PLLRC Act, although with some mental gymnastics, at least
one member of the Advisory Council could be fit into each of the specified categories.
Nevertheless, one of the respondents to my letter to Advisory Council members denied
that he represented any groups to the Commission, although he noted considerable knowledge of two of the important categories specified in the Act. A second respondent, in
defining his understanding of his own representation on the Advisory Council, generally
agreed.
P.L. No. 88-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964).
Although the Commission itself resisted efforts of the Advisory Council to organize
as a formal body competing with the Commission, the relationship between them was
cooperative and cordial.
" To determine how well Advisory Council members performed these latter two functions, which they may not have clearly perceived or accepted as appropriate functions, I
wrote seventeen members of the Advisory Council, asking to what extent they had counseled their constituency groups to support the Commission's recommendations and to
what extent they had attempted to muster support for legislative proposals that grew out
of the recommendations. Of the seven responses, most suggested that they, as individuals,
saw their role primarily in terms of advising the Commission and not in counseling consti-
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In the year following publication of the Commission's report,
Chairman Aspinall introduced a bill, H.R. 7211, which incorporated many of the Commission's recommendations and was intended to set the policy framework for other legislation that
would be introduced later. Five days of hearings were held, during
which two former members of the Advisory Council presented
oral statements and two other former members submitted written
statements. One oral statement indicated support for most of the
Commission recommendations, but disagreement with many of
the provisions of H.R. 7211. One written statement indicated
support for the bill as an outgrowth of the Commission's report.
The other two statements did not relate the bill to the Commission's recommendations. 3
This sample for judging the effectiveness of the Advisory
Council following submission of the Commission's report is admittedly limited. Furthermore, a number of Advisory Council
members assisted in Commission-sponsored regional meetings to
acquaint interested groups and people with the recommendations. It appears, however, that hopes that the Advisory Council
members would lobby their constituencies for the Commission's
approach and recommendations once the report had been filed
were not well founded, for Advisory Council members were chosen by members of the Commission, and to some degree there was
an understanding on the part of Advisory Council members that
they were the nominees of particular Commission members. This
undoubtedly affected their perception of responsibilities to the
Commission and the channels through which they could operate
most effectively.
D.

The Staff

Commission staffs are often seen as exerting an undue influence over a commission's work, its recommendations, and its report. There is sometimes tension between a commission and its
tuency groups. Three of the responses indicated that an effort was made to help constituency groups interpret the Commission's recommendations, but none of the three indicated any effort to gain support for them. Only one of the responses indicated efforts were
made to support legislation that grew out of the Commission's report. Responses are
treated confidentially in appreciation for the willingness of Advisory Council members to
participate in the survey.
Public Land Policy Act of 1971: Hearings on H.R. 7211 Before the Subcomm. on
Interiorand InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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staff and a suspicion of commission staffs by interested constituencies of the commission. Two common sources of tension between a commission and its staff are fear by commissions that
some staff members are "overzealous for social reform, with a
corresponding bias emerging in their work" and suspicion in
"formally bipartisan commissions . . . that top staff members
are really very partisan." 4
Fears that staff, however qualified and persuasive its members may be, will dominate a commission are generally not well
founded. While staffs generally write commission reports, members of the commission have a decisive influence on their content
because most commission members are actively involved in the
decisions leading up to the report, they have considerable opportunity to review and comment on report drafts, and they are
generally "strong-minded and intelligent. " 15
It is true to a degree in most commissions that "the staff is
often composed of young, less experienced people who still think
the world can and should be changed; the commissioners know
better." 6 More accurately, however, "[niot only are the views of
commission members often broadened and liberalized [by the
commission experience], but those of the staff are often moderated and tempered."6 7 The very context in which a commission
operates places the commission and its staff in a relationship that
is separate from what is happening in government in general. In
the end, the names of the staff members, as well as those of the
commission, appear on the commission reports. Both are staking
their reputations on having a good report, and neither commissioners nor staff members are well served by divisiveness.
Although the total number of staff of the PLLRC at one time
grew to forty-eight members, the basic work of preparing policy
materials for Commission meetings and writing the final report
was the responsibility of six members of the "senior staff." The
Lipsky & Olson, Riot Commission Politics, in PoLmCs/AME'CA: THE CurriNG EDGE
198 (W. Burnam ed. 1963).
WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 111-15.
" Drew, supra note 16, at 48.
,' WOLANIN, supra note 6, at 117 (footnote omitted). Wolanin also notes that commission staffs by their very background tend "toward a method of problem solving . . . of
making pragmatic adjustments and modifications in the existing programs and approaches." Id. at 101, 117. This is particularly true of senior staff members.
OF CHANGE
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identification of this senior staff during the life of the Commission
was based in part on their skills and knowledge of the issues, but
equally important was their ability to work with the Commission
and express Commission decisions in a way that reflected fairly
the views of the Commission. Partisan party views were not an
issue with respect to the staff of this "formally nonpartisan" commission since the issues that it faced did not divide on party lines
as much as on regional or substantive grounds.
Of more importance to the Advisory Council and other interest groups was the perception that the staff served as a screen
between them and the Commission. The Advisory Council saw its
function as providing advice to the Commission, not to the staff.
Commission members were not always available at and between
meetings, but the staff was available. To some extent, whatever
concerns Advisory Council members may have had regarding the
staff were mitigated by their access to the Commission members
who had championed their nominations to the Advisory Council.
E.

Public Meetings

Some 900 witnesses were heard at the Commission's regional
public meetings held at 16 locations throughout the country and
at most meetings, tours of nearby public lands were arranged for
members of the Commission, staff, Advisory Council, and Governors' Representatives. Little new information was developed at
the public meetings, especially for congressional members of the
Commission who had attended numerous committee hearings on
the same subjects. The meetings, however, served three very useful purposes.
First, they gave interested people in each region a chance to
be heard regarding the problems as they viewed them and to have
a sense of participation in the Commission's work. Second, they
gave the Commission's "official family" a firsthand chance to see
some public land problem situations. But the most important
purpose was the common experience that they built among the
official family. During the decisionmaking stages of its life, when
the Commission met in Washington, there were numerous instances when illustrations were drawn from these experiences together
at the public meetings. This united the Commission on issues on
which it might otherwise have been divided.
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F. Study Program
Thirty-three subjects were studied, mostly under outside
contract, and reports were prepared for the Commission. Most
subject areas included studies of the existing legal structure for
use and management and the resource characteristics and status
of the public lands relative to the subject. By the time the study
program was concluded, seven feet of study reports had been
prepared. "Massive" is a reasonable adjective to describe the
study program. Unfortunately, its usefulness to the Commission
was limited.
To a considerable extent the study program served a political
rather than an analytical purpose. The scope and detail of the
study reports offered convincing evidence that the Commission
had explored every nook and cranny of the public lands and the
laws, policies, regulations, and practices that determine their
administration. They also provided the Commission with organized statements of the law and with resources data that might
otherwise have been difficult to assemble readily when the Commission was writing its report. But there was little in these reports
in the way of ideas to help the Commission and staff in defining
new and better approaches to solving public land issues."
A handful of the study reports were very well done, although
even these had limited analytical value for the Commission.
Some of the reports were at best mediocre. There are two explanations for this occurrence. First, the contractors were asked to
provide only facts without any new ideas, because the Commission did not want itself to be cornered by the forceful presentation
of a particular policy option favored by a contractor.
Second, the size and scope of individual studies, the relatively short time in which they had to be completed, and their
emphasis on simple data collection and organization, as well as
the nature of the government contracting process, made it very
difficult to get a truly outstanding study team to take a contract.
The notable successes among the studies were most often those
U The PLLRC was like many other commissions, most of whose recommendations
"might be considered by many to be old hat and a collection of tired clich~s . .. [but
which nevertheless] represent substantial departures in policy when viewed in the context
of the normal pace of change and the range of line policy alternatives within the federal
government." WoLANiN, supra note 6, at 128.
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with a narrow focus and where the responsibility for the report fell
on one person. The reports that were less well done usually involved both legal and resources materials and were prepared by
a team of assorted private consultants, practicing attorneys, and
academics.
G.

Policy Evaluationand Final Report

Decisions by the Commission on public land policy matters
before it were made at a series of nineteen Commission meetings
during the sixteen months prior to sending the final report to the
printer. Each meeting included one and a half or two days of
executive sessions of the Commission and its senior staff. Reviewing drafts of the Commission's final report was limited to the last
six or seven meetings. Major decisions by the Commission were
made on the basis of "policy evaluation papers"69 prepared and
presented by senior staff for each major subject. When policy
evaluations and decisions for each of the thirty-three subjects
facing the Commission had been completed, there was not only
a foundation for drafting the Commission's report, but there was
a clear understanding of what the report would say and how it
would be said. The policy evaluation process was the linchpin of
the Commission's efforts. Several points with regard to this process are worth noting.
The policy evaluation papers set the agenda for Commission
decisions 0 and preparing them was a function of the staff. The
staff did not influence the Commission by whispering in members' ears or standing between the Commission and its Advisory
Council. It did influence the Commission's report by deciding on
the order in which decisions would be presented to the Commission and by phrasing the questions that had to be answered.
The second point was the decision, reflecting the pragmatic
character of the Commission and its staff, to leave the decisions
0 These policy evaluation papers, typically 40 to 60 pages in length, were structured
by the staff to provide the Commission with a series of "yes or no" questions. The Commission's answers were based on a good deal of discussion among themselves and with the
senior staff and in many cases were shaded to achieve consensus and to recognize the
ambiguities of public land issues. Together, they provided an excellent basis for defining
a set of policy recommendations for each subject. Hagenstein I, supra note 33, describes
in some detail how this process worked for one major recommendation and its corollaries.
70 How the agenda for Commission decisions flavored its recommendations is covered
in another paper. Hagenstein I, supra note 33, especially at 66-75.
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on grand policy designs to the last. If meaningful consensus were
to be achieved, it would come not on grand declarations of policy,
but rather on the details of those policies. The Commission's
report starts with "A Program for the Future," seventeen general
recommendations and four "fundamental premises" on which the
report was based.7 These general recommendations did not
frame, but rather were drawn from, the 137 major recommendations in the report.
Finally, during the concluding series of six or seven Commission meetings, the draft report was read aloud, word by word, by
the Staff Director to the assembled Commission. Changes were
voted on and made by the Commission as the reading progressed.
This procedure, which is often used by commissions, enables supporters of the Commission's report to point out that every member had a full opportunity to read the report and influence its
content. It also focuses attention on the specific content, rather
than the general tone, of the report. If the PLLRC report7" is seen
as uneven, this may well be the result of the decision-by-decision
and page-by-page way in which it was prepared.
H.

The Follow-up

The very facts of independence and limited duration that are
of great value to a commission in pursuing its work are a hindrance when it comes to doing the follow-up that is necessary if
recommendations are to be effected. Commission recommendations and reports are "orphans." 73 They are cast adrift in a sea of
ongoing agencies, programs, and issues that are competing for
attention. The lack of mechanisms for follow-up to commission
recommendations is a matter of some recent concern to the General Accounting Office.74
Following submission of the PLLRC report to the President
and the Congress in June 1970, the Commission had six months
of life remaining. It sponsored a series of regional public meetings
1'PuBac LAND

LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND

1-7 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
72 PLLRC REPORT, supra note 71.
13 WoLAI,
supra note 6, at 157.
71 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BErER FoLLowup SYSTEM NEEDED TO DEAL WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS BY STUDY COMMISSIONS

CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

IN THE

FEsAL

GOVERNMENT, REPORT TO THE

(1975) [hereinafter cited as USGAO].
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to gain the attention of "opinion makers."75 Members of the Commission and its official family were key participants in these
meetings, which also served as forums for debating the recommendations, and some momentary attention for the PLLRC's
recommendations was achieved.
In presenting the Commission's report to President Nixon,
Chairman Aspinall noted "the preparations being made by the
public land management agencies to review the report"7 and
welcomed a recent statement by the Attorney General that the
Justice Department would assume a leadership role in developing
by 1976 "a complete and modern statutory code for . . . our
public land resources."" However, no systematic effort by the
executive branch to implement the Commission's recommendations has occurred and, despite a formal analysis by the Department of Agriculture that was sent to the White House in July
1970, the "executive branch has not designated an action agency
or official to formulate an overall policy or plan.""8 The Bicentennial Year came and went without a sighting of the promised
Department of Justice public lands code.
Although the PLLRC reported to President Nixon, was conceived during President Kennedy's term, and had its public
members appointed by President Johnson, it had no home in the
White House. Its recommendations, many of which were critical
of the way in which the laws were being administered, did not
have the enthusiastic support of the public land management
agencies.
Chairman Aspinall stated at various times that once the
Commission finished its work, the next step would be up to the
Congress. And so, in a way, it was; but six months went by before
the next Congress convened. The Commission had done no drafting of possible legislation. It had not even gone so far as to suggest
how the recommendations might be packaged in legislative proposals. Because of the complexity of the issues and their interrelations, packaging the recommendations was a matter of substance.
Finally, some three months after the ninety-second Congress con+' PLLRC REPORT, supra note 71, at 307.
Public Land Law Review Commission, Press Release, June 23, 1970.
"Id.

,' USGAO, supra note 74, at 5.
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vened and nine months after the Commission's report had been
filed, H.R. 7211, a bill that put a number of Commission recommendations in a cumbersome package, was introduced by Chairman Aspinall. The bill in its entirety had a constituency of one,
Chairman Aspinall7 and he was never able to bring H.R. 7211
to a floor vote. 0 Faced with its own problems of timing, elections,
and politics, the Congress is not the place to center responsibility
for follow-up.8 '
Lack of a follow-up mechanism for the PLLRC does not
mean that the Commission's recommendations have not had2
some impact. The Bureau of Land Management Organic Act

enacted during the ninety-fourth Congress contains much that
appeared in the PLLRC report and in H.R. 7211. The Joint
Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission for Alaska historically is tied to the Commission's report. Other recommendations
have appeared in legislation and administrative orders. To attribute these actions solely to the persuasiveness of the Commission's
report and the soundness of its ideas would be exaggeration, but
there can be no doubt that the terms of the dialogue leading up
to these actions were influenced by the PLLRC.
IV. ARE COMMISSIONS A VIABLE DEVICE FOR INSTIGATING CHANGE?
A. Commission Form
Form must follow function, and the form of advisory commissions should follow the purposes for which they are established.s8
" Even that constituency lost its power when Chairman Aspinall was defeated in a
primary election toward the end of the 92d Congress.
Hagenstein, Changing an Anachronism: Congress and the GeneralMining Law of
1872, 13 NAT. REsOURCES J. 480, 492 (1973).
11 By contrast, following publication of the report of the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, a Citizens' Committee on the ORRRC report was established, following a model provided by the follow-up to the Hoover Commissions on government organization. POPPER, supra note 6, at 47. Funds were provided through Laurance
S. Rockefeller, who had been Chairman of ORRRC, and a small full-time staff was hired.
The Citizens' Committee is believed by many to have had a significant effect in getting
the ORRRC recommendations put into law.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (West Supp. 1977).
For example, the Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources of 195961, in effect a congressional commission, had a "considerable influence" on national water
policies. Schad, An Analysis of the Work of the Senate Select Committee on National
Water Resources, 1959-1961, 2 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 226, 247 (1962). An alternative suggestion is that the appropriate client for advisory commissions is "the public" and not the
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In a broad sense, the function of an advisory commission as a
policy analyst is two-fold: It must analyze and it must promote
its results in a political context. If the results are to be effected
through presidential action, including in many cases the development and submission of legislation, a presidential commission is
a suitable approach. Where the problems are seen as largely
within the purview of Congress, a legislative commission may be
more appropriate. The joint legislative-executive form of the
PLLRC was appropriate for the issues that it faced, which penetrated deeply into the matter of the appropriate separation of
legislative and executive responsibilities.
There seems to be a common, but unfounded, presumption
that having members of Congress on a commission will help pave
the way for any legislative proposals that may ensue. For one
thing, being party to a commission's report does not bind a member to support its recommendations. 4 In addition, members of
Congress face the realities of change. Although only one of the
thirteen congressional members of the Commission failed to serve
in the Congress following release of the Commission's report, six
more, including the Chairman, had dropped by the wayside in the
next Congress, the ninety-third. Today, only two members of the
PLLRC, the Chairmen of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee, remain in Congress.
Having congressional experience and viewpoints on a commission, on the other hand, is valuable. The congressional members initially brought a better understanding of public land issues
to the PLLRC deliberations than did the public members. But
the fact that they were elected officials in itself added little to the
credibility of the Commission's report and, as noted above, 5 did
little in the end to smooth the path of its recommendations
through the Congress.
President who created the commission. Therefore, commissions should be a joint responsibility of the President, the Congress, and even the Supreme Court, and serve much as the
royal commissions in England. POPPER, supra note 6, at 63. The PLLRC was a joint
legislative-executive advisory commission which saw its client not as the public, but as
the institutions of the Congress and the Presidency.
" Within 48 hours of the release of the PLLRC report, one of the Commission's
influential congressional members denounced the report roundly and disassociated himself from some of its major recommendations.
See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
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The idea that having presidential appointees on a largely
congressional commission would somehow tie the executive
branch to the Commission's recommendations also seems to have
been ill-founded. Even if the Nixon administration, to which the
PLLRC reported in 1970, had been interested in the recommendations of a commission with Johnson appointees, it is not likely
that it would have believed itself committed to recommendations
that favored greater congressional control over public lands.
Administrative agencies have an increasingly national constituency whose interests are at odds with those of the productionoriented constituency of the congressional committee members.M
That the administrative agencies should change their views because of the recommendations of a handful of presidential appointees on a largely congressional commission in the absence of
compelling reasons is not plausible.
B.

Commission Membership and Operation

Commission members are chosen because of their competency and knowledge of issues facing the commission, their perceived ability to represent important constituencies, and their
public visibility for adding to the report's credibility. Membership should also be balanced in terms of geography, constituencies, and viewpoints. The critical choice, though, is that of the
chairman. Those who never see a commisson's report will have a
perception of its contents consistent with their understanding of
his views.
The membership of the PLLRC met the above criteria. It was
bipartisan; the Senate and House members were equally divided
between the majority and minority and were the senior members
of the two Interior and Insular Affairs Committees. As such, they
were knowledgeable about public land matters and were, with
three exceptions, from western public land states. Three of the
presidential appointees, all of whom could be described as conservationists, were from the East; the other three, one of whom
generally voted with the conservationists, were from the West.
They included a state official, a local official, a professional resource manager, a national conservation figure, a practicing atm See text following note 46 supra.
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torney, and a professor, and one was a Republican-all together
a collection typical of advisory commissions.
Chairman Aspinall was the dominant influence on the Commission for two reasons, neither of which was expressed in an
overt attempt to dominate.8 7 His knowledge of the issues, gained
through eleven terms in the Congress, some six of which were as
Chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
was more extensive and detailed than that of any other commissioner. The second reason is that the Chairman, in very typical
congressional fashion, was allowed to dominate simply because
he was Chairman. In the frenetic atmosphere of the Congress,
chairmen are assigned tasks and then allowed to pursue them
much as they see fit.
Among congressional members of the PLLRC, there seemed
to be two attitudes. For several, especially those who had other
significant responsibilities, the attitude was one of "The Commission is Wayne's baby and I am not going to interfere." If there
were doubts about the Commission's direction, the tendency was
one of not bucking the Chairman in the Commission, but waiting
until the issues came out in the Congress.8 8 As for those who were
not holding their fire for later, they appeared to be willing to
follow the Chairman's lead in any case.
Whenever members of Congress also serve on advisory commissions, it is probably unrealistic to expect that they will act
much differently or follow a different set of rules than in their
roles in the Congress. If this is the case, as the example of the
PLLRC seems to suggest, one might well ask if the Congress
should not appoint public members to represent it on joint
legislative-executive commissions, just as presidential appointees
are drawn from the public. 9 Given the overloaded schedule of
11Chairman Aspinall stated his position or voted on issues in only the rare instances
when the other members were evenly divided.
0 This is suggested in part by the fact that only one congressional member of the
Commission joined with three of the six presidential appointees in the only significant
dissent filed with the Commission's report.
0 Popper, in his favored scheme of having national advisory commissions that report
to the public, specifically suggests that each branch appoint members, "none of whom
would come from the executive, legislative, or judicial branches." POPPER, supra note 6,
at 64.
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most members of Congress, this approach would surely have some
advantages, as well as some disadvantages.
The fact is that presidents have done rather well in choosing
commission members from their national constituency. Blue ribbon commissions typically have blue ribbon members and the
PLLRC was no exception. Presidential appointees to commissions are drawn from a "distinctively national elite" and tend to
be cosmopolitan, rather than parochial, in viewpoint. 0 They
usually have achieved national recognition and view themselves
as representing national viewpoints.
Members of Congress, on the other hand, represent largely
local constituencies and bring a different, and useful, perspective
to commissions such as the PLLRC. One might well question
whether the Congress, if asked to make public appointees to
legislative-executive commissions, would be able to do as well as
the President in making appointments from a national constituency or to improve on its own members in representing local
constituencies.
C.

Timing and Policy Context

Advisory commissions do have a finite life span, which can
have important implications. In fact, as noted earlier, some commissions are established to study issues with the hope that the
issue will simply evaporate in the meantime, and, for them, passage of time is necessary."
Beyond the buying of time, the life span of commissions is
important in relation to the policy context within which the commission exists. This is well illustrated by the PLLRC. Two policy
matters dominated the PLLRC work and report. One was
whether the nation had reached the point where broad disposal
of federal lands no longer served a valid national purpose. The
other matter was the nature of the management system that
should govern the use of federal lands. This was the context
within which the Commission was established and within which
it saw its report. Yet, in the six years between passage of the law
creating the Commission and release of its report, there was a
major change in the policy context within which the PLLRC rec"
"

Derthick, supra note 3, at 631.
See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
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ommendations were to be debated. The implications of this
change were not fully recognized by the Commission, nor in all
likelihood could it have done much about it if they had been
recognized.
This change was dramatized by Earth Day and institutionalized by the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA), 2 both in early 1970. Obviously, the Commission
was not unaware of these occurences, and its report, released
some two months after Earth Day, has its share of references to
environmental quality and ecological imperatives. 3 But this was
not enough. The report, with its emphasis on resources management and land use allocations, was met with opposition by an
environmentalist constituency that to a large extent did not even
exist in 1964.
Prefacing the first substantive chapter in the Commission's
report, a chapter on planning future land uses, is a picture of two
government land managers comparing a broad expanse of public
lands with a planning map spread out on the rocks in front of
them. Had the Commission fully understood the policy context
in which the report was being released, this picture might better
have been one of two officials with badges driving in a stake with
a sign that read, "Don't pollute! Violators will be prosecuted!"
The context for debating the report was one where regulation was
seen as a substitute for management, and the Commission had
opted for management. In the broad history of public land policies, six years is not long, but these particular six years appear
to have coincided with the threshold of major changes in the way
these policies were to be viewed.
D. A Commission's Impact
Perhaps it is idle to speculate on the impact the PLLRC
report may have had if the timing had been different, if the Commission membership or staff had been different, if the Commission's process for making decisions had been different, or indeed
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
Caldwell, Policy, Planning,and Administration,in NATURAL RESOURCES COUNCIL OF
AMERICA, WHAT'S AHEAD FOR OUR PuBLIc LANDs 116-17 (H. Pyles ed. 1970). Caldwell, in
this review of the PLLRC report, notes that the report's acceptance of the need for including environmental considerations in public land decisions would probably not have been
as strong if the report had been issued in 1968.
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if its recommendations had been different. What is clear, however, is that the Commission's report, instead of framing the debate over public land policies since its release, has provided only
some of the necessary pieces of the framework.
The unique contribution of an advisory commission to problems of government policy and administration is its perspective.
In the case of the PLLRC, three aspects of its perspective were
derived from its temporary, detached, and joint legislativeexecutive character.
First, the PLLRC was concerned with the whole range of
federal public lands. In the executive branch, responsibilities for
public lands are split among four major bureaus in two departments, as well as several other agencies with lesser responsibilities. In the Congress, legislative responsibilities are split among
at least three committees in each house. An advisory commission
was uniquely able to bridge these divisions in considering a unified policy framework. That there is continuing resistance within
both the executive branch and the Congress to such a unified view
does not deny its soundness.
Second, the historical perspective of the PLLRC, as one of
four public land commissions in the past 100 years, was broader
than that characteristic of most internal or congressional policy
reviews. Long-range impacts of possible policy changes were developed in addition to the usual short-run considerations.
Third, the Commission was by its very form well placed to
consider and define the appropriate balance between legislative
and executive responsibilities, which was the goal established in
Congressman Aspinall's letter to President Kennedy and the
President's response some two years before passage of the Act
creating the PLLRC. That the Commission worked hard on this
issue, which permeated all of its discussions and decisions, and
yet failed in achieving this goal does not detract from the potential usefulness of a joint legislative-executive commission. Where
Congress and the President have equivalent interests in finding
a solution to a public policy problem, the joint commission is a
logical form; but where only one party sees the joint commission
as a means of finding a solution, the results are almost sure to be
limited.
Providing a different perspective than that provided by other
government institutions and supporting policy proposals from
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this perspective with well-reasoned and well-documented arguments is the chief role of advisory commissions. It is one in which
they do not always perform perfectly, but their record is much
better than is often claimed.

COMMENTS ON "COMMISSIONS AND PUBLIC LAND
POLICIES: SETTING THE STAGE FOR CHANGE"

By DENNIS A. RAPP*
"The Public Land Law Review Commission was not the
President's idea in the first place."' This observation by Mr. Hagenstein distinguishes the political origins of the Public Land Law
Review Commission (PLLRC) from most of the other types of
commissions he explores in his survey of commissions as the tools
of presidential politics. Because it was a congressional idea, the
success or failure of the PLLRC cannot properly be judged by the
motives behind a presidential initiative to create commissions for
various purposes.
The absence of strong presidential interest in a comprehensive study of public land policy in 1964 was not surprising. There
was no major political issue of national importance concerning
the public lands which demanded presidential leadership in its
resolution. Other problems commanded White House attention.
The Viet Nam war had escalated, and a new set of social problems was being launched under the Great Society banner. The
most recent event concerning the public lands that had attracted
national attention was the enactment of the Wilderness Act of
1964:2 the latest step in the continuing erosion of economic interests' access to public land resources. The Wilderness Act particularly threatened timber and mining interests in public lands.
Neither the President then in the White House nor the agencies of the executive branch responsible for the administration of
the public lands were especially enthusiastic about the prospects
of joining in a thoroughgoing review of public land policy by a
congressionally-dominated Commission, among whose announced goals was redress of Congress' weak legal and political
power over public lands decisions involving assignments of the
use of the land and its resources. Much the same attitudes and
priorities existed at the White House and in the land management agencies when the Commission reported in the summer of
*
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964).
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1970. Viet Nam was the major international and domestic political issue that summer. No one downtown really wanted to start
a major legislative effort to rewrite public land policy based on
the Commission's report, especially when, as the Commission's
studies made clear, the executive branch was holding all the
cards to administer the public lands its own way-well, almost
all the cards.
The Department of the Interior wanted a statutory pronouncement that would have made clear that the remaining
public domain holdings were to be retained and managed, and
further, wanted to remove the uncertainties of the applicability
of disposal policies of the nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries still on the statute books. The Forest Service needed
little, in its opinion, to augment the broadly written statutory
powers it already possessed than gave it virtually limitless discretion in the way it chose to withhold or distribute the resources
of the National Forests. Both agencies wanted an end to the
disengaging and disruptive effect of the self-operating Mining
Law' on land management programs under agency administration. No one in the executive branch wanted any basic redirection
of the national parks and federal wildlife refuge-game range systems.
But none of these issues were important enough to convince
the White House and the land managing agencies that they had
to create a commission to come to terms with Congress on their
resolution. Actually, the President's signature on the statute creating the Public Land Law Review Commission was the fulfillment of a political commitment made by President Kennedy in
exchange for delivery by Congress, or more specifically by the
Chairman of the House Interior Committee, of the Wilderness
Act of 1964. That was all there was to it as far as the White House
was concerned.
If presidential commissions were created to lend blue ribbon
prestige (and therefore acceptability) to the resolution of public
policy issues too hot or too complicated for a President to sponsor
from within the normal institutions of the executive branch, the
Public Land Law Review Commission was created to assure, in
the minds of some members of Congress, congressional domina3 30 U.S.C. §§ 621-625 (1955).

1977

COMMISSIONS

tion of its recommendations, with the intention of co-opting the
President by association with the Commission's presidential appointees.
Western regional and interest-group political power associated with purely economic interest in and control over the public lands has been waning for 100 years. It represents a regionalism destined to come out second best in Washington, where federal policymaking has and will probably always favor the conservation and public use interests in the public lands-recreation,
preservation, and the resources for "all the people"-an interest
inherently identified as "national" in the minds of both the executive and the nonpartisan majority in Congress.
The Public Land Law Review Commission was a last attempt, at least in the minds of both its congressional architects
and some of their sympathizers downtown, to reestablish some
type of equilibrium. It failed in this purpose.
If Congress wanted to recapture power in public land decisionmaking, the time and money may have been better spent on
a singular congressional effort aimed at producing well-written
legislation to return to Congress a portion of the discretionary
power for public land policymaking handed to the executive
branch for decades by the very same Congress that now wanted
it back. As Mr. Hagenstein points out, the Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources was a congressional commission only4 and achieved a significant measure of success, indicated by the number of its recommendations and policy precepts
that became federal water policy. Even if the PLLRC effort had
been confined to the east end of Pennsylvania Avenue, any
chance that recapture legislation, even if it succeeded in getting
through both Houses of Congress, would escape a veto at the
other end of town was slim. No contemporary President-neither
a Great Society Democrat nor a Law and Order Republican-is
interested in relinquishing executive power.
So much for one test of the PLLRC's success. If one uses only
the test of its architects' initial motives and their actions that
have ensued in the nearly seven years since it filed its report, then
PLLRC was a complete failure, except perhaps to illustrate to
Hagenstein, supra note 1.
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Congress the futility of attempting to capture the Executive by
way of a joint commission.
There is another test, however, of the success of PLLRC.
That is the obvious test of the efficacy of its product-its report
and its recommendations for change in public lands policies. Did
the Commission, in its recommendations, really offer a sound
blueprint for modernization of the policies and programs that
should control the disposal, management, and administration of
the public lands in the decades ahead? Will the public lands
resources best serve the needs of both the nation as a whole and
the regions in which they lie if they are managed and administered and their resources used under the principles espoused by
the Commission? If the answers are yes, then why haven't the
Commission's proposals been written into law-nearly seven
years after it issued its report?
Mr. Hagenstein suggests some of the answers to the last
question: no organized program for a follow-through after the
report was issued, and the rapid loss of elected offices of the
Congressional Commission members, including Chairman Aspinall, within a few years after the Commission's work was completed. But within the last two years, a number of the Commission's recommendations on controversial issues have been enacted into law. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 19761 embraced the spirit and much of the substance of the
Commission's report in establishing the policy foundations for a
retention and management program for the residual unreserved
public domain. The 1976 Act also resolved the tenure uncertainties that have prevailed during more than forty years since enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act.'
The settlement laws have been repealed. Congress has made
provision for moving toward the kind of withdrawal review program recommended by the Commission. A program for comprehensive public land planning, including a requirement for
federal-state planning coordination, has been enacted into law.
Congress took a step in the direction of modernizing the public
land lien tax payment policies along the lines recommended by
the Commission. Mining in the national parks has been prohibPub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976).
6 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 485, 1171 (1934).
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ited by law, again as the Commission recommended. Although no
action has been taken by Congress to change the Mining Law,' it
should be remembered that the Commission was not unanimous
in its conclusions for needed reform of this controversial law. Not
all of the above-mentioned enactments have adopted the Commission's recommendations in precisely the form suggested by
the Commission, but the principles of the Commission's proposals have been substantially adopted by these new statutes.
While these moves to modify public land policy followed a
release of the Commission's report by more than five years, there
is no doubt that the Commission's work and proposals have had
a major influence on their shape and substance. Thus the blueprint is becoming structure; its enactment is proof of its political
acceptability; and the changes in policy that they constitute are
unquestionably improvements more suited to the needs of today's
culture than the policy structure displaced.
Most of the policy and program changes enacted into law
extend the erosion of congressional power, strengthen the hand of
the executive and the management agencies, and weaken the
opportunities for exclusive economic capture of public lands resources. While most of the congressional members of the Commission supported the adoption of these policy recommendations
by the Commission, only two members were still in Congress
when the policies were enacted into law. One wonders whether
this much progress would have been realized if all the original
congressional members of the Commission were still members of
Congress and members of the Interior Committees.
Only time will tell how much more of the Commission's blueprint will be adopted as policy structure for the public lands. The
pattern of delay and then recent gradual adoption of some of its
proposals may lead one to observe, first, that the motives of the
Commission's architects and the principal features of its final
product did not converge; second, that although the Commission's report does offer a politically acceptable blueprint for the
modernization of public land policy, it had little chance for enactment so long as key congressional members of the Commission
remained in power in Congress after the Commission's report was
' 30 U.S.C. §§ 621-625 (1955).
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completed and released; and third, that service by members of
Congress on joint congressional-presidential commissions brings
out the best of their statesmanship in perceiving and adopting the
shape of policies that serve all of society best.

AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE

PLLRC:

COMMENTS AND

SUGGESTIONS
By PHILIP H.
I.

HOFF*

THE VERMONT STATE COMMISSION STRUCTURE

I entered the governorship of Vermont in 1963 as the first
Democrat to serve in that office in 109 years, following a prolonged period of relative inactivity on the part of state government. Our administration made wholesale use of "informative"
advisory commissions throughout our six years in office. Within
a year we had almost one thousand people studying various subjects, and I think it safe to say that these commissions laid the
groundwork for the great bulk of Vermont governmental action
from that day to the present.
Looking back, it would have been most helpful if we had had
the benefit of Perry Hagenstein's thorough review of the limited
literature available on advisory commissions.
While the purposes of each of the commissions varied, generally they fell into two types. The first involved the examination
of subject matters where we knew what we wanted to do but
where it was important to build a body of public support as a
prelude to legislative action.
The selection of the membership of these commissions, and
particularly the chairman, was vital. It was essential that the
commission members shared my views.
The second type of commission involved subject matters
where we felt action probably was necessary but where we were
not sure of either the exact nature of the problem or its solution.
Here we simply named the most informed and respected people
available in the field and let the chips fall.
Our aims were: (1) To focus public attention on understanding the problem; (2) to build a substantial body of public support
for the recommendations of the commission; and (3) through (1)
and (2) above, to maximize public pressure on the legislature to
act. To this end the following steps were considered essential:
* Director, Vermont Children's Aid Society and Greater Burlington Industrial Corporation; currently in private practice.
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(1) A major press conference with the Governor was held at the
time the commission members were named and its mission defined.
(2) The commissions were encouraged to hold public meetings
and to elicit broad participation at all stages from the public at
large.
(3) Upon completion of the commission's report and recommendations, a second major press conference was held with the Governor.
(4) Follow up citizen conferences were held throughout the
state.
(5) Copies of the commission's report and recommendations
were widely disseminated.
(6) All major recommendations deemed worthwhile were placed.
in legislative forms and introduced at the next session of the legislature.
(7) A person within the administration was charged with the
responsibility of keeping in touch with the commission during the
course of its work and with following through on its recommendations and the legislation that followed.

II.

THE HAGENSTEIN PAPER

It is important to understand the total dominance of the
Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) by its chairman,
Congressman Aspinall. The Commission was, after all, his brain
child. While the Commission went through the motions of selection of the chairman, staff selections, breakdown of the areas to
be studied, and selection of the persons or groups to submit studies of particular areas, the fact is that all of this was done under
the immediate supervision of the Chairman. The decision, for
example, not to permit a minority report was the Chairman's
alone and was never submitted to the Commission as a whole
except perhaps on a pro forma basis.
I once made the suggestion that there be made available to
the public members one staff person. For a public member like
myself, this was essential. As an Easterner with virtually no background on the complex issues involved and with virtually no time
to read the voluminous studies involved, there was no way that I
could adequately be informed, or make thoroughly thoughtthrough decisions. The Chairman dismissed this suggestion out
of hand. Lastly, I made the suggestion that the entire report be
incorporated into legislation. I had a particular reason for suggesting this as will be seen in the next paragraph. This too was
dismissed by the Chairman.
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The latter suggestion was particularly important to me.
From the beginning it was apparent that the very small number
of us who had strong convictions about the environmental and
conservation aspects of the study were in an impossible position.
If we fought on every issue we would soon lose credibility and
influence altogether. The alternative was to chip away here and
there. In the end we obtained substantial concessions which made
the final report palatable.
One of the biggest problems was that unless the entire report
was incorporated in legislative form, individual congressional
members would simply pick off those portions of the report they
deemed desirable, leaving out those portions of the report deemed
essential by the small cadre of environmentalists. Essentially this
is what happened, leaving no basis for support of this legislation
on the part of the environmentalists.
I thus strongly disagree with Perry Hagenstein's assertions
that the recommendations of the Commission represented a
broadly agreeable consensus. The consensus on my part at least
was a consensus forced upon me if I was to maintain any degree
of credibility and to exercise any influence on the recommendations of the Commission. I am not a devotee of consensus. Consensus is an invitation to watering down a report to such a degree
that it loses both direction and clarity.
Several other comments by Perry Hagenstein are worthy of
note. While the Commission was a joint legislative-executive advisory commission, it is very clear that in fact it was an internal
congressional committee and operated that way. In a very real
sense the public members were so much excess baggage designed
to give the impression that the public was represented. In no
sense did the Commission make a genuine attempt to educate the
public, and the net result was deep-seated suspicion and distrust
of the Commission and its reports by conservationists, naturalists, and environmentalists.
Mr. Hagenstein refers to the report as an orphan. I agree. It
built no body of public support, and very little was done in the
way of follow through. The report remains an orphan today.
One last point of Mr. Hagenstein's paper deserves comment.
Mr. Hagenstein notes that the law creating the Commission was
very broad indeed in terms of its mandate. He then goes on to say
that two matters dominated the work and the report of the
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PLLRC. "One was whether the nation had reached the point
where broad disposal of federal lands no longer served a valid
national purpose. The other was the nature of the management
system that should govern the use of federal lands."
From my point of view these two matters were what really
lay behind the creation of the PLLRC. No matter what the language of the Act states, I never lost focus that the title was not
the Public Land Policy Commission but the Public Land Law
Review Commission.
Happily, for me at least, I believe the report established once
and for all that the wholesale or broad disposal of federal lands
is over. With respect to the management system that should'govern the use of federal lands, hopefully the Commission's report
will have its impact and will lead to reforms that are genuinely
needed.
III. "INFORMATIVE" ADVISORY COMMISSIONS: THE FAILURE OF THE
PLLRC
I am of the opinion that "informative" advisory commissions, properly set up and carried through, have great value.
Involving and informing the public, including the building of a
body of public support, is as important as the recommendations
themselves. It is here that I think the PLLRC failed.
It failed in the first instance because of the makeup of the
Commission itself. There is a misconception about public lands,
widely held in the thirteen western states, plus Alaska, that public lands are virtually their exclusive domain. The makeup of the
Commission reflected this viewpoint.
There is a very strong feeling in the so-called nonpublic land
states that public lands, wherever located, belong to the people
of this country and should be treated as such. Unfortunately, the
public in the nonpublic land states are poorly informed as to the
character of these public lands and the special impact that they
have on public land states. It is essential that this level of understanding be raised. Broader representation from nonpublic land
states would have helped considerably.
The PLLRC failed because of the relatively small number of
public meetings held in various parts of the country. It must be
pointed out that the work of the Commission was voluminous.
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Understanding of its work on the part of the public was minuscule.
The PLLRC failed because of the failure to include more
conservationists and environmentalists. Perry Hagenstein suggests that the growth of the environmental movement could not
have been foreseen. I tend to disagree, but, even if it could not
have been foreseen, clearly it became evident during the course
of the Commission's work and the Commission could have accommodated it.
The failure to simultaneously introduce legislation incorporating the Commission's report was also a factor in the PLLRC's
lack of success.
Lastly was the failure to follow through. No public support
was mobilized. The press had little understanding of public
lands. The Commission did little to facilitate communication to
assist the press in understanding public land problems. Without
a body of understanding rallying support from the public, the
political process never received the impetus to deal with these
complex public land problems. As a result, little of the Commission's work has found its way into legislation.
A follow-up mechanism is desperately needed. The capacity
and ability exists in this room to see that this report comes to
fruition. Perhaps this meeting can be the beginning. The problems of our public lands are too important to remain dormant.

EPILOGUE
SEVEN YEARS LATER

By

FRED SMITH*

The Public Land Law Review Commission Revisited has historic significance in several aspects. It sets some remarkable precedents.
In the first place, what other federal commission has ever
before reunited, under its own steam, seven years after its official
demise? Normally, nothing in our democratic experience dies so
permanent a death as a commission that has served its term,
whether or not it has served its purpose. Only its report remains,
diligently catalogued and stuck away on a shelf in the Library of
Congress, a symbolic headstone which might as handily be inscribed, "Here lie the remnants of months of hearings, meetings,
discussions, and possibly hopes of citizens in pursuit of conclusions. May they rest in peace." And usually they do.
In the second place, what chairman of a defunct commission,
especially one who is no longer in a position to consider political
favors, could reassemble a large majority of his associates and
lure them, at their own expense, over a weekend, to Denver, Colorado, to listen to papers describing (a) the relatively few constructive legislative results of the Commission, and (b) the misapplication by subsequent legislatures of constructive suggestions, and
(c) the futility of attempting to get anything constructive done in
a popular climate of destructive determination on all fronts?
The only possible answer, of course, is devotion to the chairman as an individual, which fortunately survived his departure
as a potent politician. This reflects credit not only upon him, but
upon the two dozen or more who came to the reunion, most of
whom were anxious also to resuscitate old friendships made during the adventure. Jimmy the Greek would have given long odds
on the capacity of normal adult people to remember and cherish
their leader and associates for seven long and troubled years.
From all well publicized reports on the progress of the Welfare State, there is something distinctly antediluvian and even
un-American about it all.
*
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In the third place, how many times in the past had the
commissioners and advisory committee members really cared a
great deal about how the whole thing came out? As Perry
Hagenstein pointed out in his scholarly study of commissions,
they are most often created directly or indirectly for publicity or
political purposes, and accordingly are composed of impressive
and decorative names, and staffed by bureaucratic minions who
know which flags to wave and when. They deserve the fate they
usually earn.
The Public Land Law Review Commission set out on a serious task, attacked it seriously, its Commissioners and Advisory
Committee took its work seriously, and if it is to be criticized at
all, it is because it stopped when it was finished. It might profitably have evolved into a band of revolutionists determined to see
that its recommendations were made difficult for Congress-and
perhaps federal agencies with fish of their own to fry-to duck.
At any rate, we all know where our recommendations stand
as of April, 1977. We have the satisfaction of knowing that we had
some influence, even though it was used too sparingly. We don't
think we wasted our time, or effort, or hopes. We created a family
of sorts, and proved that people of widely differing interests and
background can work together in the common interest. This in
itself is more than enough recompense for going through the exercise.
What good we may have done is a worthy bonus.

